"'I SPEAK OF FIERCELY CONTESTED THINGS:'" WILLIAM CARLOS WILLIAMS, DEMOCRACY, AND THE AESTHETICS OF A "USABLE PAST" by Jessar, Kevin L
ABSTRACT
Title of Dissertation: “'I SPEAK OF FIERCELY CONTESTED 
THINGS:'” WILLIAM CARLOS WILLIAMS, 
DEMOCRACY, AND THE AESTHETICS OF A 
“USABLE PAST”
Kevin L. Jessar, Doctor of Philosophy, 2004.
Dissertation Directed By: Professor Elizabeth B. Loizeaux
Department of English
Exploring Williams in relation to progressive historians and literary 
critics of the 1910s and 1920s, this study places the poet in debates on 
modernist poetics, social change, and the uses of history, and builds on 
outstanding work of recent critics who explore Williams’ writing as a defense 
of democratic principles in an illiberal age.  Williams' “poem including history” 
furthered a progressive social agenda by moving beyond the economic 
determinism of his progressive peers to a kind of emotional determinism, 
what I call an "affective economics." 
Williams historicized adaptation and an affective stance of extreme 
receptivity to the “moment,” as his vision of the “usable past.”  There was no 
period of uncorrupted grace but only the ever-continuing necessity of 
adapting to the present moment, the often-feminized “primary.”  Where Eliot 
envisioned the "present moment of the past," Williams espied a repeating 
impregnating moment of “contact” and “touch” -- an historical, ever-recurring 
present.  Democratic renewal and contact with the primary were reinforced 
by the ability of individuals to decide for themselves without “intermediate 
authority,” to respond to their moment.
Williams' stylistics in Paterson and In the American Grain encoded a 
democratic ethos by compelling readers to exercise individual prerogative 
jeopardized by corporate power, fascism, and communism.  His aesthetic 
animated the subject position of reader and writer, making the reader write 
his or her own imaginative history, based, paradoxically, on inhabiting the 
subject position of representative figures of the past and of the poet himself 
as they confronted the primary and a secondary culture that would suppress 
it.  Williams thus structured a "participatory aesthetic" to engage the reader in 
the historical dialectic of “contact” and fearful “withdrawal.”  In Paterson this 
dialectic was particularly refracted through fearful, dissonant encounters with 
contemporary female figures orienting us back to the “primary.“
Believing writers were a “passionate regenerative force” for society, 
Williams hoped his "new line[s]" would create "new mind[s]."  He wanted to 
release "personality," the "personal" element, that writers of imaginative 
histories argued was endangered in a distinctly anti-liberal age and make 
readers define for themselves a relation to the primary through a "usable 
past."
“'I SPEAK OF FIERCELY CONTESTED THINGS:'”
WILLIAM CARLOS WILLIAMS, DEMOCRACY,
AND THE AESTHETICS
OF A “USABLE PAST”
by
Kevin L. Jessar
Dissertation submitted to the Faculty of the Graduate School of
University of Maryland, College Park in partial fulfillment 














To Alec Dean, Olivia Rae, and Ryan Matthew with greatest love:  May you 
find your own joys in the “golden mean between the seasonal extremes.”
But yield who will to their separation,
My object in living is to unite
My avocation and my vocation
As my two eyes make one in sight.
Only where love and need are one,
And the work is play for mortal stakes,
Is the deed ever really done
For Heaven and the future’s sakes.
      (Robert Frost)
To Nancy, my richest, deepest love and friend.  This would not have been 
possible without your love, support, and patience.
“none
Gives motion to perfection more serene
Than yours, out of imperfections wrought,




Richard Wilbur says that “there is no straight way of approaching it,” 
but I will try my best to recognize the many people who have been so 
generous to me.
I want to thank Professor Elizabeth Loizeaux for her intellectual 
integrity, warmth, and enthusiasm for my project.  This study would not have 
been realized in its current form without her honesty and her prodding me to 
develop and pursue the implications of my ideas.  
I want to thank Professor David Wyatt.  I appreciate how over those 
four consecutive Tuesday afternoons in May 2002, and well beyond, he 
pushed me to define myself as I defined my project, to think in big terms as 
he does, and to have confidence in my own voice and views.  
I want to thank Professor Jackson Bryer, a special friend and mentor 
to me for over a decade, for his humor and friendship.  His practical wisdom 
and genuine care have been invaluable aids and sources of reassurance to 
me as I have navigated through graduate studies.
I want to thank Professor Peter Mallios and Professor James Gilbert 
for graciously agreeing to participate in the dissertation committee.  I 
appreciate Professor Gilbert’s helping me four years ago at the start of this 
project and his agreeing to join us at its conclusion.  
No thanks could be complete without recognizing family and friends 
whose love and support has meant much over the years.  My parents have 
given me a life-long gift of a love of learning (augmented by their wisdom in 
iv
identifying Temple Reading Lab, which enabled me to follow that love).  My 
mother-in law and father-in-law have patiently listened to my academic 
perseverations, and the latter’s solid advice has helped me cut through the 
fog and keep focused on the end, the necessary abandonment.  My sister-
in-law has been supportive throughout the dissertation process. 
I want extend special thanks as well to Patricia Herron for her 
valuable assistance as research librarian at McKeldin and to Manju Suri in 
the English Department, who correctly and kindly answered so many 
questions over so many years.   
I want to remember in loving memory Emmanual Kramer, Lil Cohen, 
Mae Warwick, Sophie Savits, Fred Jessar, Joe Lewis, and Calvin Bay.  
Finally, I want to thank as well Ray Razzi, Henry Eisner, S.K. Kolansky, and 
my friends (new and old).  You have all shaped me and, at critical points, 





Chapter I:  “[T]he poem is a social instrument:” William Carlos 
Williams, Social Change, and the Modernist “Poem 
Including History” ………………………………………….…………………1
Chapter II: A “revloution [sic] in thought with writing as the fulcrum:” 
The Progressive Critique, "Economic Democracy," and the 
Reversal of Puritan Scarcity  …………………………………..………….51
Chapter III: “Men intact – with all their senses waking:” Affective 
Economics, Fear, and Representative New World 
Voluptuaries …….………………….……………………………………….91
Chapter IV: Without “intermediate authority:” The Primary, the 
Democratic and Williams’ Participatory Aesthetics ……………..…….140
Chapter V:  "[L]ove/ bitterly contesting:" Dissonance, 
Identification, and Paterson's Women…..………………………...…….181
Chapter VI:  Conclusion …………………………………………………..248
Works Cited ……………………………………………………..……..…..256
1
Chapter I:  “[T]he poem is a social instrument:” 
William Carlos Williams, Social Change, 
and the Modernist 
“Poem Including 
History”
[T]he American writer floats in that void because the past that survives in the common mind 
of the present is a past without living value. But is this the only possible past? If we need 
another past so badly, is it inconceivable that we might discover one, that we might even 
invent one? Discover, invent a usable past we certainly can, and that is what a vital criticism 
always does.
- Van Wyck Brooks, “On Creating a Usable Past”  (339)
Yes, most assuredly, I am conscious in everything I write of a usable past, a past as alive in 
its day as every moment is today alive in me: Work therefore as different from mine as one 
period can be different from another, but in spite of that preserving between the two an 
identity upon which I feed.  In all work in any period there is a part that is the life of it which 
relates to whatever else is alive, yesterday, today, and forever.  To discover that in past work 
makes that work important to me . . . The only question of any relevance is, Was that work 
alive to its own day? If so then it is alive every day. If it was a palpable denial of its own day 
then - if I can discover it as such - out with it.  I want to look in a work and see in it a day like 
my own, of altered shapes, colors, but otherwise the same.  That I can use to reinforce my 
senses and my intelligence to go on discovering in my own day such things as those old 
boys had the courage and intelligence to discover in theirs.
- William Carlos Williams, Partisan Review (41-2)
The most original and far-reaching discovery of modern times . . . is our growing realization 
of the fundamental importance and absorbing interest of common men and common things.  
Our democracy, with all its hopes and aspirations, is based on an appreciation of common 
men; our science, with all its achievements and prospects, is based on an appreciation of 
common things.
- James Harvey Robinson, The New History (132)
History . . . cannot be reduced to a verifiable set of statistics or formulated in terms of 
universally valid mathematical formulas.  It is rather an imaginative creation, a personal 
possession which each one of us . . .fashions out of his individual experience, adapts to his 
practical or emotional needs, and adorns as well as may be to suit his aesthetic tastes . . . 
[T]he history which he imaginatively recreates as an artificial extension of his personal 
experience will inevitably be an engaging blend of fact and fancy, a mythical adaptation of 
that which actually happened.
- Carl Becker, “Everyman His Own Historian” (243, 245)
“If ANYTHING of the moment results – so much the better,” William 
Carlos Williams declared at the outset of “Spring and All,” his 1923 
masterpiece (88).  “There is a constant barrier between the reader and his 
consciousness of immediate contact with the world” (88).  The poet’s 
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emphasis on the “moment” represented a fitting start to this early work, and it 
constituted a career-long preoccupation.  Indeed, Williams declared in The 
Embodiment of Knowledge that the “first difficulty of the modern world is a 
difficulty of thought; . . . of imagination of the world, the immediate” (114).  
But for all of his interest in the “moment,” Williams was a deeply historically 
minded poet.  Like his contemporaries T.S. Eliot and Ezra Pound, Williams 
wrote what Pound would call the "poem including history" (qtd. in 
Longenbach 5).  In fact, Williams followed the opening evocation of the 
“moment” and the “immediate” in “Spring and All” with a lengthy indictment 
by an unnamed reader that was predicated largely on the grounds of 
historical comparison.  “Is this what you call poetry?,” she asks:
It is the very antithesis of poetry.  It is antipoetry.  It is the annihilation 
of life upon which you are bent.  Poetry that used to go hand in hand 
with life, poetry that interpreted our deepest promptings, poetry that 
inspired, that led us forward to new discoveries, new depths of 
tolerance, new heights of exaltation.  You moderns! it is the death of 
poetry that you are accomplishing. (88)
These opening passages suggest Williams’ acute awareness of the 
troubled relationship between the present and the past – between the 
“moment” and the continuity of history.  “History that should be a left hand to 
us, as of a violinist,” he declared in In the American Grain, “we bind up with 
prejudice, warping it to suit our fears as Chinese women do their feet” (189).  
History and the future become the bookends of a sterile fantasy as “the 
reader” rests content with knowing “himself as he was twenty years ago” or 
embraces “a vision of what he would be, some day” (“Spring” 89).  But the 
reader, “my fellow creature,” “doesn’t exist,” Williams claims, because “the 
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thing he never knows and never dares to know is what he is at the exact 
moment that he is” (89).  History that, properly conceived, could help the 
reader know himself and his moment instead binds the poet to outmoded 
conventions that offer him little more than a means to “decorate” his age (89).  
“[T]his moment is the only thing in which I am at all interested,” Williams 
declared (89).  But, getting to that moment requires the poet to navigate an 
historical terrain and to forge some kind of meaningful relation to the past.  
Indeed, critic Alec Marsh notes in his seminal study, Money and Modernity: 
Pound, Williams, and the Spirit of Jefferson (1998), that Williams “needed to 
immerse himself in history to find himself in the present moment, in the world 
of what William James called ‘pure experience’” (169).  
This study places Williams in the debates on modernist poetics and 
social change, particularly modernist aesthetics and the uses of history.  
Williams' poem including history furthers a progressive, activist political and 
economic agenda.  In this context, I want to consider Williams not simply in 
relation to other great modernist poets who write history into their verse, 
namely Eliot and Pound, but to recover him in relation to other authors.  
Williams' progressive contemporaries shared his apprehension that individual 
liberty and the democratic ethos must be preserved against accelerating 
corporate wealth and the ascension of political systems (in fascism and 
communism) hostile to democratic liberalism.  For these contemporaries, 
American history was nothing less than the war of a corporate capital elite on 
the democratic mass and democratic spirit.  It comprised a continual struggle 
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between a progressive, democratic impulse and a vast commercial, 
economic machine.  This was the argument that consumed William Carlos 
Williams, and it was what called forth the best efforts of his progressive 
contemporaries.  These like-minded peers consisted of progressive 
historians James Harvey Robinson, Charles Beard, Vernon Louis Parrington, 
Carl Becker, and Harry Elmer Barnes; New York liberal literary critics Waldo 
Frank and Van Wyck Brooks; and other creative writers like D.H. Lawrence, 
Hart Crane, Henry Adams and, of course, Ezra Pound.  Whether they were 
writing imaginative histories (such as In the American Grain, The Cantos, 
The Bridge, or even twenty years earlier, The Education of Henry Adams), 
literary histories (such as Waldo Frank’s Our America, Van Wyck Brooks’ 
America’s Coming of Age, or D.H. Lawrence’s Classic Studies in American 
Literature), or scholarly historical treatises (such as Charles Beard’s An 
Economic Interpretation of the U.S. Constitution or James Harvey Robinson’s 
The New History), these figures sought to resist the modern effects of a 
culture of corporate capital and to release what they believed to be America’s 
obscured and thwarted potential.  Their shared aim of defending individual 
liberty and the democratic spirit animated the various writings and the variety 
of types of writing of the poets, critics and historians, binding them to one 
another and to their historical moment.  
The main historians I am considering, Robinson, Beard, Becker and 
Parrington, have a unique relationship to Modernism.  Noting that Pound and 
Williams’ economic determinism made them “most modern and most like 
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other intellectuals of their time,” critic Alec Marsh identifies Beard, Parrington, 
J. Allen Smith, and Frederick Jackson Turner as “the most influential 
American historians of the Modernist moment” (Money 2).  These figures and 
the poets had “been formed,” claims Marsh, “by the political experience of 
Populism, and all were to some degree consciously Jeffersonian” (2).  Beard, 
Becker and Parrington were all born between 1871 and 1874, nine to twelve 
years prior to Williams (Robinson had roughly ten more years on his 
colleagues).  Robinson and Parrington would die between the wars and 
Beard and Becker would die near the end and shortly after World War II.  
While the historians were mid-westerners, all would study or teach in the 
East.  Beard and Robinson taught together at Columbia University and later 
founded the New School for Social Research in New York City.  Becker 
would study briefly with Robinson, and Beard would recognize Parrington’s 
1927 Pulitzer Prize-winning treatise Main Currents in a book review as 
evidence of “America’s coming of age” (qtd. in Skotheim 148).   Robinson 
and Beard would publish their early seminal works in 1912, The New History
and An Economic Interpretation of the U.S. Constitution, respectively, when 
Williams was nearing thirty years of age.  
Van Wyck Brooks and Waldo Frank were almost exact 
contemporaries of Williams, both born in New Jersey within six years of the 
poet.  Brooks would die, like Williams, in 1963, and Frank would live only
another two years.  These critics published their early seminal works just 
around the time that Williams published The Tempers in 1913 and Al Que 
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Quiere in 1917, which are recognized as his first accomplished volumes of 
poetry.  Brooks published The Wine of the Puritans in 1909 and America’s 
Coming of Age in 1915, and Frank published Our America in 1919.
Debates on literature, social change, and the uses of the past 
preoccupied Williams and his peers in the 1910s and 1920s.  Critic Paul de 
Man’s characterization, in “Literary History and Literary Modernity,” of the 
essential paradox of modernism, and critic James Longenbach’s related work 
in Modernist Poetics of History: Pound, Eliot, and the Sense of the Past, 
provide a larger context for understanding key aspects of Williams’ own 
program for the “poem including history,” and suggest how he is related to, 
and distinct from, Pound, Eliot, and others.  Paul deMan argues that the 
struggle between fidelity to the “moment” and historical continuity is a 
seminal tension in literary modernism.  Echoing the anti-historicism of the 
German philosopher Friedrich Nietzsche, modernist writers, de Man argues, 
exhibit a “desire to wipe out whatever came earlier, in the hope of reaching at 
last a point that could be called a true present, a point of origin that marks a 
new departure” (148).  Literature, de Man contends,
has a constitutive affinity with action, with the unmediated, free act 
that knows no past; [t]he appeal of modernity haunts all literature, . . . 
[as] revealed in . . . the obsession with a tabula rasa, with new 
beginnings - . . . . No true account of literary language can bypass this 
persistent temptation of literature to fulfill itself in a single moment.  
The temptation of immediacy is constitutive of a literary 
consciousness. (151-52)
The fundamental paradox that de Man identifies is that when writers “assert 
their own modernity, they are bound to discover their dependence on similar 
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assertions made by their literary predecessors; their claim to being a new 
beginning turns out to be the repetition of a claim that has always already 
been made” (161).  A “fatal interplay governs the writer’s attitude toward 
modernity,” then, as “he cannot renounce the claim to being modern but also 
cannot resign himself to his dependence on predecessors” (162).  For de 
Man this means that “the distinctive character of literature,” and not simply 
modern literature, is “an inability to escape from a condition that is felt to be 
unbearable” (162).  “The discovery,” de Man concludes,
of his inability to be modern leads him back to the fold, within the 
autonomous domain of literature, but never with genuine 
appeasement . . . The continuous appeal of modernity, the desire to 
break out of literature toward the reality of the moment, prevails 
and, in turn, folding back upon itself, engenders the repetition and 
the continuation of literature.  Thus modernity, which is 
fundamentally a falling away from literature and a rejection of 
history, also acts as the principle that gives literature duration and 
historical existence. (162)
This is the paradox in which the poet finds himself at the start of “Spring and 
All.”  He is exclusively interested in the moment, but his moment cannot be 
reached without navigating at levels internal and external the pressure that is 
brought to bear by a literary past.  This literary “duration and historical 
existence” forces the poet to articulate his own approach to his moment in 
the broader context of his predecessors’ attempts to do the same.  Indeed, 
this proved to be fertile ground for Williams as his search for a “usable past” 
in Paterson and In the American Grain would historicize adaptation to the 
moment, which he called “contact” or “touch.”  
8
The challenge for Williams and other writers, as James Longenbach 
asserts in Modernist Poetics of History, was to “negotiate between several 
conflicting types of historicism, and discover a vitalizing attitude toward 
history” (12).  The paradox from which de Man claims that Nietzsche could 
not free himself, and which bedevils writers in every era, is that 
If history is not to become sheer regression or paralysis, it depends on 
modernity for its duration and renewal; but modernity cannot assert 
itself without being at once swallowed up and reintegrated into a 
regressive historical process. (151)
How, then, can the poet realize James’ “pure experience” of a primary 
relation to his own time, as this very act immediately recedes into the 
“historical process,” and even contributes to history’s “duration and renewal?”  
This dilemma is not lost on Williams, and was, indeed, part of his own well-
documented ambivalence about completing Paterson, about having his poem 
become one of the books in the library that the poet seeks to escape in Book 
III of that poem.  
The resolution of this paradox may lay in the answer that de Man 
attributes to Nietzsche, namely in history itself.  “Only through history is 
history conquered,” explains de Man, making “modernity . . .the horizon of a 
historical process” (150).  Nietzsche, in fact, anticipates liberal literary critic 
Van Wyck Brook’s formulation of a usable past, noting that “we try to give 
ourselves a new past from which we should have liked to descend instead of 
the past from which we actually descended” (de Man 149-50).  
Poets like Pound, Eliot and Williams had to reconcile literary 
modernity to literary history and thus carried the “burden of the more 
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sensitive of Nietzsche’s heirs to forge a life-enhancing attitude toward the 
past” (Longenbach 11).  Longenbach argues that modernist poets, 
particularly Pound and Eliot, employed an “existential historicism,” which he 
defines as a view of history not “as a deadening influence on the present,” 
but as “a living part of the present that cannot be destroyed” (10).  
“Historicity,” as theorist Fredric Jameson argues, consists of “‘contact 
between the historian’s mind in the present and a given synchronic cultural 
complex from the past’” (qtd. in Longenbach 13).  History “does not exist as a 
sequence of events that occurred in the past” but rather becomes a “function 
of the historian’s effort to understand the past in the present” (Longenbach 
14).  For Longenbach, this historical praxis is romantic; “Pound understands 
the past through a process of imaginative reconstruction,” as the poet bases
his reading of history on his own subjective present (18).  
Existential historicism is enabled, Longenbach contends, by a 
rejection in the latter half of the 19th century of “empiricism” and “positivism” 
in favor of Yeats’ interest in the occult, Freud’s interest in the unconscious 
and other difficult-to-quantify phenomena.  This freed “historical knowledge” 
to be constructed as something that could be “gleaned from artistic intuition 
rather than scientific categorization”  and “align[ed] it with the arts rather than 
with the sciences” (Longenbach 26).  History, then, becomes a “product” of 
the writer’s “own consciousness” (27).  This existentialist historical method 
depends on an historian who looks beyond the “surface of events” to 
“uncover” what “lurks within them” based on the “investment of [his] own 
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experience into his work” (Longenbach 27).  “The ‘poems including history’ 
written out of these pre-suppositions about the nature of historical 
knowledge,” Longenbach concludes, “consequently tend to take the form of a 
‘palimpsest’ rather than a chronological schema” (27-28).  What Longenbach 
claims of The Cantos and The Wasteland is no less true of Paterson or In the 
American Grain: they “display a present that is woven from the past in a 
complex tissue of allusions, a past that exists only as it lives in the texture of 
the present” (28).
I believe that Longenbach’s argument is particularly apt for the literary 
critics and poets.  The move of history writing away from “scientific 
categorization,” however, should not obscure the progressive historians’ 
particular interest in recent advances in the social sciences, such as 
psychology, economics, anthropology, and sociology.  James Harvey 
Robinson, in fact would argue that science and the democratic ethos share a 
focus on the “normal and prevalent,” “the seemingly homely, common, and 
inconspicuous things” (New History 149).  “The most original and far-
reaching discovery of modern times,” claimed Robinson, 
is our growing realization of the fundamental importance and 
absorbing interest of common men and common things.  Our 
democracy, with all its hopes and aspirations, is based on an 
appreciation of common men; our science, with all its achievements 
and prospects, is based on an appreciation of common things. (New
History 132)
There is no doubt that Williams shared a vital existentialist historicism 
with Pound and Eliot.  Williams looked, like Pound and Eliot, for hidden 
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history and obscured meanings.  Indeed, he evoked in the preface to In the 
American Grain the “true character” of our history and ourselves “now lost in 
chaos of borrowed titles” (Grain, preface).  Further, Williams processed 
history more as a collection of contemporaries than as a temporal schema or 
sequence, calling, for instance, those who have fought against usury and 
greed “contemporaries, in whatever time they live or have lived” (Essays
167).  
"Language is the key to the mind's escape from bondage to the 
past," Williams declared in The Embodiment of Knowledge (19).  How can a 
poet who so steeped his verse in the past, who wrote the poem including 
history, perceive his own medium as critical to the larger project of escaping 
the past as burden?  This is the same quandary that de Man and 
Longenbach argue has plagued writers of every age.  In Williams’ case, the 
paradox is, at first blush, made more puzzling by the fact that an initial 
reading of T. S. Eliot's “Tradition and the Individual Talent” could suggest that 
Williams’ own views of the past are not so disparate from Eliot’s.  This seems
particularly odd given Williams’ vociferous objections to Eliot’s poetic method 
and to the publication of The Waste Land, which he called "the great 
catastrophe to our letters" (Autobiography 146).  "There was," Williams 
explained years later in his Autobiography, "heat in us, a core and a drive 
that was gathering headway upon the theme of a rediscovery of a primary 
impetus," but "[o]ur work staggered to a halt for a moment under the blast of 
Eliot's genius which gave the poem back to the academics" (146).  Williams 
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felt that Eliot’s poem sucked the air out of the room, jeopardizing poets’ 
nascent efforts to define a vital modern poetic “in the local conditions” (146).  
The differences between Eliot and Williams were profound; they 
represented the distance between a regressive (and conservative) or a 
progressive vision of the reader and of poetry that went to the heart of 
Williams’ defense of individual liberty and the democratic ethos.  What each 
sought from or in the past and to what uses each put it, in fact, were quite 
distinct.  Williams' poem including history was uniquely democratic.  It was 
intended to convert readers into citizens.  Williams’ democratic poetic 
focused not simply on historical representative figures, but on the figure of 
the poet and, more particularly, the reader.  It was geared towards animating 
readers, making them take an active stance of civic engagement in the 
service of their own present moment.   Williams effected a participatory 
aesthetic that drew the reader into an essential American historical dialectic 
between what he identifies as “touch” and “withdrawal,” “contact” and 
exploitation.  If Pound and Eliot exhibited, as Longenbach contends, an 
existentialist historicism in which history is refracted through the imaginative 
sensibility and subjective experience of the poet, Williams wrote the poem 
including history so as to make the reader refract the past through his own 
subjectivity, thereby compelling him to articulate his own historical narrative 
of life in America.  Williams' aesthetic, then, enacted the democratic ethos 
that he intended to defend by compelling readers to exercise the individual 
liberty and prerogative that he and his progressive contemporaries believed 
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to be jeopardized by corporate power, emerging fascism and communism.  
The democratic impulse informing Williams' stance toward the past, which I 
believe holds many likenesses to Stevens’, must be distinguished from that 
of Pound and Eliot.  I want to begin by considering Eliot's seminal essay, 
“Tradition and the Individual Talent,” as a way to contrast Williams’ with 
Eliot’s view of, and uses of, the past.
In “Tradition and the Individual Talent,” Eliot foreswore "blind or timid 
adherence" to the "successes" of our immediate predecessors, much as 
Williams did (467). Eliot noted that it is not "preposterous that the past should 
be altered by the present as much as the present is directed by the past" 
(467).  It is not difficult to imagine Williams agreeing in some measure with 
this assertion.  Eliot contended that the "historical sense," so critical to 
tradition, "involves a perception, not only of the pastness of the past, but of 
its presence" (467). Here is the simultaneous present or omnipresent 
contemporaneity of past and present that critics like de Man and 
Longenbach, as well as Richard Ruland, note – and that the poets, including 
Williams, assert.  Lastly, even Eliot's belief that no poet "has his complete 
meaning alone" may appear to apply to and help us better understand 
Williams (467).  Eliot explains that the poet's "significance, his appreciation is 
the appreciation of his relation to the dead poets and artists," and he argued 
that "[y]ou cannot value him alone; you must set him, for contrast and 
comparison, among the dead" (467).  We could apply this position to 
describe Williams' encounters with representative figures in In the American 
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Grain.  Indeed, Williams articulates in that volume multiple layers of complex 
identifications for himself and for his reader in his portraits of Champlain, 
Rasles, Poe and others.  So strong are the identifications, in fact, that 
Champlain, as an example, becomes a kind of alter-ego or extension of the 
poet himself.  These identifications will be further discussed in Chapter Four.
But these correspondences between the two poets should not 
distract us from the deeper differences in their vision of the past and in what 
the poem including history means for our stance toward that past.  Eliot 
argued in “Tradition and the Individual Talent,” for instance, that tradition 
"cannot be inherited, and if you want it you must obtain it by great labor" 
(467). The past, in his scheme, sounded like a goal or treasure to be worked 
toward.  The poet should write "not merely with his own generation in his 
bones, but with a feeling that the whole of the literature of . . . his own 
country has a simultaneous existence and composes a simultaneous order" 
(467). Williams, by contrast, expressed a greater urgency around the 
"moment" and the "barrier between the reader and his consciousness of
immediate contact with the world” (“Spring” 88).  The critical distinguishing 
feature between Williams and Eliot was that for the former the past was 
usable only to the extent that it offered models of "contact" and "touch" with 
the "moment" and what he calls the primary.  Thus, Williams was drawn to 
writers and other historical figures who had adapted to conditions as they 
actually existed in their own time.  A "usable past," Williams attested, 
consisted of a "past as alive in its day as every moment is today alive in me."  
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If the work was not “alive to its own day” and thus “alive to every day,” “out 
with it,” Williams declared.  History or the past was important, then, for 
uncovering an alternative tradition and model that could help us "touch" and 
make "contact" with the realities of life in our own time. Williams' stance 
matched that of progressive historian Carl Becker and liberal literary critic 
Van Wyck Brooks, both of whom looked for a radical potential inherent in 
history.  Van Wyck Brooks posited that we may need a vital criticism to 
discover or even create a usable past, one that can be utilized to speak to 
contemporary needs.  Becker espied this as the “power” of the past that was 
contained “within” the present (“Some Aspects” 675).  
The past and tradition are not open only to those who labor to 
inherit them, as Eliot would have it. Williams had faith in the common man's 
ability to wade through the fragments of history.  His aesthetic animates the 
reader as citizen to experience the debates of the past and to decide for 
himself what his stake is in them and where he stands. Williams would agree 
with Eliot that the poet "must develop or procure the consciousness of the 
past" (“Tradition” 468). But it was Williams' purpose in procuring this 
consciousness to find the obscured, the “strange phosphorous of the life, 
nameless under an old misappellation” (Grain, preface).  It was not, as in 
Eliot’s case, to master the “simultaneous order” of the past and to trace the 
particular uncorrupted grace of a golden, pre-modern culture.  It is critical that 
Williams saw no such historical exemplar but historicized the ever-continuing 
process and necessity of adapting to the present moment.   Where Eliot 
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envisioned the present in “Tradition and the Individual Talent” as the "present 
moment of the past" (471), Williams espied a recurring impregnating moment 
of contact and touch -- and that moment, to invert Eliot's formulation, 
comprised the past moments of the ever-recurring present.  If you believe, as 
Williams did, that to "read, while we are imbibing the wisdom of the ages" 
means "imbibing the death and the imbecility, the enslaving rudeness of the 
ages," then you can meaningfully encounter history only as a model for 
adaptation to your own unique present moment (Embodiment 107).  Our 
engagement with the past in Williams, then, was focused on the present –
the past present of various representative figures and our own present 
moment as readers navigating the text.  It is an individual and therefore 
democratic focus in contrast to Eliot's rarified vision. 
This suggests that the past, and the poem including history, in 
particular, held very different meanings for Williams and Eliot.  For Williams 
the works of the past were as "dead as shells" that once carried a living 
man's desire to write and to express himself (Embodiment 106).  Thus, 
Williams took a very different direction from the "surrender of himself, . . . 
[the] continual self-sacrifice, a continual extinction of personality" that Eliot 
posited (“Tradition” 468). Where Eliot would lead us to develop this historical 
consciousness, Williams warned us of the "Mountain of dead words, 
cemeteries of words [that] befog the mind" (Embodiment 104).   "[T]here is 
an antagonism between the ages," Williams posited (Embodiment 107). 
"Each age wishes to enslave the others" (Embodiment 107).   Far from the 
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"extinction of personality" that Eliot espoused, Williams declared that the 
"conviction that fills the whole body of a man is nearer to him than all the 
books that have ever been written" (Embodiment 105). "And these other 
books," Williams contended
the great philosophies, the endless treatises of science, the books of 
religions and the lives of other men -- the biographies, the histories --
what are they? They are part of the very oppressive, stupid, aimless, 
ignorant world which has driven him to shelter, to prison within 
himself, to defeat from which he must escape. HE must escape, weak, 
comparatively unlettered, by himself. (Embodiment 105, emphasis in 
original)
The “extinction of personality” before tradition that Eliot desired, and that he 
argued was required for anyone who would be a writer beyond his 25th
birthday, was, to Williams, a terrifying mistake.  
Related as well to their differing views of the past were Eliot’s and 
Williams’ divergent opinions on poetic language.  Eliot acknowledged that it 
may be necessary to “force” or “dislocate language” to our meaning.  The 
language may need to be made new for the poet’s contemporary purposes.  
Williams, by contrast, declared in The Embodiment of Knowledge that it “is 
by the breakup of the language that the truth can be seen to exist and that it 
becomes operative again. . . In language lodge the prejudices, the 
compulsions by which stupidity and ineptitude rule intelligences superior to 
their own” (Embodiment 19).  Williams’ program was thus much more radical 
and called for the smashing of conventional forms, not simply wrenching 
them to meet our contemporary needs.  Indeed, Williams asserted in “Spring 
and All” that:
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If I could say what is in my mind in Sanscrit or even Latin I would do 
so.  But I cannot.  I speak for the integrity of the soul and the 
greatness of life’s inanity; the formality of its boredom; the 
orthodoxy of its stupidity.  Kill !  Kill !  Let there be fresh meat.” (90)
It is not surprising, then, that the "fragments I have shored against my 
ruins," to which Eliot would cling at the end of The Waste Land, were quite 
distinct from the constituent pieces of Williams' palimpsest in Paterson and In 
the American Grain (Complete 50).  Williams' fragments and shards of 
history were not nostalgic backward glances to lost order that the poet hoped 
in vain to reconstitute. Rather, they were the glittering models of adaptation, 
touch, and contact offered by a variety of representative figures of the past. 
They were offered up to the reader to structure and model the road he or she 
must, ultimately, travel alone.  
The sequence, then, that Williams found in time, to consider Paul 
deMan's thesis in “Literary History and Literary Modernity,” was radically 
different from Eliot's.  It was inflected by Williams' interest in the pattern of 
seemingly recurrent ruptures in time – moments of discovery and alienation, 
of anxiety in the face of an unknown and overwhelming continent.  The poet, 
who felt that old words must be broken down and wonted usages must be 
escaped, used both of these things, through primary documents, to show the 
continuous, historical pattern of this necessary rupture, the continuous 
pattern of the discontinuous.  Inherent in this pattern of rupture was the 
usable past – it was the moment of adaptation and regeneration.  It was 
encoded in the aesthetic structures by which Williams presented a set of 
encounters and meta-encounters with the primary, life as it existed in the 
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New World, in the past and even in the reading process of the present.  This 
democratic formulation – democratic by how it animated and activated the 
reader – corroborated W.H. Auden's contention in “The Poet and the City” in 
The Dyer’s Hand, that the "mere making of a work of art is itself a political 
act" and it releases the radical potential inherent in history, now making it, as 
historian James Harvey Robinson hoped, the weapon of the progressive 
(88).
* * * * * 
Debates on modernism and social change, literature and politics, the 
uses of the past, and the writing of more imaginative and subjective histories, 
which I will discuss, were playing out in the context of, and were conditioned 
by, sweeping economic and social changes that for Williams and others 
produced a sense of crisis.  But what exactly threw them back on history in 
search of a usable American past and made them seek a “new history?”  The 
answer lay in part in a truism: the United States underwent profound 
economic, social, political transformation in the latter part of the nineteenth 
century.  After the effective close of the Reconstruction Period, America 
experienced substantial immigration, urbanization, industrialization and labor 
unrest.  In 1890 the Bureau of Census declared the frontier “closed” -- there 
existed no broad expanse of unsettled lands.  And what land there was 
sagged under a burgeoning population.  In 1900 alone, nearly “425,000 
Europeans arrived on the nation’s shores” (Cooper 2).  Foreign-born 
Americans “numbered about eleven million, or 14 percent of the total 
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population, . . . the highest proportion of immigrants to ‘natives’ since the 
1850s” (8).  In the first decade of the new century, “over eight million more 
immigrants would come to the United States – the largest number in any 
decade before or since . . . [and they] would account for more than 10 
percent of the entire American population” (3).  This influx of new immigrants 
“stirred apprehension . . . appear[ing] to threaten the established way of life 
of white Protestant middle-class groups” (8).  
The nation’s economy and corporate sector seemed to grow as 
impressively in this period.  In the most general terms, an economic 
powerhouse was being born.  American steel production “reached 28.3 
million tons in 1910, almost triple the amount in 1900” (Cooper 82).  Motor 
vehicle registration rose from “8,000 in 1900 to 458,000 in 1910” (82).  
Perhaps the greatest indication of industrial and broader commercial 
expansion was the explosion in railroading.  Between 1865 and 1880, “the 
ton-miles of freight carried by the thirteen principal lines in the country rose 
from 2.16 billion to 14.48 billion, an increase of 600 percent” (Smith 90).  
During this time, “track mileage more than tripled -- from 35,000 miles to 
115,647” while the “number of passengers carried on all [rail]roads increased 
from 289,000,000 to 520,000,000, and passenger-miles from 7 billion to 12 
billion” (90).  Further, between 1880 and 1890 “the average railroad mileage 
constructed per year totaled more than 6,000 miles; the peak year was 1887, 
when 12,000 miles of track were laid” (90).  Perhaps most staggering, the 
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gross national product rose by fifty percent in the first decade of the twentieth 
century, “topping $50 billlion for the first time after 1907” (Cooper 82).  
The corporate consolidation and monopolization of markets most 
aroused the apprehension of Williams and others.  These accelerated 
precipitously in the 1890s and the first decade of the twentieth century as 
over 300 mergers were effected, totaling $7.5 billion and “encompassing an 
estimated 40 percent of the country’s industrial output” (Cooper 11).  Six 
railroads controlled “95 percent of all trackage” by 1899 (11).  US Steel, 
formed in 1901, controlled 80 percent of steel production.  John D. 
Rockefeller, the “devoutly religious but ruthlessly domineering petroleum 
magnate, . . .  became the first American to amass a personal fortune worth 
$1 billion” (11-12).   
Capitalists were not the only ones on the move.  Unionization of
workers “nearly tripled between 1900 and 1910, from 548,000 to over 1.5 
million” (Cooper 145).  And political agitation and labor unrest advanced 
hand in hand.  Critic Alec Marsh notes that in the 1890s, as Pound and 
Williams
were growing up, not only the radicalized farmers of the People’s 
Party but figures as diverse as the patrician historian Brooks Adams, 
the money agitator William ‘Coin’ Harvey, and the Christian Democrat 
William Jennings Bryan believed that the country was in the grip of an 
international financial conspiracy.  They agreed that a clique of 
financiers and usurers was attempting to corner all the gold in 
existence for the purpose of enslaving the world through perpetual 
indebtedness. (Money 3)
While the “struggle between the politics of the debtor classes and the 
creditors came to a head in the presidential election campaign of 1896,” 
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economic conflict did not cease after Bryan’s crushing defeat (Marsh, Money
2-3).  Eugene Debs would win as much as 17% of the vote in several states 
in 1912 and “[a]t no time in American history was there greater tolerance and 
openness toward socialism than in 1910 and several years afterward” 
(Cooper 146).  Williams’ and Pound’s participation in Major C.H. Douglas’ 
Social Credit Movement of the 1920s and 1930s attests to the continuing 
resonance of issues surrounding economic and class struggle.  Critic David 
Frail, in The Early Politics and Poetics of William Carlos Williams (1987), 
refers readers as well to the larger economic and social agitation in the 
America of Williams’ youth.  Williams “was 17,” Frail notes,
when Theodore Roosevelt assumed the presidency, and he came of 
age in the peak of the Progressive’s ‘strenuous’ efforts to reform 
politics and society through exhortation.  Little wonder he felt, as 
Unitarianism had taught him to hope, that humanity was progressing 
in spirit and the United States was moving onward and upward. (37)
The sense of incredible, even overwhelming changes, was registered 
by Williams and others.  Frederick Jackson Turner, in fact, opened his 1910 
presidential address to the members of the American Historical Association 
by noting:
The transformations through which the United States is 
passing in our own day are so profound, so far-reaching, that 
it is hardly an exaggeration to say that we are witnessing the 
birth of a new nation in America.  The revolution in the social 
and economic structure of this country during the past two 
decades is comparable to what occurred when independence 
was declared and the constitution was formed, or to the 
changes wrought by the era which began half a century ago, 
the era of Civil War and Reconstruction. (“Social Forces” 154)
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Henry Adams starkly characterized the current moment in his 1907 
(published, 1918) The Education of Henry Adams: “[I]n 1900, the continuity 
snapped” and the mind found that “a new avalanche of unknown forces had 
fallen on it, which required new mental powers to control” (457, 461).  “The 
child born in 1900,” he continued 
would, then, be born into a new world which would not be a unity 
but a multiple.  Adams tried to imagine it, and an education that 
would fit it.  He found himself in a land where no one had ever 
penetrated before; where order was an accidental relation 
obnoxious to nature; artificial compulsion imposed on motion; 
against which every free energy of the universe revolted; and 
which, being merely occasional, resolved itself back into anarchy at 
last.  (Adams 457-8)
Adams and Turner were not alone in their assessments.  Williams 
echoed their sense that the march of industrialization and commercialism 
precipitated a broader crisis of meaning.  “Who are we?,”  Williams asked:
Degraded whites riding our fears to market where everything is by 
accident and only one thing sure: the fatter we get the duller we grow;
only a simpering disgust (like a chicken with a broken neck, that aims 
where it cannot peck and pecks only where it cannot aim, which a 
hog-plenty everywhere prevents from starving to death) reveals any 
contact with a possible freshness – and that only by inversion. (Grain
108)
Waldo Frank, in Our America, cited New York as the apogee of the 
economic transformation besieging the nation.  Its “high white towers[,] . . . 
arrows of will” revealed how modern man “has been fathered by steel and 
broken by it” (Frank 171, 174).  In New York, and perhaps, cities everywhere, 
“the outside world has taken to itself a soul – a towering, childish soul: and 
the millions of human sources are sucked void” (171).  The “brackish human 
flow . . . the molecular units” represent a “people turned debtor to its own 
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affairs” (172-73).  For Frank this broader economic crisis also revealed that 
the “gods of the fathers were ridiculous or dead” (223).  “Only the 
consciousness of life as a Whole,” he lamented,
in the consciousness of himself as a parabolic force with his 
feet upon earth and his head piercing the skies – the 
consciousness which all religions in their own ways preserve, 
all arts express – can man prevail against the clutter of a 
factual and emotional multiverse . . . . Now, America multiplied 
this clutter: America took away the consciousness that might 
have held it. (224)
The result: “The crisis finds us to-day, innerly depleted” (231).   Vernon Louis 
Parrington in Main Currents, echoed Frank, arguing that he hoped in the 
history he was writing to “unhorse the machine that now rides men and to 
leaven the sodden mass that is industrial America” (3:xx).  
Even a cursory view of the progressive historians and literary critics, 
as well as other poets, suggests how the vast social and economic changes 
of the early twentieth century produced a sense of rupture.  Corporate 
capital, monopoly, industry and commerce were remaking their world.  
Progressives responded with a sense of crisis – their “moment” was one of 
urgency.  Indeed, as Paul de Man implies, in “Literary History and Literary 
Modernity,” rupture in time was the essential modernist myth.  Thus, Williams 
and his contemporaries felt that old cultural narratives and forms failed to 
speak to or suit the pressing demands of their time.  The result was that new 
narratives rushed in to fill the vacuum.  At a time of rising American 
hegemony, when America was assuming a leading role on the world stage, 
and when there were significant economic and political changes, and even 
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unrest at home and abroad, the task of identifying the essential historical 
American character in new ways and to serve new constituencies became all 
the more critical.  Vast changes were remaking America's social and political 
landscape and the old narratives were proving to be outmoded and 
threadbare.  
The progressive historians, critics, and creative writers offered a 
different kind of history in response to the pressing social and economic 
needs of their time.  They sought, in short, through their different styles and 
methods, to deinstitutionalize history.  For all three groups, de-
institutionalizing history would mean three things, as revealed in the 
subjective and imaginative histories that they would write.  First, they defined 
writing, and history-writing in particular, as a critical weapon in the battle to 
instigate social and economic reform.  Second, they revealed how finance 
and power perverted democratic structures.  Third, they emphasized in 
varying ways the subjective or personal.  The histories of Williams and his 
contemporaries (especially the poets and critics) were more subjective and 
imaginative, personal in many ways, than the more institutional histories, 
focusing on the diplomacy and battles of great nations, that preceded them.  
The first element of these subjective histories – namely, defining 
history writing as part of a movement for social change and a rejection of 
anachronistic social forms – was evident in the work of nearly every 
progressive historian and  literary critic.  The accelerating consolidation of 
market capital and the creation of whole new vistas of commercial wealth 
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and industrial initiative made writers of progressive literary and scholarly 
histories, alike, comb the past.  They searched for elements of the American 
experience that could provide an alternative vision to stale academic 
histories.  They sought to write histories that did not simply naturalize existing 
exploitative economic and social relations but rather revealed them as man-
made forms and institutions that must evolve to remain relevant to their time.  
Social and economic inequities were not, then, immutable natural creations 
but were subject to change and could be rectified.  This was the “genetic” or 
“evolutionary” view of history that Williams, Barnes, Brooks, Robinson and 
others espoused.  They felt compelled to write histories that aided reform 
movements, that would help people adapt to changed and still rapidly 
changing economic and class realities.  Writing history was not a sideline 
pastime – it placed the historians, critics, and poets at the center of the crisis 
of their moment and on the frontlines of efforts to remake their age.  
Williams and his contemporaries, then, argued that history must 
become a force for social change.  James Harvey Robinson would argue in 
his 1912 volume The New History that history, which “has been regularly 
invoked, . . . to substantiate the claims of the conservative, but has hitherto 
usually been neglected by the radical” is the radical’s “weapon by right” and 
must be “wrest[ed] . . . from the hand of the conservative” (252).  Robinson 
argued that the “present has hitherto been the willing victim of the past; the 
time has come when it should turn on the past and exploit it in the interests of 
advance” (New History 24).  Without a meaningful history that could recall us 
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to a vision of America apart from the triumph of corporate capital, we would 
“float without question” and remain vulnerable to blatant economic 
exploitation and an accompanying impoverishment of spirit (Grain 113).  
Williams and his contemporaries lamented the "unstudied character of our 
beginnings” and the fact that “we recognize no ground our own” (Grain 109).  
Writing the poem including history comprised for Williams “a basic attack” in 
the ongoing war between corporate powers and the democratic spirit 
(Autobiography 341).  The poem was “a social instrument” the poet 
marshaled in defense, at multiple levels, of individual liberty and individual 
prerogative (Letters 286).  Writing was the “active agent” in this struggle, and 
the economic and cultural consequences in this battle were tremendous for 
Williams’ time (Autobiography 341).  
The problem from the start was one of continuity – or, more to the 
point, historical discontinuity.  The writer’s task, according to Van Wyck 
Brooks, must be to discover or invent a usable past from the “inexhaustible 
storehouse of apt attitudes and adaptable ideals” of our American past 
(“Usable” 339).  This is what Williams meant when he asserted in the 
prefatory paragraph to In the American Grain: 
In these studies I have sought to re-name the things seen, now lost in 
chaos of borrowed titles, many of them inappropriate, under which the 
true character lies hid.  In letters, in journals, reports of happenings I 
have recognized new contours suggested by old words so that new 
names were constituted . . . ; it has been my wish to draw from every 
source one thing, the strange phosphorus of the life, nameless under 
an old misappellation.” (Grain, preface)  
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Williams thus echoed Brooks’ own formulation of the problem in a 1918 
article, “On Creating a Usable Past,” in The Dial, quoted at the start of this 
chapter.  
Robinson’s student and protégé, Harry Elmer Barnes, would laud the 
“newer or dynamic and synthetic history” in his 1925 volume, New History 
and the Social Sciences (ix).  Examining the contributions of anthropology, 
psychology, sociology and other social sciences, Barnes argued for using 
these sister studies “to reach a correct notion of what is really essential and 
progressive in our civilization and of what is but an encumbering survival 
from primitive times” (15).  He attacked anachronistic cultural “habits” that 
enabled the “preservation of the social order” and made it difficult for the 
“vested interests to recognize the defects in their domination and for the poor 
to sense properly their oppression or to grasp its causes” (Barnes 83-84).  
Thus, common phenomena met the common man as a history-writing 
infused with the progressive impulse and informed by the social sciences 
would, Barnes and other progressives believed, enable their contemporaries 
to more nearly adapt their social and economic relations to, and reform, 
actual conditions.
Whether they were writing imaginative histories, literary histories or 
academic tracts, the progressive intellectuals of the 1910s and 1920s aimed 
to remake the present by remaking the past.  They attempted to steer the 
nation away from an impoverished culture of corporate capital, to fix the 
“organized anarchy to-day expressed in Industrialism which would deny to 
29
America any life . . . beyond the ties of traffic and the arteries of trade” (Frank 
9).  For this reason Carl Becker spoke for his progressive contemporaries 
when he asserted that the “business of history is to arouse an intelligent 
discontent, to foster a fruitful radicalism” (“The New History” 21).  The history 
they wrote privileged change and adaptation.  It incorporated learning from 
sister social sciences.  It sought to defend and empower democratic man 
against a corporate elite by denying conservatives’ efforts to naturalize 
exploitative social and economic relationships.
The second element of these subjective histories – namely revealing 
and resisting the corrupting influence of the money culture – was a central 
preoccupation for Williams and his progressive peers.  Charles Beard, who 
was Robinson’s colleague and co-author at Columbia University, published in 
1912 his seminal volume, An Economic Interpretation of the U.S. 
Constitution.  This critical study revealed how corporate capital interests had 
shaped our constitutional forms and controlled our politics from the early life 
of the republic better to secure their property interests.  Beard explored the 
individual financial holdings of the signers of the Constitution to expose the 
personal economic gains they realized from implementation of a strong 
federal system.  
Liberal literary critic Van Wyck Brooks lamented how corporate 
interests came to thwart individual development and inhibit the masses’ 
greater potential.  “How can one speak of progress in a people like our own,” 
Brooks inquired in his 1915 volume, America’s Coming of Age,
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that so sends up to heaven the stench of atrophied 
personality?  How can one speak of progress in a people 
whose main object is to climb, peg by peg, up a ladder . . . to 
the impersonal ideal of private wealth?” (176) 
Brooks evoked the culture’s commercial priorities in grim fashion in Seven 
Arts, a journal of art and culture that was published from November 1916 to 
October 1917 and that Williams in his Autobiography called “an important 
publication of the moment” (147).  Brooks declared in Seven Arts that 
Americans “find themselves born into a race that has drained away all its 
spiritual resources in the struggle to survive and that continues to struggle in 
the midst of plenty because life itself no longer possesses any other 
meaning” (“Towards” 543).  Williams asserted in In the American Grain that if 
“we will not pay heed to our own affairs, we are nothing but an unconscious 
porkyard and oil-hole for those, more able, who will fasten themselves upon 
us” (109).  This grim picture of economic exploitation reflected Williams’ and 
others’ apprehension about the vast changes corporate capital was imposing 
on the American landscape at the end of the nineteenth century and in the 
opening decades of the twentieth century.  Their fears for America’s present 
“moment” and belief that capital would co-opt America’s future, compelled 
them to identify “a usable past” (“Usable” 339).  
Brooks and Beard would appear together in the April 1918 issue of 
The Dial where they took special aim at academic historians for cheating the 
American writer out of his “most meager of birthrights” by putting a “sterile” 
“gloss upon the past,” a fact that Brooks attributed directly to economic, 
capitalistic motives (338).   The histories that they found had been credited 
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up to their own time were those that rendered the past “sterile for the living 
mind” (337).  They were stale nineteenth century histories written by 
“professors who accommodate themselves without effort to an academic 
world based like ours on the exigencies of the commercial mind” (338).  The 
result: they “cannot see anything in the past that conflicts with a commercial 
philosophy” (338).  
The economic analyses and political stance of Williams and of his 
progressive peers such as Beard and Parrington is heavily inflected with 
Marxist critique but not teleology.  This is evident in Williams’ interest and 
activity in the Social Credit Movement in the mid to late 1920s, which I will 
discuss in Chapter Two.  It is important to note that Social Credit was 
understood to be a way of preserving democratic liberalism by reforming its 
economic structures.  Communist collectivism was no more appealing, for its 
impact on individual liberty and prerogative, than was fascism.  Social Credit 
thus sought to alleviate the economic misery of millions by democratizing the 
availability and distribution of credit.  It is fair to say, then, that while it was 
informed by Marxist analysis it was not a vehicle for implementation of a 
Marxist social program.  Indeed, Williams would tell critic Babette Deutsch in 
a 1947 letter that she could expect to find in the soon-to-be-published Book II 
of Paterson
more relating to the economic distress occasioned by human greed 
and blindness – aided, as always, by the church, all churches in the 
broadest sense of that designation – but, still, there will be little 
treating directly of the rise of labor as a named force.  I am not a 
Marxian.” (Letters 259)
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At the very height of his Social Credit activities, moreover, Williams 
reaffirmed to Pound his own freedom from “organized theories,” and 
recognized “getting rather too fascinated with the tip of my nose” as a risk 
concomitant with his focus on the local (Witemeyer 138).  “My observation,” 
Williams informed his friend, “is that the too close organization of theories is 
likely to make one blind to what’s taking place” (138).
The third element of the imaginative histories of Williams and his 
progressive peers (particularly the poets and literary critics) can be found in 
how they sought to counter the impersonal forces of the age that threatened 
liberal democracy by affirming the subjective in the histories that they wrote 
and, in Williams' case, in the way that they wrote them.  The ethos of the 
personal that Williams and his progressive peers espoused in response, 
even rebellion, we might say, to an age perceived to be impersonal and 
hostile to individual prerogative and liberty, made Williams develop a history 
writing aesthetic that forced the reader to adapt himself continually (and to 
experience historical figures as they adapted) to new and changing 
circumstances.  Williams' subjective history was powerful for how it inhabited 
and spoke from the subject position of representative figures from the past 
and from the poet himself.  It may be, then, as critic James Breslin contends 
of In the American Grain, that while “the work of his contemporaries often 
strikes us as dated polemic . . . Williams’ book lives in the rich variety of its 
characters, moods, styles” (88) – but the impulse is nevertheless the same.  
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Reflecting their interest in the subjective and in the imaginative mind, 
Williams and the literary critics were also particularly drawn to literary 
predecessors.  V. L. Parrington, Waldo Frank, Van Wyck Brooks, D.H. 
Lawrence and Williams, constructed an alternative, usable literary past 
consisting of such promising representative figures as Poe, Whitman, 
Thoreau, and even Dickinson.  Gerald Graff has documented in Professing 
Literature that it was in this period that the American canon was defined and 
the work of American cultural studies, that would blossom in the 1940s with 
the work of Charles Fiedelson and Perry Miller, was begun.  Graff 
establishes that by 1900 “‘American literature as an independent subject had 
been introduced into practically all of the American colleges'" (qtd. in Graff 
212).  Those few exceptions "could hold out . . . only until the World War, 
when the 'demands upon the colleges for patriotism-inducing subjects' 
caused American literature to be added to the curriculum everywhere" (212).  
By the mid to late 1920s, Graff contends, there was a movement to "merge 
history and criticism in a larger cultural study that would bring literary studies 
into more intimate connection with American society" (214).  This "impulse 
toward synthesis and integration more than anything," asserts Graff, gave 
the new field of American literary studies an "iconoclastic and populist aura 
that continued to be part of its image for decades to come" (214).  Graff 
observes that "the initial aspirations of American literature studies were tied 
to a quest for cultural synthesis [recognizing wider economic and political 
forces] not unlike what Van Wyck Brooks and the young radical intellectuals 
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were calling for" (215).  Brook's "impressionistic talk of a usable past," 
contends Graff, would be complemented by work that combined "synthetic 
vision with precise scholarship" (215).  It was V.L. Parrington "who at first 
most influenced the shape of that combination" and whose 1927-30 volumes 
Main Currents in American Thought "reinforced the link between the 
academic study of American literature and the progressive social outlook of 
the nonacademic critics" (Graff 215).  
Parrington, as the most prominent figure in this scholarship, explored 
the entire pantheon of America's literary forebears in Main Currents from an 
admittedly Jeffersonian progressive perspective.  He turned to the “pretty 
largely neglected . . . field of American letters” Main Currents to trace the 
“broad path of our political, economic, and social development” (1: i, iii).  
Acknowledging his own position on contemporary economics and politics 
from the start, Parrington confessed: “The point of view from which I have 
endeavored to evaluate the materials, is liberal rather than conservative, 
Jeffersonian rather than Federalistic” (1: i).  Viewing “the discussion of 
literature . . . [as] part of a social struggle, in which the theory and uses of 
literature were understood to be a weapon” (Hofstadter 388), Parrington, in 
his essay, "Economics and Criticism," asserted starkly that “Literature is the 
fair flower of culture, but underneath culture are deeper strata of philosophy, 
theology, law, statecraft – of ideology and institutionalism – resting finally 
upon the subsoil of economics” (98).  “We may begin as critics,” Parrington 
added, “but we end up as historians . . . [The critic and historian] cuts under 
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the feet of the humanist to the property basis of ideas and institutions.  In 
every society, he discovers, property is sovereign” (100).
Parrington's purpose, of course, was to reaffirm the humanistic and 
progressive.  To this end, he presented the historical dialectic of “the 
aristocrat and the republican, privileged minority and democratic majority, 
frontier democracy and Wall Street Whiggery, the middle class and the 
proletarian masses, producer and middleman” (Skotheim 140).  Parrington 
lauded always the imaginative and creative power – the subjective worth, 
experience and vision – of democrats and artists.  
Others histories, written by Waldo Frank, D.H. Lawrence, and Hart 
Crane, similarly sought to reaffirm the individual by validating the personal 
and subjective.  Frank's 1919 imaginative history Our America turned to 
creative writers and authors as offering the “most salient and most pregnant 
utterances” of our expression of an American character apart from its 
obsession with corporate capital (7).  Writers could best assist us, he argued, 
in the “whole vast problem of reaching down to the hidden vitals, and of 
bringing these up -- their energy and truth -- into the play of articulate life” 
(Frank 4).    
D.H. Lawrence’s imaginative history, Studies in Classic American 
Literature (1923), located a usable past in figures like Whitman, Melville, 
Poe, and Hawthorne.  “There is a new voice in the old American classics,” he 
declared, though he admitted that it “is hard to hear . . . as hard as it is to 
listen to an unknown language.  We just don’t listen” (1).  Hart Crane, in his 
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1930 poem, The Bridge, likewise inquired of the contemporary scene, “Years 
of the Modern!  Propulsions toward what capes?” (94-5).  Looking, like 
Lawrence or Frank, to past literary figures, Crane invoked a saintly vision of 
Whitman as a partial guide – “yes, Walt,/ Afoot again, and onward without 
half, --/ Not soon, nor suddenly, -- no, never to let go/ My hand/ in yours,/ 
Walt Whitman” (95).  This echoed Brooks’ own invocation of Whitman in 
America’s Coming of Age in 1915, as having “precipitated the American 
character” (118).  “All those things,” Brooks attested,
which had been separate, self-sufficient, incoordinate –
action, theory, idealism, business – he cast into a crucible; 
and they emerged, harmonious and molten, in a fresh 
democratic ideal, which is based upon the whole personality. 
(Coming 118)
The interest in earlier writers, of course, was fed partly by Williams' and 
others' feeling that the humanism of their literary forebears validated and 
confirmed the value of the individual, the subjective and the personal in an 
impersonal, anti-liberal, and menacing age.   
* * * * * 
Williams’ critics have long noted the need to put the poet in the 
context of his contemporaries.  “We still need a study of Williams’s sense of 
American history,” Paul Mariani asserts, “which would cover not only In the 
American Grain but also other prose and poetry, including Paterson” (Critics
243).  Mariani adds: “There is also room for a book on Williams and his 
contemporaries” (Critics 243).  There is no shortage of excellent critical 
works addressing Williams’ relation to the visual arts, painters and artists 
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such as Charles Demuth, Alfred Stieglitz, Marsden Hartley, and Juan Gris.  
This study, however, builds on the outstanding work of recent critics like 
Brian Bremen, John Beck, and Alec Marsh, who explore Williams’ writing as 
a defense of democratic principles and individual liberty.  
Marsh positions Williams and Pound in Money and Modernity as 
“latter-day Jeffersonians . . . in a long tradition of American political and 
economic dissent” (x).  Both poets seek to “democratize capitalism by 
reorganizing its benefits” and to return the “control of money” to the people 
(ix-x).  Marsh argues that “it is their economic determinism that makes Pound 
and Williams most modern and most like other intellectuals of their time”(2).  
Thinkers like Turner, Beard, Parrington, and J. Allen Smith had, like the 
poets, the formative “political experience of Populism,” which made all of 
them “consciously Jeffersonian” (2).  Marsh argues that Williams and Pound 
believed that poetry must “restore true aesthetic, ethical, and moral values, 
an undertaking that entailed agitation in verse for a practical political program 
bent on defining exactly what money was and what it was not” (5).  This 
meant distinguishing the “Jeffersonian version of capitalism [which] reflects a 
belief in use values” from Hamilton’s “exchange values, ‘worth’ as opposed to 
‘value’” (12).  Marsh characterizes Pound and Williams’ work as partly 
“Jeffersonian jeremiads and partly experimental structures through which 
Jeffersonianism can be renovated and modernity reshaped” (14).  Marsh 
focuses on historically “defining and tracing Jeffersonian economic ideals 
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and their aesthetic implications from the early United States to the ‘corporate 
age,’” including in Pound’s and Williams’ work (9).
Marsh is particularly interested in how John Dewey’s attempt to 
“‘adapt Jeffersonian idealism to the corporate industrial-age,’” “rescues the 
poet’s critique of capitalism from the often cryptic, sometimes evil chatter that 
badly damages the latter half of Pound’s Cantos” (Money 7).  Marsh 
contends that through the “pragmatism of Dewey, Williams was able to see a 
way out of the otherwise unavoidably reactionary anti-industrialism that 
eventually crippled Pound’s critique” (7-8).  Pragmatism “taught Williams that 
we cannot go back to the past.  We cannot deny history,” and it “allowed 
Williams to maintain a constructive position as a poet and a social critic” (8).    
John Beck, in Writing the Radical Center: William Carlos Williams, 
John Dewey, and American Cultural Politics (2001), claims that the poet’s 
“conception of art is embedded in . . . the language of liberal democracy” and 
that the “questions Williams asks concerning art and the artist are, then, 
closely related to the conditions of American democracy, to the ‘economic, 
the sociological’ forces that shape this democracy, and therefore impinge 
upon the consciousness of its citizens” (2).  Beck relates Williams, as a 
matter of ”ideological confluence” and shared “social progressivism,” to the 
educator and philosopher John Dewey, who “sought to answer the kind of 
questions Williams is so keen to consider” (2-3).  Beck identifies Dewey and 
Williams with “progressive liberalism” of the 1920s and 1930s that “faced . . . 
with the impossible choice between fascism and communism, . . . made 
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much of their middle ground, of the possibility of change without bloodshed, 
of cooperation over conflict, and of communication over censorship” (4).  
Williams and Dewey, Beck claims, “speak the language of American 
democracy with a lack of equivocation not shared by many of their 
contemporaries (Williams’ long-running argument with his friend Ezra Pound 
comes to mind, not to mention his antipathy toward T.S. Eliot’s views)” (4).  
Williams and Dewey shared a desire to “recharge the dissipated power” of 
the “guiding principles” of American democracy (Beck 4).  They are, “like 
other liberal intellectuals of their time,” contends Beck, “primarily concerned, 
not with internecine squabbles of professional elites and political ideologues, 
but with America in its entirety, and with the relation between the usefulness 
of knowledge and its application in the renovation or resuscitation of the 
polis” (6).  Williams, then, redefines “artistic work as a form of social 
democratic praxis” and his critique “depends on individual agency in an age 
when such agency is thwarted at every turn” (Beck 136, 155).   
Brian Bremen focuses his seminal study, William Carlos Williams and 
the Diagnostics of Culture (1993), on “Williams as a ‘medicine-man’ whose 
writing is always a form of criticism-as-diagnosis” (6).  Bremen explains that 
Williams’ “understanding of language” is consistent with that of his friend, 
historian and critic Kenneth Burke, who held that art should be primarily 
understood as a “symbolic act of synthesis” of “myriad social and personal 
factors” (6).  Any analysis of Williams’ work, then, requires appreciating how 
the poet constructs an aesthetic of “dialogue, dialectic” to encompass and 
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represent these factors (4).  Bremen argues that by “asserting his own 
dialectical mechanism in opposition to customary forms of representation, 
Williams engages in a cultural critique that acts as both an engaged 
diagnosis and a step toward cure” (8).  “Williams’s own concern with history, 
culture, and the word becomes the way in which he can extend his 
diagnostics beyond the individual to embrace both the language and the 
community, providing both cure and consolation” (7).  Bremen explores, in 
particular, the political implications of prose and poetry, and the ways in 
which Williams distinguishes them.  The larger dialectic movement of 
Williams’ work, of which the relation of verse to prose is just one facet, 
Bremen asserts, comprises “the promotion of ‘creative democracy’” and, 
quoting Cornel West, “‘the cultural enrichment and moral development of 
self-begetting individuals and self- regulating communities by means of the 
release of human powers provoked by novel circumstances and new 
challenges’” (8).  
This study is broadly sympathetic with and seeks to complement the 
work of Marsh, Beck and Bremen.   Indeed, without the able scholarship and 
thoughtful readings of Williams’ work contributed by these and other critics, 
the present study might not be possible, and certainly it would not have 
assumed its current form.  My study explores in greater detail Williams’ work 
in relation to the progressive historians, liberal literary critics, and his fellow 
poets, all of whom are acknowledged but do not comprise the focus of the 
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preceding studies.  I place Williams more in relation to Ezra Pound (and to a 
lesser extent, Eliot), in the manner of Alec Marsh.  
My own argument that Williams asserted the democratic ethos in the 
face of illiberal forces means that I strongly agree with Marsh that Williams 
remains a “counterforce to anxieties about the status of the individual in a 
corporate age” (Money 7).  I share as well Marsh’s awareness of the 
dilemma created for Williams and his peers by accepting economic 
determinism as a key to history.  Marsh asks how, if the march of history is a 
simple matter of determinative economic forces, the individual could avoid 
being “abolished” (234-35).  Marsh’s answer, which is a detailed analysis of 
Williams’ pragmatism and Jeffersonianism, comprises an extremely valuable 
contribution to Williams studies.  My own answer to the dilemma of economic 
determinism is that Williams found a way to move past it to a kind of 
emotional determinism by making economic hierarchies contingent upon 
emotional resonances, by historicizing adaptation and choice, and by 
structuring an aesthetic to engage the reader’s active participation in forming 
an historical narrative.  While I take a slightly different approach from Marsh, 
my argument does rely on two factors that Marsh notes were available to the 
poet and his contemporaries, namely, an “insistence” on the power of 
“human adjustment” and an approach that sought “to render human beings 
capable of mastering the processes of modernization that are changing 
them, allowing them to make their own way in it” (235).  
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While I do not place Williams in relation to theorists such as John 
Dewey or Kenneth Burke, I do explore what critic Bryce Conrad notes in 
Refiguring America: A Study of William Carlos Williams in the American 
Grain (1990), namely, the relation of In the American Grain, and other works 
by Williams, “to contemporary reevaluations of American history by Van 
Wyck Brooks, . . . Waldo Frank, D.H. Lawrence, . . . . Hart Crane,” and others 
(9).  This study explores the commonality of Williams’ views with other 
progressives in the 1910s through 1930s regarding the purposes and effects 
of writing history.  I am interested, in particular, in the affective emphasis of 
Williams’ economic critique.  I am interested as well in how his aesthetic 
structures the reader’s response in the specific context of the historical 
dialectic of “contact” (also called “touch,” “marriage”) and fear (or 
“withdrawal”).  In these particular aspects, Williams’ history writing reflects 
how he moved beyond the economic determinism that he shared with his 
progressive peers.
In the chapters that follow I will explore in specific terms how Williams, 
in the context of his intellectual milieu, wrote history to re-establish the 
primacy of the individual and of the democratic mass and democratic spirit in 
an illiberal, often politically regressive, age.  Chapter Two will address 
Williams’ existential historicism in the context of contemporary progressive 
notions regarding the very act of writing history.  Williams shared his 
contemporaries’ belief in the need for a usable past, though he defined it in 
ways that were more nuanced, and crafted it into the very structure of his 
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work by what I will call in chapter four his participatory aesthetics.  I will 
consider as well how Williams’ activity in the Social Credit movement fit with 
his peers’ view of history writing as a means of recovery, resistance, and 
release – as an act in defense of political democracy that had been 
subverted by a rival economic structure.
In Chapter Three I focus on In the American Grain, specifically, to 
explore what I call Williams’ affective economics.  I am interested in how the 
poet contextualized the war by corporate capital on the democratic impulse in 
the broader contest of primary versus secondary culture and in how he made 
the economic impulse rely on the human, emotive drama of fear in the face 
of the unknown.  In this way, William moved beyond or beneath economics 
and made the corporate engine dependent on human factors, thus bringing it 
within our control.   I explore as well how Williams figured our encounter with 
the New World along putatively economic lines, but transformed these into 
emotional stances towards New World experience.  Thus, the representative 
historical figures who people In the American Grain enacted a binary of 
giving versus grabbing, sharing versus withholding.  This has at least one 
effect, that of historicizing a stance of responsiveness and adaptation, which
formed the core of Williams’ version of the “usable past.” 
Chapter Four explores the participatory aesthetics of In the American 
Grain that complement the affective economics.  The poet returned individual 
initiative and control to the reader by crafting a democratic, participatory and 
kinetic aesthetic.  The reader writes the history he reads by the choices he 
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must make based on Williams’ manipulation of primary source material.   The 
poet constantly puts before the reader the essential historical binary, the 
conflict between primary and secondary, democratic and capitalist, contact 
and withdrawal.  This compels the reader to decide for himself what is at 
stake and to situate himself in this conflict.  Williams is the intermediate 
authority – he would guide us to corroborate his vision – but his aesthetic 
was consciously crafted to be open enough to enable the reader to choose 
for himself or herself.  I explore, in particular, three stylistic elements of In the 
American Grain, namely, the aesthetic construction of the work itself, the use 
of a terminology of valuation to effect an economic and affective 
redistribution, and the introduction of a series of revelatory identifications 
between the poet, the reader, and representative historical figures.  
Chapter Five focuses on Paterson.  I am interested here in how 
Paterson further elaborated and fundamentally transformed the affective 
economics of In the American Grain.  Fear of the primary was now 
complemented by fear of the secondary.  Moreover, fear gets played out in 
Paterson in more deeply personal ways for the poet through his dissonant 
encounters with a series of contemporary female figures who represent the 
primary.  The romantic identifications of In the American Grain were replaced 
by more complex, often conflictual, encounters with these representative 
figures, more particularly Cress, “She,” Beautiful Thing and Madame Curie.  
All of the figures enact the poet’s trope of discovery in dissonance as 
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Williams used writing to effect a release across economic and non-economic 
lines.  
* * * * * 
I want to note at the outset that my critical approach, generally, as well 
as my discussion of participatory aesthetics, in particular, throughout this 
study, corresponds to the theoretical Reader-Response framework of 
Wolfgang Iser and Stanley Fish.  Iser’s contention that the “reader and author 
participate in a game of the imagination” (“Reading Process” 51) recalls 
Williams’ assertion in “Spring and All” that “In the imagination, we are 
henceforth (so long as you read) locked in a fraternal embrace, the classic 
caress of author and reader” (89).  “We are one,” Williams declared, 
“Whenever I say, ‘I’ I mean also, ‘you.’  And so, together, as one, we shall 
begin” (89).  I am not claiming that Williams articulates the fundamental 
bases of reader-response criticism twenty or forty years prior to Iser's, Fish's 
and others' theorizing on the affective experience of the reading process.  
Indeed, at some points, Williams even posits reading as passive, and thereby 
dangerous.  “If we read alone,” he attested, “we are somehow convinced that 
we are not quite alive, that we are less than” our predecessors (Embodiment
107).  “To read, while we are imbibing the wisdom of the ages, we are at the 
same time imbibing the death and imbecility, the enslaving rudeness of the 
ages” (Embodiment 107).  
Yet, Williams does posit a different kind of engagement by the reader 
such that he would certainly share Iser’s view that the literary text must “be 
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conceived in such a way that it will engage the reader's imagination in the 
task of working things out for himself, for reading is only a pleasure when it is 
active and creative” (“Reading Process” 51).  Williams recognized in each 
man who writes the attempt to "strike straight to the core of his inner self, by 
words” (Embodiment 105).  Williams' similar declaration that “WE are at the 
center of the writing, each man for himself” can apply equally to the writer or 
the reader in the unique participatory aesthetic that he crafted (107, 
emphasis in original).  In animating readers as citizens, Williams’ aesthetic 
recalls Iser's contention that as the "reader passes through the various 
perspectives offered by the text, and relates the different views and patterns 
to one another, he sets the work in motion, and so sets himself in motion" 
(“Interaction” 106).  Stanley Fish likewise argues that reading is a “[k]inetic 
art” – "it forces you to be aware of 'it' as a changing object"  – and 
also to be aware of yourself as correspondingly changing.  Kinetic art does 
not lend itself to a static interpretation because it refuses to stay still and 
doesn’t let you stay still either.  In its operation it makes inescapable the 
actualizing role of the observer, [and recognizes] ‘the movingness,’ of the 
meaning experience and . . . the active and activating consciousness of 
the reader. (401) 
These are not simply abstract or theoretical propositions about how a 
text processes a reader and how a reader processes a text.  They are, 
rather, apt characterizations of what Williams requires of his readers and 
what he positions them to attain.  
The "structured blanks" that fall between seemingly unrelated or even 
contradictory passages or textual segments, particularly in a work as 
complex and fragmented as Paterson, for instance, "spur the reader into 
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coordinating these perspectives and patterns – in other words, they induce 
the reader to perform basic operations within the text" (Iser, “Interaction” 111-
12).  Iser argues, and I believe that Williams' work offers a pure example of 
how in modernist texts, the reader is called to fill “gaps” and bridge 
“blockages” in the process of processing the text (“Reading Process” 55).  
Modernist texts are "often so fragmentary that one's attention is almost 
exclusively occupied with the search for connections between the fragments; 
the object of this is not to complicate the 'spectrum' of connections, so much 
as to make us aware of the nature of our own capacity for providing links" 
(55).  This is the key to Williams' aesthetic program.  He defended the 
prerogative and liberty of the individual by how he crafted what Fish calls an 
"affective stylistics" to make the reader actively compose the narrative.  
Williams wanted us to fulfill our capacity to make these “links,” and his 
democratic programs relied on it.
Iser explains this aspect of the phenomenon of reading as an act of 
recreation, recalling William’s own description of the artistic process.  "In a 
process of trial and error," Iser contends, quoting John Dewey’s Art as 
Experience:
we organize and re-organize the various data offered us by the text.  
These are the given factors, the fixed points on which we base our 
'interpretation,' trying to fit them together in the way we think the 
author meant them to be fitted.  ‘For to perceive, a beholder must 
create his own experience.  And his creation must include relations 
comparable to those which the original producer underwent. They are 
not the same in any literal sense.  But with the perceiver, as with the 
artist, there must be an ordering of the elements of the whole that is in 
form, although not in details, the same as the process of organization 
the creator of the work consciously experienced.  Without an act of 
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recreation the object is not perceived as a work of art.’ (qtd. in 
“Reading Process” 62, emphasis in original)
Williams' own notion of the creative process as recreative, creating 
something co-extensive with life, echoes Iser's notion of reading as a 
recreative process.  In language that can characterize writing or reading, 
Williams argued in “Spring and All” that the "imagination . . . attacks, stirs, 
animates, is radio-active in all that can be touched by action" (149).  Indeed, 
Williams invoked John Gaunt's speech in Shakespeare's Richard II to 
illustrate the equally vital and active roles of the reader and writer.  Williams 
contended that as the play is “written to be understood as a play, the author 
and reader are liberated to pirouette with the words which have sprung from 
the old facts of history, reunited in present passion" (“Spring” 149, emphasis 
added).  The poet essentially demonstrates the truth of Iser's contention that 
in literary works the "message is transmitted in two ways, in that the reader 
'receives' it by composing it" (“Interaction” 107).  
Fish's and Iser's focus on reading as a "process of continual 
modification" (Iser, “Reading Process” 56), of recurrent "establishing and 
disrupting consistency," (61) and of an ongoing "interaction between the 
explicit and the implicit, between revelation and concealment" (“Interaction” 
111) is particularly fitting for such disjunctive texts as Paterson and In the 
American Grain.  With such radically discontinuous texts, reading is best 
understood as "an event, something that happens to, and with the 
participation of, the reader (Fish 386), and it is necessary to analyze the 
"developing responses of the reader in relation to the words as they succeed 
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one another in time" (388, emphasis in original).  Williams' aesthetic is all 
about structuring and enabling – necessitating, even –  what Fish calls the 
“reader’s actualizing participation" (389) as the reader 's mind works "on the 
raw material of the text" (Iser, “Reading Process” 54) in the same manner 
that representative historical figures encounter the "raw new" of life in this 
hemisphere.  This accords with Williams' prescription in The Embodiment of 
Knowledge for "a useful body of knowledge made to serve the individual who 
is primary" (9, emphasis in original).  
In conclusion, Williams’ primary purpose was to re-animate what he 
called in Paterson the “thousand automatons” who “because they/ neither 
know their sources nor the sills of their/ disappointments walk outside their 
bodies aimlessly/ for the most part,/ locked and forgot in their desires –
unroused” (1: 6).  “They walk incommunicado,” Williams declared, because 
the “equation is beyond solution . . . . The language is missing them/ they die 
also/ incommunicado.  The language, the language/ fails them/ They do not 
know the words/ or have not/ the courage to use them” (1: 10-11).  Williams 
hoped in the history he wrote to give democratic man his story, his language 
– to give him his life back from the mercantile interests that seized it.  
America may be, as Frank suggested, a “turmoiled giant who cannot speak” 
(4), but good criticism and imaginative history writing could make her 
“articulate” through “self-knowledge” (5).  What better way to animate 
America's walking dead and to provoke self-knowledge than by an aesthetic 
and text that "activates our own faculties" (Iser, “Reading Process” 54).  
50
What Fish says of the reader-response method can equally describe 
Williams' own aesthetic: "In a peculiar and unsettling (to theorists) way, it is a 
method which processes its own user, who is also its only instrument.  It is 
self-sharpening and what is sharpens is you.  In short, it does not organize 
materials, but transforms minds" (425, emphasis in original).  This is critical 
because we may, in the final analysis, apply to Williams and his 
contemporaries, as well as to ourselves, what Parrington in Main Currents
observes of the “polemics of colonial debate” (1: i).  The 
subjects with which they dealt are old-fashioned only in 
manner and dress; at heart they were much the same themes 
with which we are engaged, and with which our children will 
be engaged after us. (1: i)
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Chapter II:  A “Revloution [sic] with Writing as the Fulcrum:” The 
Progressive Critique, "Economic Democracy," 
and the Reversal of Puritan 
Scarcity
Now our present institutions are not designed to promote the free and joyous development of 
the individual as a member of society, for ‘all our institutions have their historic basis in 
Authority,’ and the main purpose of all ancient authority is to hamper the great mass of 
people and keep them in a safe routine.
- James Harvey Robinson, “The Still Small Voice of the Herd” (313)
The history of thought is one of the most potent means of dissolving the bonds of prejudice 
and the restraints of routine.
- James Harvey Robinson, The New History (131)
The business of history is to arouse an intelligent discontent, to foster a fruitful radicalism.
- Carl Becker, “Review” (21)
[I]n history, to preserve things of ‘little importance’ may be more valuable – as it is more 
difficult and more the business of a writer – than to champion a winner.  
- William Carlos Williams, In the American Grain (76)
[S]hall we under economic pressure retain the long fought for principles of representative 
democratic government which we inherit from the past or relinquish them today?
- William Carlos Williams, “Revolutions Revalued” (98)
“In my world, “ William Carlos Williams declared in 1939, “there are no 
classes but the good guys and the bastards” (Partisan Review 43).  Four 
years earlier, in a review entitled “Pound’s Eleven New Cantos,” Williams 
referred to the “Damned and the Damnable” (Essays 168).  The Cantos, he 
attested, “should become an Index” of these classes, “the anatomized 
Inferno of our lives today” (168, emphasis in original).  The same can be said 
for Williams’ own cultural critique of the “social distresses which need 
righting,” which he attributed in a 1936 speech at the Institute of Public 
Affairs at the University of Virginia, to “a very badly managed, because poorly 
understood economics” ("Revolutions" 98).  In the “Power Age,” Williams 
alleged, “political democracy” was being “thoroughly subverted by a rival 
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economic structure which . . . negates much of the democratic intention” (97-
99).    Thus, he would assert later in his career: “I’m out of sympathy with all 
our capitalists to this day.  Money is the death of America . . . money is a 
cancer” (Interviews 51-2).  Williams’ progressive peers agreed, and it is this 
theme and their efforts to preserve liberal democracy in an illiberal age that 
defined Williams’ career in relation to his contemporaries.  
This chapter explores how Williams and the progressive historians 
and critics projected their sense of economic crisis into history and how 
writing history itself became a radical act.  The history they wrote played a 
seminal role in the continual struggle (at levels personal and cultural) 
between a progressive, democratic impulse and a vast economic machine.  
Williams, Beard, Parrington, Van Wyck Brooks, Frank and others subscribed 
to an economic determinism played out in the contemporary scene and in the 
historical struggle between the ideals enshrined in the Declaration of 
Independence and the economic interests served by the Constitution.  They 
critiqued the inadequate standard histories that preceded them, as well as 
the culture’s adherence to outmoded customs and practices.  Williams and 
his progressive peers, in short, sought a history writing based on social 
activism.  
The Social Credit movement, with which Williams was involved in the 
mid and late 1930s, espoused “economic democracy” through the equitable 
distribution of financial credit.  It was intended to preserve the prerogatives 
and foster the potential of the individual as the best way to ensure the future 
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viability of liberal democracy.  Williams’ own Social Credit activities date at 
least to 1934 when Gorham Munson (literary critic, editor of New Democracy, 
and teacher at the New School for Social Research in New York, where 
Robinson, Beard, and Barnes taught at that time) had Major Douglass’ new 
Social Credit sent to Williams directly from the publisher (Weaver 103).  In 
April of that year, Williams helped to bring Douglas to New York to lecture on 
Social Credit.  Williams joined the General Council of the League for National 
Dividends in 1936.  That same year he traveled to Charlottesville to speak 
about credit monopoly from a “[c]ultural [v]iewpoint” at the Institute of Public 
Affairs at the University of Virginia.  Here he reminded his audience of the 
need to preserve individual freedom as an “important agency of government” 
("Revolutions" 96, 99).  Williams registered at once as a dues-paying 
member when the American Social Credit Movement was launched by 
Munson in October 1938.   Throughout the early and mid 1930s – three times 
in 1934, twice in 1935, and once in 1936 – Williams published in New 
Democracy, the journal of the American Social Credit Movement edited by 
Gorham Munson.  He published periodically – twice in 1932 and once in 
1933 – in its London equivalent, New English Weekly.  Included in these 
articles were Williams’ review, “Pound’s Eleven New Cantos,” in 1935, and a 
1934 “Commentary on Williams,” by Pound.  
Williams and Pound elaborated on the cultural critique and economic 
determinism of the progressive historians and liberal literary critics by their 
activity in the Social Credit movement.  Recognizing Williams’ engagement in 
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Social Credit provides an essential context for understanding his history 
writing as a form of social activism and reform, and for appreciating his 
seminal prose works of the 1930s, namely, "The American Background" 
(1934), "Revolutions Revalued" (1936), and "Against the Weather" (1939), 
and the evolution of his poetics, especially in Paterson.  Beyond the 
economic critique that infused Williams’ history writing project, lay his 
construction of a “usable past” through the affective economics and 
participatory aesthetics that I discuss in Chapter Three and Chapter Four, 
respectively.  Before we can reach these latter aspects of Williams’ “poem 
including history,” however, we must more fully understand how the 
economic critique and the idea of writing as a form of social action were both 
underlying premises in Williams’ career-long exploration of a “usable past.”
* * * * *
Writing history, Williams responded to the Partisan Review’s 1939 
questionnaire to “representative” American writers, involved identifying a 
“usable past,” which he defined as a “past as alive in its day as every 
moment is today alive in me.”  “The only question of any relevance,” the poet 
contended,
is, Was that work alive to its own day?  If so then it is alive every day.  
If it was a palpable denial of its own day then – if I can discover it as 
such – out with it.  I want to look in a work and see in it a day like my 
own, of altered shapes, colors, but otherwise the same. (Partisan 
Review 41-42)  
Seeing this, Williams claimed, was something “I can use to reinforce my 
senses and my intelligence to go on discovering in my own day such things 
as those old boys had the courage and intelligence to discover in theirs”  
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(42).  History and history writing, then, were ensconced in the present, which 
critic James Longenbach describes as “existential historicism” in The 
Modernist Poetics of History.  We will see in Chapter Three that a usable 
past would embody a stance of adaptation and responsiveness to one’s own 
moment.  Williams’ view of history did not enshrine a golden past but 
required “great powers of adaptability” to “the new conditions” of life around 
us ("Background" 134, emphasis in original).  It was the temporal analogue of 
Frederick Jackson Turner’s thesis of “perennial rebirth” at each spatial 
iteration of the frontier.  Turner imagined democracy and democratic 
institutions being reinvented at each new edge of civilization as the frontier 
moved westward.  So, too, Williams imagined engaged citizen-readers 
always defining anew their relation to their past, and through it, their own 
contemporary moment.
Attaining a usable past, however, was no simple matter as propertied 
interests struggled to maintain the status quo and control the historical 
narrative.  In fact, “History,” an early poem published by Williams in Al Que 
Quiere (1917), illustrated that the past was contested ground.  The drama of 
the poem resides in how it stages a competition between the voice of the 
dead priest and the living poet.  The three interior stanzas comprise tales 
from the crypt -- “Uresh-Nai, priest to the goddess Mut,/ Mother of All” uses 
his wealth and power to speak through a co-opted art (Collected Poems 1: 
81).  The sarcophagus is his message.  “‘The chisel is in your hand, the 
block/ is before you,'” he commands the artisan (1: 82).  “‘[C]ut as I shall 
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dictate:/ This is the coffin of Uresh-Nai,/ priest to the Sky Goddess, --  built/ to 
endure forever!'” (1: 82).  “‘I arrogant against death!,'” he adds, “‘I/ Who have 
endured!  I worn against/ the years!’" (1: 84).  
But the poet’s commands compete with the priest’s.  “Run your finger 
against this edge!,” the poet urges, “—here went the chisel! – and think/ of an 
arrogance endured six thousand years/ without a flaw!” (1: 81-2).  The poet 
circumscribes the priest’s arrogance, first calling it “love” – an “oil to embalm 
the body,” a “packet of spices, a strong-/ smelling liquid to be squirted into/ 
the thigh” (1: 82).  Ultimately, though, despite his best efforts, the priest ends 
up no better than “Gnats on dung!” (1: 82).  The poet further minimizes the 
priest’s status – “Your death? – water/ spilled upon the ground” – and 
rebukes him: “water will mount again into rose-leaves --/ but you? – would 
hold life still,/ even as a memory, when it is over” (1: 82-3).  
The poet, in fact, substitutes his own carved message for the one 
inscribed on the sarcophagus – and adopting a prophetic voice he speaks to 
the priest and reader simultaneously: “Climb about this sarcophagus, read/ 
what is writ for you in these figures/ hard as granite that has held them/ with 
so soft a hand the while/ your own flesh has been fifty times/ through the guts 
of oxen, -- read!/ ‘I who am the one flesh say to you,/ The rose-tree will have 
its donor/ even though he give stingily” (1: 83).  The speaker asserts the 
primacy of the present, the living, and pointedly integrates the priest into the 
life cycle.  The granite, which represented the priest’s arrogant endeavor to 
“endure” and to outlast death, is now figured as “so soft,” almost caressing 
57
and human, and the priest’s own flesh is, ironically, recycled through oxen 
guts.  In the key line, “I am the one flesh,” the priest’s flesh appears to be 
identified with a god-like being, and is, paradoxically, brought closer to his 
creator, only by virtue of the very “flesh” the priest would deny.  
“History” is a struggle between the common man, those who visit the 
museum, and the powerful and wealthy, represented by the priest.  He would 
direct the artisan and, across the millennia, the masses that flock through the 
museum turnstiles.  In this scheme, history, far from Williams’ notion of a 
usable past, is a static, imposed entity.  The priest attempts to use or control 
the present, not the other way around.  “Each age,” Williams asserted in The 
Embodiment of Knowledge, “wishes to enslave the others” (107).  The poet 
accuses the priest of trying to “hold life still,/ even as a memory, when it is 
over” (Collected Poems 1: 83).  
The fourth section of “History” comprises the priest’s desperate 
attempt to keep the public reading his sarcophagus – “‘Lay your hands/ upon 
the granite as a lover lays his/ hand upon the thigh and upon the/ round 
breasts of her who is beside/ him'” (1: 83).  Desperation even creeps in as 
the priest declares: “‘Here I am with head high and a/ burning heart eagerly 
awaiting/ your caresses, whoever it may be,/ for granite is not harder than/ 
my love is open'” (1: 84).  But Williams further circumscribes the priest’s 
control, ultimately, by the very aesthetic structure of the poem, which asserts 
the primacy of the present and the living.  Williams curbs the high priest’s 
aspirations by sandwiching his pronouncements between a first and fifth 
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stanza that depict museum-goers entering, and especially exiting, the 
museum.  “Nobody comes here today," he concludes (1: 81) – and on exiting 
the speaker observes: “Look! This/ northern scenery is not the Nile” (1: 84).  
History and cultural authorities of the past are circumscribed by the present, 
which alone must be served in light of man’s contemporary needs and 
realities.  
“History” neatly captured in poetic form the very arguments that 
Robinson, Beard, Brooks, Frank, and others made about the purpose of 
writing history.   Studying history should disabuse us of our “persistent 
assumption” that “‘the wisdom of the Fathers,’ ‘the tried wisdom of the ages,’ 
‘the findings of mankind,’ and other postulated and rationalized entities are 
wholly adequate to the needs of the present day” (Barnes 587-88).  “The 
history of thought, Robinson wrote, “is one of the most potent means of 
dissolving the bonds of prejudice and the restraints of routine” (New History
131).  History writing and historical knowledge became for the progressives 
(poets, historians and critics alike) “rationale[s] for social action" and 
"instrument[s] for controlling the future” (Hofstadter 185).    
Williams was sympathetic to Carl Becker’s claim that the “business of 
history is to arouse an intelligent discontent, to foster a fruitful radicalism” 
(Becker, "New History" 21).   Williams’ history writing contained an 
unmistakable radical intent.  “[A]ll men are contemporaries,” he declared, in 
his 1935 review of Pound’s Cantos, “in whatever time they live or have lived, 
whose minds . . . have lifted them above the sordidness of a grabbing world” 
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(Essays 167).  This radical vision both collapsed historical time to make 
figures like Aaron Burr “contemporaries,” and presented a damning cultural 
and economic critique.  Economic struggle was a given, an essential part of 
the continuity of history.  The “situation is historic,” Williams declared in 
"Revolutions Revalued."  The usurpation of democratic institutions, and 
cultural and material resources, by a moneyed elite made us contemporaries 
with “Presidents Jackson and Van Buren [who] fought the first great battles in 
the campaign” ("Revolutions" 99).  The artist, then, was a “revolutionist” who 
“attacks, constantly toward a full possession of life by himself as a man” and 
“is to be understood not as occupying some outlying section of the field of 
action but the whole field” ("Against" 197-99).  Writing was “an attack” 
(Paterson 3: 113).  The artist was in “rebellion against the world” – especially 
as “certain things, disastrous things, are happening in the world because of 
man’s stupidity, definite stupidity” (Interviews 12-13).  “Nothing less is 
intended,” Williams told us, “than a revloution [sic] in thought with writing as 
the fulcrum” (Embodiment 98).  The poet as “social regenerator” engaged in 
“a continual, age long criticism of past times to suit the necessities, the 
discoveries, the total knowledge, the greater release of the human spirit that 
each age seeks to add to the last” ("Revolutions" 109).
History writing and the poem, then, were each a “social instrument” 
(Letters 286).  Restoring our past to us, the poem was “an attempt, an 
experiment, a failing experiment, toward assertion with broken means . . . of 
a new and total culture” (286).  At the simplest level, history writing was part 
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resistance to and recovery from the hegemony of corporate capital, and other 
anti-liberal forces of the time.  The task of In the American Grain, "The 
American Background," and Paterson was to recover the history that had 
been lost under the chaos of borrowed titles.  The history of Jackson and 
Van Buren represented “the sort of history we lack and must have” 
("Revolutions" 99).  Because of these presidents’ defense of the democratic 
ethos and the mass against property interests in the dispute over the 
National Bank, “[e]verything possible was done, as pointed out in recent 
years by Ezra Pound, to keep Van Buren’s telltale autobiography from the 
eyes of the people” (99-100).  
* * * * * 
Williams did more than simply argue for the restoration of missing 
passages of our past that spoke to individual liberty and the historical 
struggle to preserve it.  He also incorporated the progressive’s economic 
critique and economic determinism to reveal illiberal forces at work in history 
that he believed to be at work in his own time.  Thus, Williams and his peers 
essentially historicized the fight between the democratic impulse and 
corporate capital by means of a compelling economic determinism.  The 
poet’s work, Williams declared, was necessarily economics-related, 
historical, and muckraking, exposing the economic corruption of government, 
church, and the academy.  “Usury,” he asserted
– the work of double-crossing intellectual bastards in and out of 
government and the church – rules the world and hides the simple 
facts from those it torments for a profit.  The poet sees, links together 
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and discloses in the symmetry of his work this bastardy of all ages. 
(Essays 167)
Williams confirmed, not surprisingly, that he “was very conscious of” Pound’s 
“usura theme,” and acknowledged “I identified myself with him as far as I was 
able to, to assist him” (Interviews 52).  “I was very sympathetic with Pound, in 
this way,” Williams added, “I always had a sympathetic feeling toward 
socialism, and when Pound began to talk about it, he interested me in Major 
Douglas’" work (Interviews 51).  “Never worked with [Pound] at all in 
anything!,” Williams joked, “Never had any task that I know of in common 
(except to reform the American nation and the world, incidentally –  of course 
that’s a small matter)” (Interviews 10).  
Williams and Pound, then, shared a belief that financial manipulation 
and constriction by credit monopoly was responsible for the misery of 
millions.  They believed that the potential of the individual and of the masses 
would be released only by the equitable distribution of credit, as advocated 
by Major Douglas.  Williams, like Pound, looked beyond simply predatory 
credit practices to consider more broadly the effect of money – not only in 
terms of social inequities but in terms of how economic necessity narrowed 
men’s’ vision, even making them into, what he called in Paterson, 
“automatons.”  Williams knew that robots do not make good citizens, 
especially not in a liberal democracy.    
What Williams and Pound shared, though, should not blind us to 
clearly recognizing where their paths very sharply diverged.  Williams would 
identify Pound as “a good thinker in economics, but erratic” (Interviews 16).  
62
He reminded Pound as early as 1935 that “If you can’t tell the difference 
between yourself and a trained economist, if you don’t know your function as 
a poet, incidentally dealing with a messy situation re. money, then go sell 
your papers on some other corner” (Witemyer 171).  “What I want out of you 
is not economics but the poem,” Williams charged nearly twenty years later 
(qtd. in Mariani, New World 713).  Williams was alarmed by Pound’s flirtation 
with figures like Silvio Gessell, Hugo Frack and Gottfried Feder, “reformers 
whose political applications were tainted by fascism” (Weaver 109-10).  
Williams, in fact, accused Pound in 1940 of “slipping badly both in your 
mentality and the force of your attacks” (Letters 203).  “It comes,” Williams 
alleged
from babying yourself and hiding behind a philosophy you know 
damned well is contrary to everything you stand for, really.  I’ve 
defended you till I’m sick of it.  Why, for instance, try to tell me that 
your whole initiative hasn’t been anti-semitic of recent years?  You 
know damned well it has been so.  Tell somebody else such things but 
don’t try it on me if you value the least vestige of what we used to 
treasure between us. (Letters 203)
Williams’ own participation in the American Social Credit Movement, 
which I discuss at the end of this chapter as an elaboration of the concerns 
he shared with progressive historians and critics, was consistent with the 
Movement’s 1938 Manifesto, which attested to its belief in the “liberty and 
equality of opportunity of the individual irrespective of race, creed or color” 
(qtd. in Weaver 105).  “We abominate anti-Semitism,” the Manifesto 
asserted, and declared that the “Money Question and the so-called Jewish 
Question have NOTHING to do with each other and we will let no one confuse 
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this fact” (qtd. in Weaver 105-06, emphasis in original).  Williams admitted to 
Pound that “I have no use for Jews as Jews, their religion is so much shit” 
(Letters 203).  But so, too, was “T.S. Eliot’s religion or the Catholic Church” –
Judaism, the Church were simply “identical – in everything but the stuff they 
dilute the arsenic with” (203).  Both, Williams claimed, are “made for the 
same purpose, to deceive” (203).  
Williams viewed “wealth, by the influence it wields,” as the “chief 
cause of cultural stagnation” and “primary cultural decay” ("Background" 146-
47).  This view, which resonated not just with Pound but with his progressive 
peers, reflected a belief, based on Marxist theory, in the determinative effect 
of economics on social forms and political relations.  It did not mean, though, 
that Williams or his progressive contemporaries were committed to a Marxist 
teleology.  In fact, Williams embraced Social credit precisely because it stood 
on the firm, if endangered, ground between . . . fascism – in this 
country only definable as Credit Monopoly, in the hands of a select 
group, seeking control of government . . . on one side and dictatorship 
by labor . . . on the other, from both of which the abolition of personal 
liberty must be immediately expected once they succeed in their 
purposes. ("Revolutions" 115)
The progressive historians often, even reflexively, argued, as E.R.A. 
Seligman did in his 1902 volume The Economic Interpretation of History, that 
“‘the economic life is . . . the fundamental condition of all life’” (3).  Charles 
Beard cited Seligman’s thesis approvingly, believing it to be “‘as nearly 
axiomatic as any proposition in social science can be’” (Hofstadter 198).  
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“[T]hat the mainspring of the struggle is the economic,” Parrington asserted 
in "Economics and Criticism," “is plain as the way to parish church” (100).  
Parrington and other progressives attested to a hatred of “big 
business because of its brutal hoggishness” (qtd. in Hofstadter 370) and 
counted the economic interpretation of history as the “chief luminary” in their 
“intellectual sky’” (qtd. in Hofstadter 374).  Underlying even literature, “the fair 
flower of culture,” argued Parrington, are “deeper strata of philosophy, 
theology, law, statecraft – of ideology and institutionalism – resting finally 
upon the subsoil of economics” ("Economics" 98).  “We may begin as critics,” 
Parrington declared,
but we end up as historians . . . . He has only to apply the familiar 
principles of the economic interpretation of history to his literary 
documents, in order to measure in what degree they reflect the current 
ideology.  He cuts under the feet of the humanist to the property basis 
of ideas and institutions.  In every society, he discovers, property is 
sovereign. (98, 100)
Parrington argued that the Populists were “fighting the battle of 
democracy against an insolent plutocracy, defending the traditional American 
principles against a feudal industrialism” (Hofstadter 370), just as Frederick 
Jackson Turner traced the “contest between the capitalist and the democratic 
pioneer from the earliest colonial days” ("Social Forces" 164).  Hofstadter 
nicely encapsulates the intellectual stance of the progressive historians, and, 
I argue, of Williams and the liberal literary critics.  Wholly post-Civil War and 
post-industrial,” Hoftsadter asserts, 
the Progressive generation had grown up with American industry, had 
witnessed the disappearance of the frontier line, the submergence of 
the farmer, the agrarian revolt, the recruitment of a vast labor force, 
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the great tides of the new immigration, the fierce labor struggles of the 
1890’s.  Their awareness of the whole complex of industrial America 
was keener, and their sense of the urgency of its problems had been 
quickened by the depression of the 1890s.  They were disposed to 
think more directly about the economic issues of society, and to look 
again at the past to see if economic forces had not been somewhat 
neglected.  They were disposed also to think more critically about the 
ruling forces, about the powerful plutocracy that had been cast up by 
the national growth of the past thirty years. (41-42)
Williams and his contemporaries read into the past those economic 
forces determining the fate of their own time, and this was best illustrated by 
their assertion of a fundamental disjunction between the ideals of the 
American Revolution, enshrined in the Declaration of Independence, and the 
property interests secured by the Constitution.  Believing that class and 
property divisions form the basis of modern government, and that politics and 
constitutional law inevitably reflect these contending interests, Beard traced 
each founder’s economic holdings (including their land interests, public 
securities, and loans).  The “contest over the Constitution,” Beard contended 
in Economic Origins of the Jeffersonian Democracy, “was not primarily a war 
over abstract political ideals, such as state’s rights and centralization, but 
over concrete economic issues, and the political division which accompanied 
it was substantially along the lines the interests affected’” (qtd. in Skotheim 
92).  The Constitution should be understood as “‘essentially an economic 
document based upon the concept that the fundamental private rights of 
property are anterior to government and morally beyond the reach of popular 
majorities’” (Beard, Economic Interpretation 324-25).  Beard praised James 
Madison’s Federalist #10 as “a masterly statement of the theory of economic 
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determinism in politics” (15-16).  He critiqued the undemocratic method by 
which the framers convened the Constitutional Convention, defined its scope 
and authority to act, and secured its adoption.  As Beard explains, the 
Constitution was not 
created by the ‘whole people,’ which was a fiction of the jurists; nor by 
the states, which was a fiction of Southern nullifiers; but was ‘the work 
of a consolidated group whose interests knew no state boundaries 
and were truly national in their scope.’ (qtd. in Hofstadter 210)
Beard concluded that members of the Constitutional Convention could 
not be said to be “‘disinterested’” but rather “knew through their personal 
experiences in economic affairs the precise results which the new 
government that they were setting up was designed to attain. . . . [A]s 
practical men they were able to build the new government upon the only 
foundations which could be stable: fundamental economic interests” 
(Economic Interpretation 151).  The Constitution, Beard declared, “was an 
economic document drawn with superb skill by men whose property interests 
were immediately at stake; and as such it appealed directly and unerringly to 
identical interests in the country at large” (188).  
Beard was not alone of course.  President Woodrow Wilson, an 
academic before he entered politics, likewise asserted in Division and 
Reunion (1893) that the “federal government was not by intention a 
democratic government.  In plan and structure it had meant to check the 
sweep and power of popular majorities” (qtd. in Hofstadter 194).  “The 
government had, in fact, been originated and organized upon the initiative 
and primarily in the interest of the mercantile and wealthy classes,” claimed 
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Wilson (qtd. in Hofstadter 194).  “It had been urged to adoption by a 
minority,” he stated, “under the concerted and aggressive leadership of able 
men representing a ruling class . . . a strong and intelligent class possessed 
of unity and informed by a conscious solidarity of material interest” (qtd. in 
Hofstadter 194).
Historian Henry Jones Ford observed in The Rise and Growth of 
American Politics (1898) that the “‘constitutional history of the United States 
begins with the establishment of the government of the masses by the 
classes” (qtd. in Hofstadter 195).  Historian A.F. Bentley in The Process of 
Government (1935) asked: “‘[H]ow can one be satisfied with a theory that 
comes down hard on the federal Constitution as primarily a great national 
ideal, in the very face of the struggles and quarrels of the constitutional 
convention for the maintenance of pressing social interests?’” (qtd. in 
Hofstadter 187).  Finally, populist historian J. Allen Smith’s The Spirit of 
American Government (1907) prefigured Beard’s dualistic interpretation, 
describing a “long-running quarrel between aristocracy and democracy” 
embodied in the Constitution and Declaration, respectively (Hofstadter 192).
Williams employed the same economic determinism, though he 
adopted his own idiosyncratic labels, in "The American Background," In the 
American Grain, "Revolutions Revalued," and other works.  Local and 
individual initiative, which Williams designated in "The American 
Background" as “primary” culture, battled constantly with an imported, 
monied, “secondary” culture.  “Wider and wider the two bands of effort drew 
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apart,” Williams asserted (”Background" 145).  Echoing the dualism of 
Parrington’s  “liberal rather than conservative, Jeffersonian rather than 
Federalistic” (Main Currents 1: i) approach, Williams noted that the “division 
which must inevitably have taken place [was] signalized by the two more or 
less definite parties in American politics” ("Background" 145).  The binary 
initially explored throughout In the American Grain was even more explicitly 
related to economic forces in "The American Background."  “The secondary 
split-off from what, but for fear, had been a single impetus, finally focused 
itself as personal wealth in America” ("Background" 146).    The result was 
“cultural stagnation” and a “culture in effigy” (147).  
Williams repeated in his own terms the standard progressive 
economic gloss on the Revolutionary and Constitutional periods offered by 
Beard in The Economic Interpretation of the U.S. Constitution (1912).  “After 
the Revolution,” Williams declared, there “would be an accelerated dropping 
back to style and the unrelated importations” ("Background" 145).  “The war 
over, the true situation, raised into relief by patriotic fervor, would flatten out 
as before into the persistent struggle between the raw new and the 
graciousness of an imposed cultural design.  England eliminated, those very 
ones who opposed her would fast take the leading place in the scheme from 
which she had been driven” (138).  In short, “[f]inding itself, as a democracy, 
unable to take up the moral and economic implications of its new conditions, 
which Jefferson lived and proposed, America slumped back to fashion on the 
one, favored, side” (139, emphasis in original).  In this critical post-war 
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period, “wealth took the scene, representative of a sort of squatter spirit, 
irresponsible because unrelated to the territory it overran” (149).  
Williams explored this period in depth, fixing on Burr, particularly, as 
the exemplar of liberty, “a subversive force where liberty was waning” (Grain
194).  Sensitive to a “deeper and a stronger force passing through the 
moment,” Burr recognized the “defeat of England was the obvious false end” 
(193).  He saw that the real contest was whether America would “remember 
what in its hour of excitement it had promised, its declarations, its 
pronouncements, its Patrick Henry speeches.  Were these just expedients of 
war to spur to battle or was it serious?” (193)  Williams likened the early 
Constitutional period, which he characterized as “a living thing, something 
moving, undecided, swaying,” to his own present condition  (192).  “Which 
way will it go?,” he asked of the past, was it “something on the brink of the 
Unknown, as we are today” (193).  
Critically, the poet located in this historical period the subversion of 
individual liberty and the democratic spirit that he saw in his own time.  The 
“sense of the individual, the basis on which the war was fought,” Williams 
claimed, “instantly the war was over began to be debauched.  Randolph
sensed it.  Burr sensed it” (Grain 194).  Hamilton and the propertied interests 
would “harness the whole, young, aspiring genius to a treadmill . . . .  
Hamilton sewed up his privileges unto kingdomcome, through his holding 
company, in the State legislature.  His company, His United States: 
Hamiltonia – the land of the company” (195, emphasis in original).  Burr’s 
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“spark was not preserved” (197).  “Now he saw a somber Washington – with 
shrewd dog Hamilton at his side –locking the doors, closing the windows, 
building fences and providing walls;” the “Federal Government was slipping 
in its fangs.  The banks were being organized” (197).  Williams saw Burr’s 
drama as an inseminating moment – for “as it is a winter we are now in, and 
the more ordered the more wintry – dulled values, stereotyped effects of 
bygone adventures – so it began to be after the Revolution” (196).  
According to the progressive schema, Williams identified Andrew 
Jackson, because of his “basic culture” as the “first to smell out the growing
fault and attack the evidence of a wrong tack having been taken, the 
beginning raid on public moneys by private groups” ("Background" 141).  
Over time the “culture of immediacy, the active strain, which has left every 
relic of value which survives today,” and which resided in the “correctly aimed 
but crude and narrow beginnings” of small communities dried up and died 
("Background" 148).  
As some of the passages from Williams and his peers suggest, over-
simplification was a powerful rhetorical device, conferring clarity and 
commanding the reader’s attention despite a miasma of historical events and  
plethora of primary records.  Simple binary rhetoric significantly affects the 
shape and reception of the text.  If the reader develops what Wolgang Iser 
calls a “configurative meaning” by observing the direction in which different 
parts of the text “are leading us” and by projecting “onto them the 
consistency which we, as readers, require” ("Reading Process" 58-59), 
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simple binary oppositions, by posing more obvious disjunctions and 
dilemmas, make clear to the reader the necessity of his own active 
participation.  It is part of how Williams activates the reader’s imagination, 
throws the reader into the tussle, and makes him choose between conflicting 
viewpoints.  At the same time, over-simplified dramatic statements about 
economics and wealth allowed the author to present his message to the 
reader clearly and directly, and helped, paradoxically, to counteract the text's 
own disjunctiveness.  It may, though, reflect an ambivalence on the poet's 
part around wanting to animate readers as citizens by stimulating a 
recreative process that he hopes will lead them to replicate afresh his own 
imaginative acts, but wanting, as well, a hedge against not being able to 
control where the reader will end up.
Further, it is important to note that over- simplification extended 
beyond rhetoric to substance.  It reflected the habit of thought, the binary 
thinking of the era, and was a trait that Williams shared at some level with the 
progressive historians and liberal literary critics.  This is so even if Williams 
was drawn to Social Credit for the very reason that it avoided the extremes of 
fascism and communism.   
Despite his progressive critique, however, Williams was not purely 
reductionistic, and he was able, at times, to look beyond a simple binary.  He 
recognized that the monied, imported culture was necessary and even 
beneficial to a point – and lamented mostly that it came to “be taken to be a 
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virtue itself, a makeshift, really, in constant opposition to the work of those 
good minds which had the hardihood to do without it” ("Background" 144).
I do not believe that Williams objected so much to property as a basis 
for civil society.  He would have accepted the premise, I believe, that those 
who own also take care of what they own.  But the problem that Williams saw 
was that those in an ownership position, if unchecked, were prone, 
eventually, to use the community’s resources for their own purposes, and, 
finally, for their own gain.  The property argument – especially when it is 
rhetorically cast as “usury” – was meant to highlight this very fact, to throw it 
into dramatic relief.  
* * * * * 
Envisioning history writing as a form of recovery and social action, 
Williams and his peers necessarily confronted the inadequacies of standard 
histories to do what they felt history must do.  For Williams writing history 
was fundamentally informed by his belief that “[h]istory must stay open” 
(Grain 189).  If the poem was to be a social instrument, and if, as Beard 
asserted in The Rise of American Civilization (1927), the “‘history of 
civilization, if intelligently conceived, may be an instrument of civilization’”  
(qtd. in Hofstadter 314), then history could not be frozen like Uresh-Nai’s 
sarcophagus.  
The history that the progressive historians and literary critics wrote 
revealed how our culture had been determined by economic forces and 
capital interests, how it had been closed to the democratic and the primary.  
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Williams, then, sought to introduce a space for individual prerogative and 
liberty, and for contact with the primary, that Burr, Boone and others 
represented.  Williams was intent on breaking the grip or impasse of 
economics at two levels.  First, he presented a kind of hidden or alternative 
history, consisting of obscured, dispossessed figures that represented the 
democratic and the primary.  This is what Williams meant when he said “that, 
in history, to preserve things of ‘little importance’ may be more valuable – as 
it is more difficult and more the business of a writer – than to champion a 
winner” (Grain 76).  Moreover, in the process of constructing a “usable past” 
out of these dispossessed voluptuaries, Williams articulated what I call an 
“affective economics” making the secondary and economic dependent on a 
range of human emotions and affective stances.  
Second, what I call Williams’ “participatory aesthetic” opened a space 
and offered a means of resistance and recovery by crafting a singular 
historical aesthetic of co-creation.  The reader makes his own meaning, 
writes his own history, as he negotiates primary records, including journals of 
historical figures experiencing a “torsion in the spirits” induced by the new 
continent “tearing them between the old and the new” ("Background" 134).  
This participatory aesthetic makes men fashion, and each age define, its own 
usable past.  This converts readers into citizens, engaging them in civic life, 
and is critical to a healthy liberal democracy.  Both the affective economics 
and the participatory aesthetics had the effect of making history writing (and, 
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thereby, history) a living, open entity.  I will describe both of these aspects of 
Williams’ history writing in greater detail in Chapters Three and Four.  
At this point, we need to consider that Williams’ and his progressive 
peers’ alarm about standard histories reflected their sense that history was a 
resource and that like any resource it could be seized and used against us by 
propertied and conservative interests.  History’s potency – what should make 
us “fear it” –  according to Williams, was that it “lives in us practically day by 
day” (Grain 189).  “[I]f it is, as it may be,” Williams contended, “a tyranny over 
the souls of the dead – and so the imaginations of the living – where lies our 
greatest well of inspiration, our greatest hope of freedom . . . we should 
guard it doubly from the interlopers” (189).  “I speak of fiercely contested 
things,” the writer-speaker would tell his interlocutor in “The Virtue of History” 
in In the American Grain , referring to the struggle between capital interests 
and democracy that “tortured the souls of the founders” and the struggle to 
write our own history (194).  
History (inside and out, the content and the writing of it) was contested 
ground, and Williams always relished a good fight.  Daniel Boone’s 
biographer was an “asinine chronicler” whose “silly phrases and total 
disregard for what must have been the rude words of the old hunter serve 
only, for the most part, to make it a keen disappointment to the interested 
reader” (Grain 133, 135).  An historian’s conventional account of Samuel de 
Champlain and the founding of Quebec prompted Williams’ rebuke: “Good 
Lord, these historians!  By that I understand the exact opposite of what is 
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written” (69).  Histories of Thomas Morton exhibited a “nearly universal lack 
of scale ”and “parochialism” (75).  They were inadequate “to describe a man 
living under the circumstances that surrounded Morton” and rely too heavily 
on “pretty scholar humor [that] can be very annoying” (75).  More critically, 
what Williams said of the history of Morton applied for him across the board -
- conventional historiography “dulls rather than heightens” Morton’s work “as 
a piece from American History [that] has its savor” (80).
Williams was deeply disappointed, as were his progressive 
colleagues, by the history writing of the prior generation.  History that should 
reveal the co-optation of a primary culture by wealth and should protect us 
from interlopers was, instead, bound “up with prejudice” and warped “to suit 
our fears” (Grain 189).  Propertied interests, “extend[ing] their ill will 
backward, jealous even of a freedom in the past,” had maligned Burr and 
other promising figures (189).  “We are deceived by history,” claimed 
Williams (197).  This meant that we were likely to miss what was most 
important.  “America,” argued Williams, “had a great spirit given to freedom 
but it was a mean, narrow, provincial place; it was NOT the great liberty-
loving country, not at all.  Its choice spirits died” (197, emphasis in original).  
The significance was that a “country is not free, is not what it pretends to be, 
unless it leave a vantage open (in tradition) for that which Burr possessed in 
such remarkable degree” (197).  “This is my theme,” contended Williams 
(197).
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Williams saw “the history we are taught” as maligning or 
misrepresenting significant portions of our past (Embodiment 64).  The result 
was that history was “particularly blank” and the history we were not taught 
was “terrifying when one looks back at the years that have been spent solely 
to keep us ignorant” (64).  Consequently, “our most impressionable years 
[pass] without coming into contact . . . with what has happened and is 
happening around us” (64).  We have become like “fools” who do not believe 
that we “have sprung from anything: bone, thought and action” (Grain 113).  
We “will not see that what [we] are is growing on these roots” (113).  We 
have 
lost the sense, being made up as we are, that what we are has its 
origin in what the nation in the past has been; that there is a source in 
America for everything we think or do. (109, emphasis in original)
Williams argued that we must return to our past, to our origins, recognizing 
that “what has been morally, aesthetically worth while in America has rested 
upon peculiar and discoverable ground” (109).  We must see, Williams felt, 
that what we have become we have gotten by “word of mouth or from 
records contained for us in books,” not simply “out of the air or the rivers, or 
from the Grand Banks or wherever it may be”  (109).  
Reading history, then, for Williams, was not an academic nicety.  
Rather, he argued, “lacking intelligent investigation of the changes worked 
upon the early comers here, to the New World, the books, the records,” we 
will have no defense against becoming an “unconscious porkyard and oil-
hole” (Grain 109).  Our ignorance invites further cultural and economic 
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exploitation.  So it is, warned Williams, that “aesthetically, morally we are 
deformed unless we read” (109).  
As an illustration of the need to read, we can cite Williams' portrayal in 
In the American Grain of Pere Sebastien Rasles, the Jesuit priest who lived 
34 years “with his beloved savages” near present-day Quebec (120).  
Williams used Rasles’ journal to reveal another side to the Indians – “another 
music than the single horror of his war-whoop terrifying the invader” (124).  
Never reading Rasles, we would not realize that “we are used only to the 
English attitude bred of the Indian raid” which is “FIXED in us without 
realization of the EFFECT that such a story, such a tradition, entirely the 
product of the state of mind that it records, has had upon us and our feeling 
toward the country” (124-25, emphasis in original).  The “effect” of this story 
was precisely to expose the fear, which, as I discuss at length in Chapter 
Three, has been bred into the bone of successive generations by the 
dominant historical and cultural narrative.  
Williams believed that the usurpation of government and culture by 
corporate capital – the winter that began in the early federal period – was 
continuing in his own day and was reflected in his time’s art, history writing, 
and rigid adherence to custom.  Williams thus evoked a “culture in effigy” in 
which false values were enshrined by triumphant wealth and revealed in 
outmoded customs.  Williams lamented a 
generation of gross know-nothingism, of blackened churches where 
hymns groan like chants from stupefied jungles, a generation 
universally eager to barter permanent values  (the hope of an 
aristocracy) in return for opportunist material advantages. (Grain 68)
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There was, Williams contended, a “niggardliness” to our history, a “falseness 
of our historical notes, the complete missing of the point” (Grain 157).  
Williams saw an historical stance of withdrawal from the primary, what he 
would call the “quality," the "weight” of the New World (157).  This, he 
believed, was reflected in the “suppression of the superb corn dance of the 
Chippewas, since it symbolizes the generative processes” (157).  This 
suppression revealed the “tenacity with which fear still inspires laws, 
customs” (157).  Williams argued that his countrymen were like the Puritans 
who “knew only to keep their eyes blinded, their tongues in orderly manner 
between their teeth, their ears stopped by the monotony of their hymns and 
their flesh covered in straight habits” (Grain 112).  This persistence of 
traditional attitudes and suppression of native customs was as much a sexual 
repression as anything else.  In place of the celebration of the generative and 
sensual, Williams felt that his own time was left only with what he called in 
Paterson “divorce” and sterility.  Williams thus referred to this blind 
adherence to tradition as an “abortion of the mind” (112).
The progressive historians and critics shared Williams’ scorn for rigid 
custom.  The "past dominates and controls us, for the most part 
unconsciously and without protest on our part, ” and our youth “are reared 
with too much respect for the past, too little confidence for the future” 
(Robinson, New History  256).  “Curiously enough,” Robinson contends in 
The New History,
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our habits of thought change much more slowly than our environment 
and are usually far in arrears.  Our respect for a given institution or 
social convention may be purely traditional and have little relation to 
its value, as judged by existing conditions.  We are, therefore, in 
constant danger of viewing present problems with obsolete emotions 
and of attempting to settle them by obsolete reasoning.  This is one of 
the chief reasons why we are never by any means perfectly adjusted 
to our environment. (22)
“Man’s zeal for antiques as furnishing and equipment for his sitting-room,” 
attested Harry Elmer Barnes, “seems excelled only by his lust for them to 
serve as the lining of his cerebral space” (587).  “When he desires to have a 
tooth pulled or a spark plug replaced,” Barnes claimed, man “feels it 
necessary to have recourse at once to an expert along these lines of 
endeavor, but he is prepared to regard as wholly adequate the opinions on 
economic and political matters of the ‘man on the street’ which date from the 
period of the ox-cart and the practice of knocking out decayed teeth with a 
stone hammer” (587).
Out of this view of stale custom and inhibiting adherence to the past, 
came Williams’ rant in "Spring & All" (1923) against the “TRADITIONALISTS OF 
PLAGIARISM” who ”ask us to return to the proven truths of tradition” ("Spring" 
97-98, emphasis in original).  “These men who have had the governing of the
mob through all the repetitious years resent the new order . . . . Those who 
led yesterday wish to hold their sway a while longer” (97-98).  Williams 
invoked the artistic initiatives of peers fighting this “hard battle” – those like 
“Demuth and a few others do[ing] their best to point out the error” (98).  
Williams evoked in personal terms the wider battle against entrenched social 
and economic powers by calling attention to his own difficulties getting 
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published due to a “virtual dictatorship through economic forces centered in 
Credit Monopoly, which  . . . subsidizes bad writing, and places the cultural 
stress on false values” ("Revolutions" 114).  Pound made the same point in 
Canto 51, describing usura stifling individual initiative – “Duccio was not by 
usura/ Nor was ‘La Calunnia’ painted./ Neither Ambrogio Praedis nor 
Angelico/ had their skill by usura/ Nor St. Trophime its cloisters;/ Nor St. 
Hilaire its proportions” (51: 250).  Williams’ lament that the “sole criterion 
today as to a book’s value is this, ‘Will it sell and pay a dividend?’” 
("Revolutions" 108), was echoed in Pound’s assertion in Canto 45 that “no 
picture is made to endure nor to live with/ but it is made to sell and sell 
quickly” (45: 229).  The distinction Williams and Pound made was between 
usura that commodifies art and seeks to exploit its transactional value, and 
its opposite, which is the creative and generative act of “making” something 
that holds intrinsic value.  
The same blunting of individual initiative that Williams and Pound felt 
corporate capital effected in the arts they saw in the academy.  Though the 
universities “should be devising means/ to leap the gap[,]/ . . . They block the 
release/ that should cleanse and assume/ prerogatives as a private 
recompense” (Paterson 1: 34).  “Witness . . .  the extraordinary dullness and 
sloth of the official preceptors as represented [by] . . .  the English 
Departments in the lead, in the American universities,” charged Williams 
("Background" 159).   Williams characterized their “gallivanting back and 
forth upon the trodden-out tracks of past initiative” as nothing less than 
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“subserviency” to wealthy trustees (159).  “[F]or the power of wealth,” alleged 
Williams,
which by endowments makes the university and its faculty possible, at 
the same time keeps that power, by control of salaries and trustees’ 
votes, in order to dictate what those who teach must and must not 
say. (159)
Most galling was that “the  teachers submit to it” and “thus the higher is 
suborned by the lower branch of the cultural split off, another evidence of 
how the coercion is applied” (159).  In Paterson, Williams referred to “the 
knowledgeable idiots, the university,” as “the non-purveyors[,]/ . . . [t]he 
outward/ masks of the special interests/ that perpetuate stasis and make it/ 
profitable” (Paterson 1: 34).  Pound shared this view, referring in a 1940 
letter to Williams to the “stinking lack of ANY intellectual life in our goddam 
onivurstities [sic]” (Letters 204, emphasis in original).  
Pound's and Williams’ academic critique could not have come as a 
surprise to Beard, Brooks, Robinson, and Parrington.  Beard resigned from 
Columbia University in protest at the Board of Trustees limiting academic 
freedom in advance of America’s entry into World War I.   “‘I have been 
driven to the conclusion,” he asserted, “that the University is really under the 
control of a small and active group of trustees who have no standing in the 
world of education, who are reactionary and visionless in politics, narrow and 
medieval in religion’” (qtd. in Hofstadter 286).  In the same 1918 issue of The 
Dial in which Van Wyck Brooks published “On Creating a Usable Past,” 
Beard accused “[t]hose who lead and teach” as working less under “the eye 
of eternity” and more “under the eye of the trustees’ committee on salaries, 
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pensions, and promotions” (335).   Brooks, too, assaulted in that issue the 
“professors who accommodate themselves without effort to an academic 
world based like ours upon the exigencies of the commercial mind” ("Usable 
Past" 338).  Parrington lost his teaching position at the University of 
Oklahoma in a purge of 14 faculty members and the president as part of a 
political, cultural crusade by conservative religious reformers (Hofstadter 
373).  Waldo Frank lauded Robinson and Beard for their “[c]onstructive 
reaction against . . . the impossibly illiberal conditions” at the established 
universities, which compelled them to found the New School for Social 
Research (210).  
* * * * * 
Williams’ and Pound’s interest in the 1930s in the Social Credit 
movement represented, in the context of the Great Depression, a critical 
elaboration by the poets of the progressives’ economic determinism and 
economic critique.  It is essential to understanding the context in which 
Williams' prose essays on American history in the 1930s and his poetry, 
especially Paterson, would develop.  Moving beyond their shared sense that 
writing (history, poetry, the poem in history) was a form of social activism, 
and that culture rests on the “subsoil of economics,” Williams and Pound 
embraced in Social Credit a particular program of economic reform based on 
the equitable distribution of credit.  
Though founded by the English engineer Major C.H. Douglas in the 
late 1910s and early 1920s, Social Credit gained currency in America in the 
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1930s as a particular response to the crisis of the Great Depression.  Social 
Credit was argued to be a form of "Economic Democracy" (Williams, "Social 
Credit as Anti-Communism" 1) that would “extend our present form of 
government to include the credit situation, making it more and more 
democratic” ("Revolutions" 98).  This was critical because the “root of our 
economic distress,” claimed the 1938 Social Credit Manifesto, was an 
"automatic shortage of purchasing power maintained by the Monopoly of 
Credit” (qtd. in Weaver 105).  Where fascism, argued Williams, is “founded 
on the destruction of civil liberties and the control of credit by the same old 
gang,” and where communism “propose[s] to centralize ownership; Economic 
Democrats propose to decentralize credit” ("Social Credit as Anti-
Communism" 1-2).  In the “Power Age,” explained Williams, borrowing a turn 
of phrase from other contributors to New Democracy, the American Social 
Credit journal, "purchasing power" or credit “has not been socialized to keep 
pace with present-day requirements” ("Revolutions" 97).  Thus even as 
production had surged, due to technological innovations, the wealth that had 
been generated, Social Credit advocates argued, had not been distributed to 
the working masses: “[P]urchasing power, as represented by wages or their 
equivalent, though it should have been expanded . . . has remained relatively 
stationary” (97).  The result was that credit “remains in the hands of a few 
individuals and institutions” (97).  Major C.H. Douglas “located the economic 
flaws of modern industrial society not in production but in distribution,” 
namely the “discrepancy between prices and purchasing power brought 
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about by excessive bank interest charges, or usury” (Witemeyer 123).  The 
resulting imbalance created poverty and “through competition for overseas 
markets, . . . international war” (123).  
Social Credit, then, made three specific proposals to correct 
distribution – to unlock what Williams in Paterson called the tight-packed 
seed.  First, credit banking would be nationalized in a federal agency 
operated in the interest of the public, not a commercial oligarchy:  
“[G]overnmental administration of a national credit account” would restore the 
“control of currency and credit to the people” ("Outline" 169).  Second, price 
controls or a “Compensated Price System” would be imposed on certain 
goods and services; this was a “national discount or credit to meet fluctuating 
prices” (Weaver 105-06).  Third, the government would distribute “National 
Dividends, . . . or direct consumer subsidies from the national treasury” 
(Witemeyer 123).  
By these measures, the ASCM Manifesto asserted, “the Two 
Principles of Economic Democracy” would be effected – first, the “power of 
the individual over his material environment” would match “advances in 
production;” and second, the "choice of the individual in joining or declining 
productive enterprises should increase [and] opportunity and leisure should 
be enlarged” (qtd. in Weaver 105).  The argument that Social Credit would 
increase individual economic "opportunity and leisure" is where, I believe, 
Williams’ and his colleagues’ anti-Puritanism met economics.  "The Outline 
for a Course in Social Credit" named the “change from the economy of 
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scarcity to economy of abundance” as the very first point an instructor should 
cover ("Outline" 169, emphasis added).  Social Credit proponents 
“consciously opposed the Puritan ethic in which virtue lay in scarcity and men 
were more or less virtuous to the degree that they submitted to onerous 
labour to reap a small reward” (Weaver 108).  Economic democracy, then, 
would finally trump the “more regressive American tradition . . ., the tradition 
of economic Puritanism” (108).  
Social Credit was not merely a fanciful argument, not simply a matter 
of poets dabbling in economics.  It is well documented by historians that the 
international competition in the late 1920s to build gold reserves, especially 
after America returned to the gold standard in that time period, had the effect 
of tightening credit (Rees 216).  When gold reserves were "reduced by $715 
million" in 1931, the "result was to promote credit restriction and severe 
deflation, followed by a renewed crop of bank failures" (216).  Historian 
Michael Bernstein notes that with a "massive deficit spending effort, perhaps 
on the scale of spending undertaken during World War II, consumption could 
have led the way out of depression" (170).  
But such a strategy was not only politically impossible, it was also 
hampered by "two major short-run shocks to consumer spending that 
enervated the U.S. economy after the panic of 1929: the impact of the 
downturn on incomes, and the stress placed on consumer credit markets" 
(Rees 216-17).  Social Credit sought to ameliorate the credit squeeze and 
power economic recovery with expansionary fiscal policies.  The fatal flaw, I 
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believe, is that this may not have been especially realistic.  Bernstein notes 
that it "appears by the mid-thirties, consumers were so concerned with 
liquidating the relatively large debt incurred at the start of the decade, and so 
wary given the experience of the crash, that the aggregate marginal 
propensity to consume fell" (Bernstein 172).  It is not clear, ultimately, that 
expanded credit would have been effective.
Nevertheless, Social Credit was appealing for how it fit with American 
democracy.  It consciously positioned itself against the “implied dangers to 
individual liberty inherent in the trend of modern thought,” namely fascism 
and communism ("Social Credit as Anti-Communism" 2).  It was “a halfway 
house between capitalism and socialism” (Witemeyer 123).  “We are 
unalterably opposed,” the American Social Credit Movement had asserted in 
its 1938 founding manifesto, “to totalitarianism and collectivism, social 
systems in which the individual exists only for the group” (qtd. in Weaver 
105).   
The appeal of Social Credit “for middle-class professionals” like 
Williams “who wanted a non-socialist welfare state” was likely how it 
“proposed a greater degree of socialisation [sic] without socialism; it was 
radical without being revolutionary” (Weaver 107).  Williams declared that 
while it “may appear little more than a currency measure,” Social Credit was 
“the bayonet into the bowels of the problem” ("Revolutions" 115).  Even if it
lacks the “basic emotional instinctive and summative power of a clenched 
fist, it yet remains the heart of any real advance which by bloody fights or 
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less drastic realization must come about” (117).  Battling the destruction of 
individual freedom, which is the aim of fascism, and resisting the “narrowing 
of the attack to a fanatical and static fixation on a class war” promised by 
communism, Social Credit, Williams declared, would preserve “all liberty of 
thought so characteristically American” (115).  
It was fitting that Williams concluded "Revolutions Revalued" by 
evoking the “battles fought about the figure of George Washington [that were] 
more important to our condition today than Yorktown or Monmouth” 
("Revolutions" 117).  He believed that Social Credit could win back for us “the 
dearest fruits of the first Revolution” – those fruits were lost to us in the 
“memorable engagement centering about the new Constitution,” Williams 
argued, “when Hamilton and Jefferson split the Cabinet of the first President” 
(117).  The “subtle tyranny” of credit monopoly could have been “foreseen 
and forestalled at the beginning by some such philosophy as Social Credit 
now proposes,” Williams claimed (117).  The “basis could have been 
grasped[,] . . . the social demands Jackson later realized and fought for” 
could have been attained (117).  Yet, it was not too late – Social Credit and 
the history Williams wrote, he hoped, would clarify and assert the prerogative 
of the individual that underpins liberal democracy.  “[I]ndividual genius is the 
basis of all social excellence,” he claimed, but the individual is presently 
“beset .. . by a virtual dictatorship through economic forces centered in Credit 
monopoly” ("Revolutions" 104, 114).  “[S]hall we under economic pressure,” 
he asked, “retain the long fought for principles of representative democratic 
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government which we inherit from the past or relinquish them today?” 
("Revolutions" 98).
Social Credit, in Williams’ view, as stated in "Revolutions Revalued," 
was the only approach that was “consistent with the history of the artist’s 
world, since it only respects individual liberty as the basis of the state” 
("Revolutions" 111).  “Except for the individual,” Williams attested
society is a body without a head.  But it is the head that is of the 
chiefest value . . . . Society as an organism is on a far lower biologic 
plane than one man.  In fact, unless appended to the individual, it has 
a mere vegetative function. (112)
As all constructive initiative remains with the individual, Williams argued, “it 
behooves society to preserve, as its very life, the individual," to work towards 
"liberating that individual from other burdens" and to free him "to do his 
exclusive originating” ("Revolutions" 111).  A society that limits or destroys 
individual initiative and self-determination, Williams contended, would discard 
“the seed of its own possible regeneration” ("Revolutions" 106).  The artist, of 
course, as the conscious individual par excellence, was uniquely qualified to 
lead this renewal – he was thus characterized as the “passionate 
regenerative force” and “social regenerator” ("Revolutions" 106, 109, 
emphasis in original).  
FDR’s New Deal, of course, did seek to redress some of the same 
economic concerns that Williams identified.  Williams would refer to 
Roosevelt as “the good President” and weep at his death (Mariani, New 
World 505).  While Williams may have wanted Roosevelt to adopt Social 
Credit policies and proposals, the poet’s own declining activity in the Social 
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Credit Movement in the late 1930s may have reflected some satisfaction with 
the priorities and initiatives of the New Deal.  Two things mitigate against 
drawing such a neat conclusion, however.  First, Williams included a 
prominent discussion of credit politics in Book IV of Paterson, published in 
1961.  Second, Williams’ declining engagement in Social Credit activities 
may have as readily reflected his discomfort with the increasing presence of 
pro or proto-fascist elements trying to infiltrate the Social Credit movement in 
the late 1930s and early 1940s.
* * * * * 
Williams’ concern with the fate of individual liberty and prerogative in 
an illiberal age explains his participation in the larger movement of the time 
toward imaginative or subjective history-writing.  Waldo Frank and Van Wyck 
Brooks envisioned a kind of personal encounter with the past that reflected a 
personal renaissance of spirit consistent with liberal democracy.  “‘Now that 
the republic -- the res publicata -- has been settled, it is time to look after the 
res privata,’” Frank asserted, citing Thoreau with approval (153). The “only 
serious approach to society is the personal approach (33),” argued Brooks in 
America's Coming of Age, adding, 
How can one speak of progress in a people like our own that so sends 
up to heaven the stench of atrophied personality?  How can one 
speak of progress in a people whose main object is to climb, peg by 
peg, up a ladder to the impersonal ideal of private wealth? (176)
Williams lamented that “[s]teadily the individual loses caste” (Grain 128), and 
Parrington declared that the “passion for liberty is lessening and the 
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individual . . . is being dwarfed; the drift of centralization is shaping its 
inevitable tyrannies to bind us with” (Main Currents 3: xx).  
Fittingly, then, Williams and his progressive contemporaries wrote 
history as a form of social action, as a social instrument, to preserve 
individual liberty and prerogative, and the roots of democratic liberalism.  For 
the poets (Williams, Pound, Lawrence, and even, Eliot), in particular, this 
meant privileging an imaginative or subjective encounter with the past.  
Williams’ imaginative history, or his poem (and prose) including history, 
informed by Social Credit’s promise of economic democracy and the 
progressive historians’ and critics’ search for a “usable past,” sought a kind of 
rebirth of America.  The coming chapters will explore how Williams structures 
his history writing and his poem including history to achieve this aim. 
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Chapter III: “Men intact – with all their senses waking:” Affective 
Economics, Fear, and Representative New World
Voluptuaries
The leaders of a to-morrow forced to spiritual discovery are men of letters.
- Waldo Frank, Our America (8)
[T]he nation was the offspring of the desire to huddle, to protect – of terror – superadded to a 
new world of great beauty. 
- William Carlos Williams, In the American Grain (155)
The good which history should have preserved it tortures.  A country is not free, is not what it 
pretends to be, unless it leave a vantage open (in tradition) for that which Burr possessed in 
such remarkable degree.
- William Carlos Williams, In the American Grain (197) 
[M]oney is like a bell that keeps the dance from terrifying, as it would if it were silent and we 
could hear the grunt, -- thud – swish.  It is small, hard; it keeps the attention fixed so that the 
eyes shall not see.
- William Carlos Williams, In the American Grain (156)
This chapter will examine how Williams developed what I call an 
affective economics by variously moving beneath and beyond theories of 
economic determinism in two specific ways.  First, Williams contextualized 
the war by corporate capital on democratic culture and institutions in the 
broader contest of primary versus secondary cultural thrusts, with specific 
emphasis on the human drama of fear in the face of the unknown.  Second, 
Williams explored our encounter with the New World along lines that are 
putatively economic, but transformed these economic axes into emotional 
stances toward the world.  Thus he deployed a series of representative 
figures to illuminate polarities of giving versus grabbing, sharing versus 
withholding.
In response to illiberal forces of the 1920s and 1930s, including 
corporate capital, fascism, and communism, Williams and his progressive 
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peers espoused values of liberal democracy, represented in their lexicon of 
“res persona,” “personality,” and “inner cultivation,” as well as in their interest 
in representative figures generally, and artists in particular.  Williams did not
simply employ an anti-capitalist polemic like his peers.  His peculiar genius in 
espousing liberal democracy resided in how he structured an aesthetic that, 
first, re-oriented readers to the human drama beneath the economics, and 
second, activated their participation, and, thereby, inner cultivation.  We can 
thus identify in Williams what the poet himself saw in Boone – that his 
“genius was to recognize the difficulty as neither material nor political but one 
purely moral and aesthetic” (Grain 136).  
Williams’s affective economics worked a significant inversion of power 
at several levels.  First, he did not reject but inverted Parrington’s dicta, 
which reflected the thinking of most of Williams’ progressive contemporaries, 
that all cultural forms rest on the “subsoil of economics” ("Economics" 98).  
Economics were now exposed as resting on human, emotional reactions and 
considerations.  Second, Williams’ thesis necessarily implied that if we could 
understand how human fear drives the economic machine then we could 
somehow remedy our plight.  Williams thus moved past a deterministic view 
of behavior to one in which the human actor could discover the power to 
change things.  
“Burr knew what a democracy must liberate . . . . Men intact – with all 
their senses waking,” Williams had asserted in In the American Grain (206).  
For Williams, men could not be “waking” or awakened unless they had 
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contact with the primary.  Poetry – and writing in general –  was a mechanism 
for awareness, for awakening readers to a critical engagement with their 
world.  Consistent with the assertion of liberal democratic principles, Williams 
made the experience of the individual, be it the reader, the poet, or the 
historical visionary loner, the critical element in awaking his countrymen.
While Brooks, Franks and others spoke of “atrophied personality” (Brooks, 
Coming 176) and res persona, Williams actually structured an aesthetic that 
made seminal the reader’s affective experience.  He facilitated the reader’s 
engagement with the primary, both in historical terms as a “usable past” and 
in the present by what he modeled.  “Not one” of America’s prominent 
writers, “not all of them,” lamented Brooks, “have had the power to move the 
soul of America from the accumulation of dollars” (44).  “Personality” for 
Williams’ peers referred to a greater “density, weight, and richness, a certain 
poignancy” that would foster the reader’s spiritual and intellectual 
development (40).  Williams thus answered, in his poem (and prose) 
including history, the call of Brooks and Frank for writers who had the 
“shaking impact of personality” (39).  
  Williams agreed that individual development was critical as he based 
his “argument on a single point: the . . . necessity for individual freedom 
under the law” ("Revolutions" 99).  “[I]ndividual genius is the basis of all 
social excellence,” he argued (104).  Individual genius may not be easy to 
cultivate or identify in a culture driven by capital priorities, but Williams 
believed that the individual’s “essential freedom” was a “social asset of the 
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highest sort without which society itself will perish” (104, emphasis added).  
Williams clearly understood that “waking” citizens engaged with the primary 
and thus having an affective experience of their own moment, were essential 
to a democratic society.  What was good for the individual was necessary for 
a democracy:  “[S]ociety, to be served, must generate individuals to serve it, 
and cannot do otherwise than to give such individuals full play – until or 
unless their activities prove anti-social” (103, emphasis in original).  
Williams’ own obsession with the primary, then, represented a 
democratic imperative to engage one’s own “moment” independent of “all 
intermediate authority” or “unrelated authority” ("Background" 143).  This 
was, as he termed it in The Embodiment of Knowledge, “the characteristic 
American position of the intelligence – the pioneer turn of mind – the 
individual superior to authority.  No external to it” (9, emphasis in original).   
Williams’ history writing models, but does not impose, a particular stance 
towards history and a “usable past.”  Brooks made the same argument on 
behalf of individual initiative and liberal democracy:  “[S]elf-fulfillment . . . the 
working out of one’s own personality, one’s own inventiveness through forms 
of activity that are directly social, . . . gives a man . . . a life-interest apart 
from his rewards” (Coming 32).  “And just as this principle,” asserted Brooks,
becomes generally diffused and understood the incentive is withdrawn 
from economic self-assertion, a relative competence being notoriously 
satisfying to the man whose prime end is the fulfilling of his own 
creative instincts; and the wealth of the world is already socialized. 
(32)
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For Brooks, Williams, and others, then, the primary and the 
democratic were integrally connected, and the latter relied on its citizens to 
be actively engaged with the former.  Direct contact with the social and 
natural landscape of one’s own time, which James Longenbach defines to 
include the past in his conception of “existential historicism,” and which 
Williams called a true “usable past,” was a premise of democracy.  It was the 
individual seeing for himself, deciding for himself.  A failure to make contact 
with one’s own moment – with the “situation as it exist[s]” (144), of a 
“realization of the actual” ("Background" 146), of “attachment to an essential 
reality” (148), -- a lack of “relation to the immediate conditions of the matter in 
hand” (143) – had dire political and social implications for democracy.   
Williams and his peers already feared for democracy in the 1910s, 
1920s and 1930s.  D.H. Lawrence lamented that Americans “dodge their own 
very selves” (1).  Frank called America a tongue-tied, “turmoiled giant” whom 
he hoped to make “articulate” (4-5).  His enterprise was the “effort of self-
knowledge” (Frank 5).  Brooks conceived of the present as a “void” and 
attested in his seminal 1918 Dial essay, “On Creating a Usable Past,” that 
“the American writer floats in that void because the past that survives in the 
common mind of the present is a past without living value” (339).  In clearly 
resonant terms, Williams declared seven years later in In the American Grain
that we “float without question, . . . [our] history . . . an enigma” (113).  
The resolution of this personal and cultural crisis, Williams and 
Pound suggested, depended on “the men who can think with some clarity” 
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(Contact).  “[M]en are driven to their fates by the quality of their beliefs,” 
Williams attested.  “[T]hat in America,” he argued, “has been the success of 
the unrelated, borrowed . . . culture” – it has been the money cancer and the 
“wealth [that] took the scene” ("Background" 149).  To descend to something 
real and meaningful in their own time, and in our history, then, required 
political and social engagement.  In 1921, Williams published, as editor of 
Contact, Pound’s declaration that the “symbolist position, artistic aloofness 
from world affairs, is no good now.  It may have assisted several people to 
write and work in the 80’s, but it is not, in 1921, opportune or apposite” 
(Contact, emphasis in original).  “Don’t imagine that I think economics 
interesting,” Pound added,
-- not as Botticelli or Picasso is interesting.  But at present they, as 
the reality under political camouflage, are interesting as a gun 
muzzle aimed at one’s own head is ‘interesting,’ when one can 
hardly see the face of the gun holder and is wholly uncertain as to 
his temperament and intentions. (Contact )
The men best able to “think with some clarity” were the artists.  The 
figure of the artist was that of “the whole man, . . . [who] belongs to his world 
and time, sensually, realistically” ("Against" 197).  It was the artist who 
“attacks, constantly toward a full possession of life by himself as a man” 
(199).  He alone could “give new currency to the sensual world at our feet” 
(215).  As the “most down on the ground, most sensual, most real” (198), 
only “[h]e is the most effective of all men, by test of time, in proving himself 
able to resist circumstances and bring the load through” (197).  Those 
“circumstances” that the poet must “resist,” of course, were undoubtedly the 
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economic and cultural exploitation and oppression wrought by corporate 
capital.  It is not surprising to learn, then, that In the American Grain was 
originally planned as the third in a series of cultural pamphlets to be 
published by Stanley Charles Nott, founder and manager of the Social Credit 
publication New England Weekly and subsequently of a Social Credit 
publishing house in the mid-1930s.
Williams was not alone in looking to the artists to “rouse” or 
regenerate his fellow country-men.  Waldo Frank asserted that from “the time 
of Lincoln, the drama of American life has shifted: has become the struggle 
for the assertion of life itself” (8).  As the “utterance of life is art,” Frank 
concluded,  “the leaders of a to-morrow forced to spiritual discovery are men 
of letters” (8).  Brooks, in his 1918 essay, called for an approach to “our 
literature from the point of view not of the successful fact but of the creative 
impulse” ("Usable Past" 340).  The “more personally we answer” what, “out 
of all the multifarious achievements and impulses and desires of the 
American literary mind” we “elect to remember . . . the more likely we are to 
get a vital order out of the anarchy of the present” (340).  Brooks called the 
past “an inexhaustible storehouse of apt attitudes and adaptable ideals” 
(339), and Williams, in large measure, applied Brooks’ approach not simply 
to our literary heritage but to the entire tableau of American history.  Williams 
idiosyncratically answered what ideals, “impulses and desires” of the 
American mind, more generally, should be remembered (339-40).  Williams’ 
genius was to make the open stance of the “creative impulse” itself the focus 
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of his history.  He identified not simply one “adaptable ideal” but adaptability 
itself as the telling point of American history – and thus of our relation to our 
past and our own present moment.  Williams offered a model of what each of 
us does, and of necessity, must do.  
For Williams, then, finding a usable past was not simply a question of 
uncovering alternative traditions of openness, tolerance, or even individual 
action against corporate powers and other illiberal forces.  It was, rather, a 
matter of finding figures in the past who adapted to and spoke to their own 
present moment as Williams felt his readers must do to their own.  These 
figures from the past, Williams believed, could teach his contemporaries, and 
perhaps subsequent generations of readers, how to live in and touch their 
own present.  History did not enshrine and convey conventions to which 
future ages should adhere or conform, but instead demanded a stance of 
responsiveness and adaptation.  He necessarily recalled Frederick Jackson 
Turner’s reference to “perennial rebirth,” in his description of the formation of 
democratic culture at each iteration of the frontier.  Williams, in short, 
historicized adaptation and insisted on responsiveness to the moment.  This 
stance towards the past and the present, of course, drove Williams’ affective 
economics.  We must understand, he felt, the emotive forces that actually 
drive the economic engine and must see the economic stances exposed for 
the truly emotive positions that they are.  Only this will enable men to meet 
the moment, and possibly to influence its movement.
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Williams’ aim, then, through all of his work was to awaken readers to 
contact with conditions as they exist, permeating that barrier between 
ourselves and our world, whether he wrote of the “moment” or a “usable 
past.”  It is in this way that Williams took up Brooks’ call to create a “usable 
past.”  Williams effectively awakened readers to focus critically on the 
secondary cultural thrust, the hegemony of the corporate capital elite, 
through his affective economics in "The American Background" and In the 
American Grain.  By contextualizing the drive for personal wealth in the 
human drama of fear before the primary, by transforming economic stances 
into emotive ones, and through his unique aesthetics, Williams exposed the 
demands for adaptation and contact that were no different in his day than 
they were for our forebearers.  Thus the “old boys” who were alive to their 
own time, or those few settlers who could look the New World in the face 
without clinging to familiar English landscapes – who could avoid mistaking 
and misnaming the New World thrush for the English robin – illustrated what 
is needed.  If the poet can give us a “usable past” – alive to his own moment, 
showing us how to be alive to our own – then he will have fulfilled his role as 
the “passionate regenerative force” for his time, and, more critically, he will 
have awakened us to play the same role so necessary in a liberal democratic 
state ("Revolutions" 106, emphasis in original).
* * * * *
I have stated initially that Williams contextualized the war by corporate 
capital on democratic culture and institutions in the broader contest of 
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primary versus secondary cultural thrusts, and specifically focused on the 
human drama of fear in the face of the unknown.  As described in Chapter 2, 
Williams’ essential economic critique was consistent with the economic 
determinism of Beard, Parrington, Frank and others.  Better to understand 
how this is so, we must first appreciate Williams’ explicit frame in "The 
American Background" of the contest between primary and secondary 
culture.  Then I will define how Williams, by his conception of fear, went 
beyond the economic determinism of his peers.
At the start of this 1934 essay, Williams informed readers that “the 
terms native and borrowed, related and unrelated, primary and secondary, 
will be used interchangeably to designate these two opposed split-offs from 
the full cultural force, and occasionally, in the same vein, true and false” 
("Background" 135).  What Williams did not say immediately but what 
became swiftly evident was that the former term in each pairing referred to 
non-economic values while the latter term referred to economic values.  
What did Williams mean by primary?  It is what In the American Grain
referred to as “contact” and “touch,” with its suggestion of the sexual, sensual 
and generative.  No less than a dozen times, Williams referred in "The 
American Background" to the primary as a vital contact with reality, with the 
facts and harsh realities of life in the New World.  Thus, the primary 
encompasses “men working toward the center” of the New World “inventing 
their new tools of thought, welding their minds to new conformations with the 
situation as it existed,” while “men of the opposing force were in closer and 
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closer touch with the Old World” ("Background" 144).  Men seeking to touch 
the New World sought a “realization of the actual” (146); exhibited an 
“attachment to an essential reality” (148); desired a “relation to the immediate 
conditions of the matter in hand” (143); sought a “direct relation to actuality 
but remained heavily opposed by a more fashionable choice” (142).  Men like 
Boone and Rasles were significant for how they “abandoned touch with those 
along the coast, and their established references, and made contact with the 
intrinsic elements of an as yet unrealized material of which the new country 
was made” (140).  These men make strenuous “effort to appraise the real” 
through direct contact where their countrymen do so only “through the maze 
of a cut-off and imposed culture from Europe” (143).  Washington, Boone 
and others stand out because they “stuck fast to the facts,” “clove to the 
actual conditions of [their] position, . . . [and exhibited] the strength of a 
cultural adjustment of the first sort” (142).  
The challenge of the primary, the harsh facts as they existed in 
establishing life in the New World, are first set out by Williams in their psychic 
dimension in the italicized parable about the misnaming of the native 
American Thrush that commences "The American Background."  The 
thrushes that the settlers called robins induced a “Blur.  Confusion” – for the 
settlers chose to name the new species by what was familiar and close to 
home, even as a closer look would have clearly shown the difference in form 
and flight between the two birds ("Background" 134).  This “slight” example, a 
misnaming based on sloppy attention, was “enough,” Williams claimed, to 
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reveal how “from the start, an America of which they could have had no 
inkling drove the first settlers upon their past” (134).  They sought to make 
the New World adhere to their European experience: “Strange and difficult, 
the new continent induced a torsion in the spirits of the first settlers, tearing 
them between the old and the new” (134).  “They found,” Williams explained,
that they had not only left England but that they had arrived 
somewhere else: at a place whose pressing reality demanded not only 
a tremendous bodily devotion but as well, and more importunately, 
great powers of adaptability, a complete reconstruction of their most 
intimate cultural make-up, to accord with the new conditions. 
("Background" 134)
The settlers described in the parable could not adapt to their new 
environment, -- “[t]he most hesitated and turned back in their hearts at the 
first glance” (134).  Because the “land was from the first antagonistic,” and 
the settlers’ “purpose must have been in major part not to be bound to it but 
to push back its obstructions before invading amenities,” our ancestors “were 
at the same time pushing back a very necessary immediate knowledge of the 
land” that ultimately was “all that they possessed and should henceforth be 
able to call their own” (137).  This was the “cost” that Williams referred to in 
the opening parable of “retreat[ing] for warmth and reassurance to something 
previously familiar” (134).  
To understand better Williams’ conception of the primary, we must 
first explore the historical triumph of what he terms the secondary cultural 
thrust.  That is, the imposition and importation of an unrelated, European 
culture, “false” because it was not founded in the conditions of life in the New 
World.  
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"The American Background" was essentially an economics essay –
one that traced the usurpation of the democratic experiment by a propertied 
elite.  The contest between primary and secondary culture became a 
narrative of the triumph of an unrelated, money-focused culture.  According 
to Williams, this secondary culture quickly assumed economic, cultural and 
political hegemony in the settlements and colonies.  In “poverty and danger,” 
Williams claimed, “America borrowed, where it could, a culture from Europe –
or at least the warmth of it ad interim [sic]” ("Background" 146).  What was ad 
interim and “valuable for the moment and later as an attribute of fashion and 
wealth, fixed itself upon the mind until . . . the realization of the actual” was 
lost (146).  This borrowed “culture of purchase, a culture in effigy” became 
predominant (147).    “Wealth went on” and the “primary cultural influence . . . 
came to a stop,” Williams contended, and the American Revolution 
represented the only time that primary American character was “to be given a 
general sanction” (136, 147).  
The contest was uneven from the start, for the culture of purchase 
would keep “drawing inhabitants back to the accustomed with its appeals to 
loyalty and the love of comfort” where the primary could only prod the people 
to “face very often the tortures of the damned, working a new way into a 
doubtful future” (138).  It was not a surprise, then, that the “graciousness of 
an imposed cultural design” would triumph over the “raw new” (138).  Thus, 
Jefferson’s agrarian democratic vision was “sadly snowed under” and 
Benjamin Franklin’s “necessitous technical side,” which would underwrite 
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industrial and commercial development, triumphed (139).  “Finding itself, as a 
democracy,” Williams declared, “unable to take up the moral and economic 
implications of its new conditions, which Jefferson lived and proposed, 
America slumped back to fashion on the one, favored, side, and . . . slighted 
the difficult real” (139, emphasis in original).  
Thus, Boone, Houston and others who worked toward the center, the 
primary, become “strangers” and “foreigners – in their own country” (140-1).  
Williams identified Andrew Jackson as the only one of these figures who 
“carried the crudeness of his origins successfully up to the top by the luck of 
battle,” but recognized that it was “for a short time only” (141).  Williams 
focused on the seventh president and Tennessee backwoodsman in 
particular because of his attack against the Second National Bank of the 
United States in the 1830s.  Jackson was able, “as Ezra Pound has recently 
pointed out,” claimed Williams, given his “basic culture,” to “smell out the 
growing fault and attack the evidence of a wrong tack having been taken, the 
beginning raid on public moneys by private groups” (141).  Ultimately, 
though, Jackson failed like the others to alter the oligarchic trajectory of 
things to come.  In time, “the acquisition of a borrowed European culture” 
was “taken to be virtue itself” and wealth ensured a “primary cultural decay,” 
including the destruction of the small community (144, 147).  “Wealth took 
the scene” and “[a]gainst an overwhelming mass superiority of wealth the 
struggles of a related culture grew still less and less” (148-49).   
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The broad strokes of Williams’ economic critique did not particularly 
distinguish him from his progressive contemporaries.  Even while his peers 
did not refer to the democratic and capitalist impulses in terms of “primary” or 
“secondary” culture, Brooks and Frank identified how capital had high-jacked 
American democracy.  The historians argued as well that the very design of 
American constitutionalism was itself meant to serve and preserve capital 
interests.  Recall how E.R.A. Seligman called economics the fundamental 
condition of all life and how Parrington argued that property is sovereign and 
lauded the Populists for defending democracy against an arrogant plutocracy 
(Hofstadter 198-99).  
Williams, though, distinguished his approach from that of his peers by 
his more psychological take on American culture.  In particular, he 
contextualized and subsumed economic impulses and class realities in the 
human drama of man’s reaction to the primary.  Williams would undergird the 
hegemonic economics, the secondary cultural thrust, with a simple human 
factor – fear.  As New World wealth was made to emanate from deeper 
human forces, from Montezuma himself, in “The Destruction of Tenochtitlan” 
chapter of In the American Grain, so too Williams defined the culture of 
corporate capital as emanating from human, emotive forces.  Montezuma re-
oriented the Spanish from his empire’s riches – his “houses with walls of 
gold” and the “many beautiful and curious artifacts” on which “no price could 
be set” – to his own humanity (Grain 31): “‘You see that I am composed of 
flesh and born like yourselves and that I am mortal and palpable to the 
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touch,’” the Aztec king tells Cortez (31).  Montezuma’s humanity and “the 
earthward thrust” of his people, “the realization of their primal and continuous 
identity with the ground itself,” contextualized and provided meaning for their 
great wealth (33-34).  
Williams identified in his affective economics, beyond simple greed or 
avarice, a deeper, human – even primitive (fitting with primary) – foundation 
of fear.  Fear of absorption, obliteration, of loss of self, were what Williams 
identified in his existential historicism.  Williams populated his history with 
Spanish conquerors who emerged from New World jungles transformed in 
likeness and dress into Indians and Puritans who feared being kidnapped or 
killed in Indian raids.  De Soto sunk to the bed of a stream as he inseminated 
the female body of the New World.  But for each of these fearful losses of 
self, Williams sought to guide the readers’ contact with the New World, to 
make it less obliterating and terrifying.  He offered the touch and contact of 
Rasles, Boone, and Champlain, who were absorbed into the New World 
willingly, even passionately.  They illustrated the stance of adaptation, not 
fear, a sensual relationship of contact and touch, descent and marriage.
Williams’ contemporaries did occasionally make passing references to 
fear, but it did not comprise a major aspect of their investigations of the 
American character.  Only Williams developed it as critical to the American 
experience.  His emphasis on fear as driving the economic engine, in 
particular, truly set him apart.  In Canto 62 Pound quoted John Adams’ 
observation in his own personal papers characterizing Calvinism as a 
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“Passion of orthodoxy in fear” (62: 341).  Waldo Frank also noted of the 
Puritans that “[d]iscipline among them was whetted by fear into ferocity” as 
they “lived in an unending beat of danger” with a “hostile people, a savage 
continent enclos[ing] them” (19).  Van Wyck Brooks did not use the word fear 
but described something quite like it, arguing of Puritans and American 
writers generally that “Nothing is more marked than their disinclination to take 
a plunge, reckless and complete . .  . into the rudest and grossest actualities” 
(Coming 110- 11).  American writers, Brooks contended, were “able to make 
nothing of a life so rude in its actuality” (112-13) – “This is the whole story of 
American literature: in a more than usually difficult and sordid world it has 
applied its principal energies to being uncontaminated itself” (111).  D.H. 
Lawrence noted the fear of “a real new experience” because of how it 
“displaces so many old experiences” to explain why “a new voice in the old 
American classics” had thus far been obscured and ignored (1).    
Williams developed fear as an aspect of the American character by 
detailing in "The American Background" and In the American Grain the tragic 
feedback loop of American history that ensured the triumph of corporate 
capital and Alexander Hamilton’s mercantilist vision for the fledging country.  
Fear of the primary drove the growth of wealth, which in turn destroyed 
primary culture and corrupted law, government, culture and art.  The fear 
factor is not difficult to find in In the American Grain, but Williams most clearly 
described this human and cultural dynamic in "The American Background."  
“The secondary split off from what, but for fear,” Williams declared 
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had been a single impetus, finally focused itself as personal wealth in 
America, important since it is wealth that controls the mobility of a 
nation.  But dangerous since by its control it can isolate and so render 
real values, in effect, impotent. ("Background" 146)
Here, then, were both sides of the tragic loop – fear of the primary, or, more 
accurately, fear of absorption or obliteration by the primary, fueled the drive 
for personal wealth, which in turn destroyed the real, the primary which 
inspired the fear.  “Incredible, fairy-tale-like, even offensively perverse as it 
may seem” Williams asserted in similar fashion, “it is fear, the cowardice, the 
inability [to function] before the new, which in America whipped the 
destructive false current on like a forest fire” ("Background" 152).  
In the American Grain provided a virtual American history of fear.  “It is 
necessary in appraising our history,” Williams reminded us, “to realize that 
the nation was the offspring of the desire to huddle, to protect – of terror –
superadded to a new world of great beauty and ripest bloom that well-nigh no 
man of distinction saw save Boone” (Grain 155).  Williams’ most fully 
developed his emotive thesis in his description of Boone and Franklin.  
Boone made contact with the real, the primary – he descended to the 
“ground of his desire” (136).  But for most of Boone’s contemporaries the 
“problem of the New World was, as every new comer soon found out, an 
awkward one” (136).  How, in short, could they “replace from the wild land 
that which, at home, they had scarcely known the Old World meant to them; 
through difficulty and even brutal hardship to find a ground to take the place 
of England” (136).  “They could not do it,” claimed Williams, so  “They clung, 
one way or another, to the old” (136).  The settlers and colonists could see in 
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the “raw new” only economic resources, and Williams thus described them 
“striving the while to pull off pieces to themselves from the fat of the new 
bounty” (136).  The spirit of Boone’s contemporaries was “insecurity calling 
upon thrift and self-denial” even in the shadow of “the forbidden wealth of the 
Unknown,” namely the primary, the land itself (131).  “Clinging narrowly to 
their new foothold,” Williams noted somewhat sympathetically, “dependent 
still on sailing vessels for a contact none too swift or certain with ‘home,’ the 
colonists looked with fear to the west” (130).  
Williams critiqued Franklin as the “full development” of this kind of 
“timidity, the strength that denies itself” (Grain 155).  “He sensed the power” 
of the New World “and knew only enough to want to run an engine with it” 
(155).  It is on this basis that Williams named Franklin “the dike keeper, 
keeping out the wilderness with his wits,” even as he would seek to harness 
its raw power to scientific, technical uses (155).  “His mighty answer to the 
New World’s offer of a great embrace was THRIFT” (156, emphasis in 
original).  Evoking the corresponding, underlying fear, Williams added: “Work 
day and night, build up, penny by penny, a wall against that which is 
threatening, the terror of life, poverty.  Make a fort to be secure in . . . . Poor 
Richard: Save, be rich – and do as you please – might have been his motto, 
with an addendum: provided your house has strong walls and thick shutters” 
(156).  As we might expect, Williams concluded that it was not greed but fear 
that drove Franklin’s curiosity (155).  
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D.H. Lawrence had spoken in remarkably similar terms only two years 
earlier, in 1923, in Studies in Classic American Literature.  He accused 
Franklin of “tak[ing] away my wholeness,” and putting the author in a moral 
“corral” (14, 18-9).  “I’m really not,” he added, “just an automatic piano with a 
moral Benjamin getting tunes out of me” (16).  Williams, in fact, read 
Lawrence’s book sometime between its publication in 1923 and May 1925, 
and complimented the Englishman “on his un-English breadth of spirit” after 
Lawrence gave In the American Grain a positive review (Mariani, New World
246, 331).  Lawrence never acknowledged or responded to Williams’ letter 
(331).
Williams further elucidated the driving fear that characterized “our 
pioneer statesmen,” arguing that the “character they had  . . . was that of 
giving their fine energy . . . to the smaller, narrower, protective thing and not 
to the great New World” (Grain 157).  Williams fairly recognized that in their 
huddled, besieged state of eking out new lives in a new world, the settlers 
and colonists did “as they must have done,” but notes that “it can be no 
offense that their quality should be named” (157, emphasis in original).  “The 
sweep of the force was too horrible to them,” Williams concluded – “The 
terrific energy of the new breed is its first character; the second is its terror 
before the NEW” (156-57, emphasis in original).  
Fear’s direct relevance to his own time may well have inclined 
Williams to make it a seminal facet of his history writing.  He saw in the 
adaptability and responsiveness that his own world demanded a 
111
correspondence with what the raw new demanded of our ancestors.  Indeed, 
Williams’ contemporaries were quite articulate about the fearfully vast 
changes sweeping the American landscape in the early twentieth century.  
Henry Adams noted that in 1900 “a new avalanche of unknown forces had 
fallen on” the mind “which required new mental powers to control” (461).  
Frederick Jackson Turner referred to “the birth of a new nation in America” 
(“Social Forces” 154), and Frank argued that a “[n]ew multitude of fact and of 
detail deluged man’s mind; shut him away from the eternal contemplations” 
(224).  The result was that America had multiplied the “clutter” of modern life 
and found itself in “crisis” (224, 231).    
Williams revealed that juxtaposed with all of this change in the first 
decades of the new century, and perhaps fed by a fear of it, was the 
maddening adherence to custom and tradition, what Williams termed the 
“unrelated, crazy rigidities and imbecilities of formal pattern” ("Background" 
139) that represented the “frightened grip” of the Puritan “upon the throat of 
the world” (Grain 68).  With “tenacity,” he concluded, “fear still inspires laws, 
customs” (Grain 157).  As Harry Elmer Barnes noted in 1925, “Man’s zeal for 
antiques” with which to furnish his “cerebral space” was tenacious and 
disturbing (587).  
Williams exposed America’s greatest custom, namely, business, 
based on “the inevitable Coolidge platform” of “goodness and industry,” as a 
manifestation of the fear that “forces us upon science and invention – away 
from touch” (Grain 175, 179).  We are much like modern-day Ben Franklins, 
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Williams alleged.  “American men are the greatest business men in the 
world,” Williams declared, adding,
To me, it is because we fear to wake up that we play so well.  Imagine 
stopping money making.  Our whole conception of reality would have 
to be altered.  But to keep a just balance between business and 
another object is to spoil the intoxication, the illusion, the unity even. 
(179-80)
Powerfully capturing the fear that drives our custom of economic enterprise, 
Williams contended: 
Do something, anything, to keep the fingers busy – not to realize –
the lightning.  Be industrious, let money and comfort increase; 
money is like a bell that keeps the dance from terrifying, as it would 
if it were silent and we could hear the grunt, -- thud – swish.  It is 
small, hard; it keeps the attention fixed so that the eyes shall not 
see. (Grain 156)
A critical aspect of fear, Williams felt, was how it blinds us.  It blinded 
the Puritans to the Indians’ humanity.  It blinded men in his own time to how 
wealth had co-opted all aspects of the American cultural scene.  The poem, 
and writing generally, as a social instrument set out to expose this vast 
corruption, even self-consciously invoking the name of Lincoln Steffens, the 
muckraking journalist who uncovered police and other municipal corruption at 
the turn of the nineteenth century.  Thus, law was shown to be “the agent 
serving this colossal appetite for wealth” and was the “index of the moral 
corruption of the time” ("Background" 151).  Government, too, was impugned 
as “those, at the top, possessing cash, and so retaining their enviable 
mobility, relied on the lawyer-politician-officeholder or professional 
intermediary as the means to keep them there” (152).  “The organization of 
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the underworld,” Williams added, “would be exactly the replica, the true 
picture, of the national government – until finally they fused actually into one 
in the early years of the century, unabashed” (152).  Artistic culture was co-
opted as well.  “Wealth established museums” for respectability and 
credibility “but it could not tell, it had to be told, what was good in them” 
(153).  Opera “boxholders” slept “through the music . . . wondering what the 
hell it was all about, while the American composer, Ives, remained unknown” 
(153-54).  The academy displayed “extraordinary dullness and sloth” and “for 
writers, the official magazines have been a positive plague” (159).  
Williams’ depiction of a “generation universally eager to barter 
permanent values (the hope of an aristocracy) in return for opportunist 
material advantages” echoed Waldo Frank’s argument of America’s crippling 
extroversion in which the development of our souls and psyches had been 
sadly neglected (Grain 68).  Williams recognized that something must be 
done and that the old forms would not suffice.  So it was that in "Spring and 
All" he lamented the “greatness of life’s inanity; the formality of its boredom; 
the orthodoxy of its stupidity” (90).  “Kill!  kill!,” he declared, “let there be fresh 
meat” (90).  The fresh meat Williams sought he found in an exposé of fear, in 
revealing the fear that had always driven economics and cultural corruption.  
Williams’ affective economics, including his aesthetics, were intended to 
assist readers to make contact with the primary, to “rediscover or replace 
demoded meanings,” to work through the “layers of demoded words and 
shapes” (100).  Williams made clear in "Spring and All" that the “practical 
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corrective” for this cultural situation was contact with the primary.  Thus he 
offered the figure of the “farmer or the fisherman who read their own lives” in 
the sky as much more than “an association, . . . [a] function of accessory to 
vague words whose meaning it is impossible to recover” (100).  Whether 
farmer or reader – the same was true.  Only individual contact with the 
primary could serve as the corrective for fear and be the engine for social 
regeneration.  
Williams offered an historical analogue to his own time’s corrupted 
and fearful state: the Boston minister who recoiled from French Indians who, 
falling to their knees, began kissing his hands as he disabused them of 
Catholic dogma.  “He would not,” Williams described, “suffer the contrite 
Indians to lay their hands upon him, as the Catholic fathers in the north had 
done, but drew back and told them to address themselves to God alone” 
(Grain 119).   The scene for Williams was an ugly historical corollary of that 
“which has persisted,” namely our being “afraid to touch!” – “But being forced 
to every day,” Williams added, “by passion, by necessity –  a devil of duplicity 
has taken possession of us” (119).  Williams’ affective economics sought to 
awaken readers by exposing the human emotions beneath and beyond the 
economics and by structuring a primary experience for the reader.
* * * * *
As part of advancing an affective economics to rewrite capital values 
along human dimensions and to recast the triumph of corporate capital as 
the triumph of human fear, Williams explored our putatively economic 
115
encounter with the New World for its peculiar emotional resonance.  A series 
of representative figures illuminated much more than simply a debate 
between federal and state power, or mercantile and agrarian values.  The 
stance that Williams explored towards experience in general, and the New 
World in particular, was the economic one of giving versus exploitive taking, 
sharing versus miserly withholding.  He organized our thinking along these 
fundamentally economic axes, but they gained their power from their 
essential emotional core – the way in which one’s stance was as much an 
emotional reflection on a person, or a people – as an economic one.  
Williams turned to a series of visionary loners from the past because, as he 
noted of the perennial economic conflict in his review of Pound’s new cantos, 
the situation is historic (Essays 167).  Men who, “in whatever time they live or 
have lived, whose minds . . .  have lifted them above the sordidness of a 
grabbing world” are thus made “contemporaries”  (167).  Alive to their own 
time, these visionary loners, through their stance of receptivity and 
responsiveness to the primary, what Williams called “touch” and “contact,” 
offered us a usable past and a contemporary model.  Along with the masses 
that Williams depicted in Paterson, these visionary figures were the foot 
soldiers in the historic battle between the primary and secondary cultural 
thrusts, between the democratic spirit and the forces of corporate capital.
Williams’ visionary loners come in the context of the period’s interest 
in representative figures and representative types.  Williams and his peers 
especially featured the Puritan as the figure most responsible for shaping 
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American economic and social structures, thus making it a convenient foil to 
these authors’ preferred cultural types and figures.  Williams, Brooks, Frank, 
Lawrence, and Parrington all sought to drive Puritan “terror” from the land.  
Williams saw our fearful withdrawal from contact with reality originating in the 
Puritans.  While Brooks and Frank did not develop their analyses around 
fear, reference withholding, or posit the same broader emotive and economic 
stances that Williams did, they did attribute a profound contemporary 
relevance to the emblematic type of the Puritan and identify an inherent 
stance of withdrawal in the Puritan legacy.  For all of these writers, including 
Williams, the Puritan was the origin of a culture of corporate capital, 
responsible for a society fixated on the money-chase.
For Brooks, the Puritans “have always divided American life” between 
“the current of Transcendentalism, originating in the piety of the Puritans, . . .  
[and] the current of catchpenny opportunism, originating in the practical shifts 
of Puritan life” (Coming 8-9).  The result was an “impersonal” and 
“[d]essicated culture at one end and stark utility at the other,” that “created a 
deadlock in the American mind (14).  Brooks would resolve this dilemma in 
America’s Coming of Age by substituting a pro-social “self-fulfillment” for 
mere “economic self-assertion” to find some “middle plane between vaporous 
idealism and self-interested practicality” (32-4).  
Frank, too, developed a Puritan thesis.  Frank shared Williams’ sense 
that the “early colonies lived in an unending beat of danger,” enclosed by a 
“hostile people, a savage continent” (19).  But where Williams used the 
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pioneer type in figures like Boone and Houston to illustrate “contact,” Frank 
positioned the pioneer as an extension of the Puritan.  The harshness of the 
land necessitated of both an almost masochistic withholding from 
themselves.  The “ferocity of the Puritan,” he argued, “prepares the Pioneer,” 
teaching the “sweets of austerity” and revealing how a “self-denying life” can 
alone enable the energy needed to confront a “virgin and hostile continent” 
(Frank 63).  Here was the fear, the withdrawal and withholding, that Williams 
drew out of the Puritan past.  Frank saw, too, the broader emotive, economic 
stance of taking.  “Every narrowing instinct of self-preservation and 
acquisition,” Frank claimed, “tended to make them intolerant, materialistic, 
unaesthetic” (19).  With Puritan moralism as a basis for commerce, the 
Puritan became obsessed with “material and practical exertion,” a man 
“innerly locked up, outwardly released,” with “no immediate need to consult 
either his social or spiritual senses” (20).  “He was conscious,” Frank 
asserted, using Jack London as a contemporary analogue, “of the external 
world merely as a fact to be traversed, as material to be exploited” (36).  “The 
culture of Puritanism,” Frank declared, drawing the lineage from Puritan, to 
pioneer, to industrialist, 
for all its rigidity and dogma, had been a living thing.  It met the 
resources of America and American Industrialism was the issue.  The 
Puritan ways of life and thought and measure were taken over.  They 
fitted the new, more vigorous, more realistic pioneering form.  
American Industrialism is the new Puritanism, the true Puritanism of 
our day. (98)
118
Frank was not the only one to focus on the type of the pioneer.  Brooks 
lamented the “sheer impetus and groundswell of an antiquated pioneering 
spirit” which left Americans “with no means of personal outlet except a 
continued economic self-assertion” (Coming 31).  
Where D.H. Lawrence called “a pillar of dollars . . . all the God the 
grandsons of the Pilgrim Fathers have left” (10), V.L.Parrington envisioned 
capitalism not as the degraded remnant of, but as the seed inherent in, the 
Puritan movement.  He defined the English Puritan revolution as “primarily a 
rebellion of the capable middle class,” that produced “the system of 
capitalism and the system of parliamentary government” (Main Currents 1:7).  
The Puritans, Parrington argued, were responsible, finally, for transplanting a 
mercantilist vision to the New World, even if it was initially part of a larger 
egalitarian struggle for the “natural rights” of man over the divine right of 
monarchs.
Williams, using a slightly different tack from Parrington, Brooks, Frank 
and the others, examined the Puritans mostly through their Indian-consorting 
counterparts, Thomas Morton and Pere Sebastian Rasles.  The former 
alienated the Plymouth Colony by his trade of guns, alcohol and beaver pelts 
with the natives.  The latter, a French Jesuit missionary, lived with the 
Indians for over thirty years.  Williams described him as “to the north, another 
force, equal to the Puritans but of opposite character” (Grain 116).  Aside 
from his analysis of Franklin as a sort of secularized Puritan, Williams 
devoted only one chapter of In the American Grain to a Puritan authority, 
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Cotton Mather.  Interestingly, Williams contained Mather by sandwiching him 
between the chapters on Morton and Rasles.  The Mather chapter represents 
the only segment of In the American Grain comprised entirely of primary text, 
suggesting the complete, and more significantly, the completely closed, world 
view of this famous Puritan elder.
For Williams, the Puritans exhibited foremost an “inhuman clarity” 
(Grain 112).  They offset visionary figures’ “apprehension of detail” by how 
they were “blind to every contingency, mashing Indian, child and matron into 
one safe mold” (112, emphasis in original).  Finding only “‘emptiness’” in this 
world, they were “precluded from SEEING the Indian” as anything other than 
“an unformed PURITAN” (113, emphasis in original).  Williams evoked the 
tremendous “cost” of such emptiness – “the immorality of such a concept, the 
inhumanity, the brutalizing effect upon their own minds, on their SPIRITS –
they never suspected” (113, emphasis in original).  Ultimately, Williams 
condemned the Puritans by explicitly linking blindness and immorality, which 
are the exact opposite of the detailed eye and superior moral position of the 
visionaries.  “Blind seeds,” the poet declared, “filled with the baleful beauty of 
their religion: an IMMORAL source” (113, emphasis in original).  Just as 
Boone’s and Rasles’ contact with the Indians best revealed their embrace of 
the New World, so the Puritan’s intolerant recoil from the Indians best 
exemplified their blindness and inhumanity.  “Never could they have 
comprehended,” declared Williams,
that it would be, that it WAS, black deceit for them to condemn Indian 
sins, while they cut the ground from under the Indian’s feet without 
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acknowledging so much as his existence.  The immorality, I say, of 
such an attitude never becomes apparent to them . . . . To them it was 
as nothing to desecrate the chief’s mother’s grave, in the name of 
sanctity pulling up the stakes, to shock the spirit of native reverence. 
(113-14)
“[T]hey knew only to keep their eyes blinded,” Williams added (112).  “They 
must have closed all the world out,” he explained – “the enormity of their task 
. . .  enforced it” (112).  
The Puritans, “encitadeled” in their habits and hymns, then, 
represented miserly withdrawal and blindness; their stance was one of 
inhumanity and immorality.  Williams called this their “colossal restraint,” their 
poverty and miserliness amidst New World riches.  They could find “no 
ground to build on, with a ground all blossoming about them – under their 
noses” (Grain 114).  “Clipped in mind,” they would not permit, even perhaps 
“could not afford to allow their senses to wander any more than they could 
allow a member of their company to wander from the precinct of the church” 
(111).  Williams acknowledged a certain “beauty” in their “firmness,” (111), 
but he lamented that “[t]heir religious zeal, mistaken for a thrust up toward 
the sun, was a stroke in, in, in – not toward germination but the confinements 
of a tomb” (Grain 66).  
Williams characterized the Puritans in economic terms, calling their 
approach to making a life in the New World, paradoxically, “a possession of 
the incomplete” (Grain 114).  He meant that their miserly withholding from 
this world in general, and the New World in particular, made them 
impoverished despite the riches that surrounded them.  For all that they 
121
achieved, settling the New World under the harshest and most adverse 
conditions, Williams noted their eventual bankruptcy – “instead of growing,” 
they “looked black at the world and damning its perfections praised a zero in 
themselves” (Grain 65).  
Williams believed that the Puritans’ blindness and withdrawal 
persisted in the powerful hold of custom and tradition for many people in his 
own time.  The poor were treated as “cockroaches, and not human beings 
who may want what we have in such abundance,” he claimed, recalling the 
Puritans’ recoil from the Indian (Grain 176).  Fear of contact made, he 
believed, for class, racial, and religious intolerance.  It made his countrymen 
eschew what Williams called “a harder personal devotion” – “[d]o not serve 
another,” he warned us, “for you might have to TOUCH him and he might be a 
JEW or a NIGGER” (177, emphasis in original).  Sexual mores, of course, also 
appeared to Williams to derive from Puritan fear.  American girls were 
schooled to believe that their sexuality was “fundamentally wrong” (183, 
emphasis in original).  Where “a woman from Adrianople might be taught not 
that it is wrong to give herself but that murder will follow it, or that it is a 
dangerous gift to be given rarely,” the American girl is made to feel a “low 
thing” and the “color of her deed” is made “unprofitable, it scrapes off the 
bloom of the gift” (183, emphasis in original).
“If the Puritans have damned us with their abstinence, removal from 
the world, denial,” declared Williams,
slowly we are forced within ourselves upon an emptiness which 
cannot be supplied, -- this IS the soul, according to their tenets.  Lost 
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in this (and its environments) as in a forest, I do believe the average 
American to be an Indian, but an Indian robbed of his world. (Grain
128)
Not surprising, Williams felt that Puritan withdrawal, driven by fear, tragically 
co-opted and bankrupted an entire culture.  The “zero” was now within 
ourselves, and ironically, his fellow citizens compensated through the 
“accumulation of great staying wealth” (Grain 128).  Withdrawal and fear, 
then, for Williams were integral to, and enabled, a stance of taking, of 
exploitation.  Thus, even George Washington “[e]ncitadeled, . . . keeper of 
the stillness” and “wild paths” “within himself,” contained the primary within 
himself and exhibited “a profound spirit of resignation before life’s rich 
proposals which disarmed him” (140).  He was “curiously alive to the need of 
dainty waistcoats, lace and kid gloves, in which to cover that dangerous 
rudeness” (140-41).  Moreover, Ben Franklin, the “dike keeper” against 
contact with the primary, “adaged [men] into a kind of pride in possession” 
(154-55).  
The Puritans’ stance of miserly withdrawal from the New World was 
absorbed by the generations that followed.  “The dreadful and curious thing” 
was how the Puritans would “deceive themselves and all the despoiled of the 
world into their sorry beliefs” (Grain 65).  They were the great cultural 
homogenizers of the New World – they were like cultural real-estate 
developers, and, sadly, they “would succeed in making everything like 
themselves” (63).  It was “sordid that a rich world should follow apathetically 
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after,” making the Puritan’s “misfortune . . . a malfeasant ghost that 
dominates us all” (65-66).     
Puritans were not the only category of New World types.  Williams, in 
fact, was unique among his contemporaries for employing a broader range of 
representative figures, particularly by occupation and nationality.  He filled his 
historical narrative with Red Eric and Spanish explorers like Columbus, 
Cortez, Ponce de Leon, and DeSoto.  Included, too, were the French 
explorer Champlain, and the French missionary Rasles.  Pioneers Daniel 
Boone and Sam Houston had a role as did politicos Aaron Burr, George 
Washington and Abraham Lincoln.  In the American Grain even included a 
fictional Indian squaw, Jacataqua, and the Naval hero John Paul Jones.
Williams’ unique focus was a natural corollary of his aesthetic, the way 
in which he viewed history as a choir of voices and visions in the New World.  
His focus on explorers, moreover, was a necessary outgrowth of his interest 
in contact, touch – that first moment of encounter and the “torsion of spirit” 
that it imposed.  Williams’ choice of such varied types and figures enabled 
his unique aesthetic affects and will be explored further in the next chapter.
By contrast, Lawrence devoted only a single chapter of Studies in 
Classic American Literature to a non-Englishman, Hector St. John 
Crévecoeur.    Parrington, too, omitted French, Spanish, and Indian explorers 
and missionaries, focusing instead on a wide range of English and American 
religious, political, and artistic leaders in his three-volume work, Main 
Currents in American Thought.  In addition, Frank and Brooks, being writers 
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and, particularly, critics, often made artists their representative figures while 
Williams included E.A. Poe as the only literary figure of In the American 
Grain.  While Williams identified the poet as a social regenerator in 
"Revolutions Revalued," he did not harbor illusions that the artist was the 
primary historical visionary or mover.  A clue as to the difference between 
Williams and his contemporaries may be found as well in Book Three of 
Paterson, where the poet desperately seeks to escape the library.  The 
greatest value resided not in the shelved literary and other works but in the 
drama of the mind’s adaptation to reality in the present moment and in 
shaping an aesthetic to facilitate that adaptation and contact.  
* * * * *
Let us turn, then, to Williams’ and his progressive peers’ visionaries.  
These were the men who, alive to their own moment, rose above the 
“sordidness of a grabbing world” (Essays 167).  For Williams, these figures’ 
unusual receptivity and their capacity to “touch,” to “marry,” to make “contact” 
with the primary comprised the counter-weight to the Puritans’ emotive and 
economic stance of taking and withholding.  Williams’ visionaries are found 
primarily in In the American Grain.  They are statesmen like Burr and Lincoln; 
backwoodsmen like Boone and Houston; explorers like Champlain, de Soto, 
Ponce de Leon, Cortez and Columbus; a Jesuit missionary, Rasles; a 
wayward Puritan, Thomas Morton, and even, by virtue of their barely 
contained primal energy, colonists like Washington and Franklin.  All of these 
men were seminal figures in the ongoing struggle between the primary, 
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democratic spirit and the secondary culture, and Williams would have us 
recognize them as parts of a usable past and a contemporary model.  
Like Parrington, Frank, and others, Williams’ representative figures, in 
contrast to the acquisitive, miserly culture around them, were notable for their 
lack of economic motivation and their opposition to monopoly.  They were, in 
short, voluptuaries who possessed the artist’s tender eye for detail, truth-
telling and moral directness.  Cut from a mold different from the vast majority 
of their countrymen and the powers that manipulated the masses for their 
own gain, these representative figures typically ended up dispossessed, 
tragically lonely and lost figures in the American tableau.  Frank, Brooks and 
others shared and were even inspired by Williams’ identification of the 
economic, emotive stances of giving and taking, sharing and withholding 
even if they did not highlight “touch” and contact in the same way.  But the 
significance accorded to their own emblematic figures tended to be either 
more political (e.g., in the case of Parrington) or more overtly spiritual (e.g., in 
the case of Frank’s depiction of Thoreau and Lincoln).  
Williams raised Columbus’ lack of economic motivation almost 
immediately. “Weep for me,” Columbus asserted, 
whoever has charity, truth, justice.  I did not come out on this voyage 
to gain myself honor and wealth; . . . I went to your Highnesses with 
honest purpose of heart and sincere zeal in your cause.  I humbly 
beseech your Highnesses, that if it please God to rescue me from this 
place, you will graciously sanction my pilgrimage to Rome and other 
holy places. (Grain 16)
At the heart of the colonial expedition, then, resided the pure heart of the 
discoverer, at least as Williams would have it.  In contrast, Columbus’ 
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adversaries were “closer to that curious self-interest of natural things than 
he” (Grain 10, emphasis added).  Columbus had obtained a promise to be 
named “Chief Admiral of the Ocean Sea, perpetual Viceroy and Governor of 
all the islands and continents” that he should discover (9).  But, according to 
Williams, Columbus’ cut of “all and every kind of merchandise” was but a 
“tenth part of the whole” (10).  Furthermore, Columbus would “for the balance 
of his whole life, follo[w] his fortune, whose flower, unknown to him, was 
past,” and, in the end, he would retain nothing of the vast riches he found (9).  
In similar fashion, Champlain, “asks one favor only of the king, a 
monopoly of the fur trade for three years” (Grain 70).  Again, this claim was 
somewhat modest considering both the extreme hazards brooked and the 
exorbitant riches tapped for future generations.  Neither did Thomas Morton, 
the wayward Puritan who broke with the Puritan elders over his consorting 
with the Indians at Merry Mount, seek great riches.  Williams, rather, 
construed Morton as counteracting the hypocrisy by which the white settlers 
monopolized arms and liquor and Williams asked why, in light of the white 
monopoly, it “was . . . in the eyes of history wrong for Morton to use them for 
his trade” (76, emphasis in original).  Morton was the first trust-buster – who, 
for his efforts, got captured and sent back to England.  Williams argued that 
the “fantastic violence” and “duplicity” with which the Puritans disassembled 
Merry Mount related less to their moral objections to Morton consorting with 
the Indians and more to their having another monopoly, “the trade in beaver 
skins[,] in view” (80).  
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Other visionaries or voluptuaries were also not economically 
motivated.  Thus, Boone, driven by the
mountains . . .  to be crossed and a new and unexplored country, 
invested with every beauty, every danger, every incident that could 
amuse the imagination or quicken action, . . . learned even better than 
before that neither roof, nor house, nor bed was necessary to 
existence. (Grain 132)
Where others would “pull off pieces to themselves from the fat of the new 
bounty,” Boone, “[p]assionate and thoroughly given” to the New World, 
“avoided the half logic of stealing from the immense profusion” (136, 
emphasis added).  This stance was the moral and aesthetic counter-weight 
to the acquisitive, exploitive stance of his countrymen.  Poe, too, given to the 
New World, “abhorred the ‘excessively opportune,’” and opposed the “mood 
as ever dominant among us[,] [t]ake what you can get” (Grain 227, 220).  
This resonates with Parrington’s description of Poe as coming to “shipwreck 
on the reef of American materialisms” (2: 58).  It recalls as well Frank’s 
evocation of Thoreau as detecting “the deep hostility between the American’s 
faith of ‘business’ and life” and of uncovering “the false passions of 
possessiveness” (155).  Frank’s depiction of Lincoln as a “mystic” and “saint” 
(51) who “prophesies the break from the materialistic culture of pioneer 
America: personifies the emergence from it of a poetic and religious 
experience” is written in the same vein (56).  Pound also evoked in Canto 34 
Andrew Jackson’s voluntary divestiture of stock to avoid a conflict of interest:
I called upon Nicholas Biddle . . . and recd. two dividends
of my bank stock  . . . . . as I might be called to take part in
public measures . . . . . I wished to divest myself
of all personal interest . . . . . Nov. 9. ’31. (34:169)
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The quest for wealth did not drive men like Red Eric, Rasles, Boone, 
Burr, Champlain and Morton because they were voluptuaries who were 
impassioned to “touch” the primary, and did not regard the New World as a 
commodity to be exploited.  Thus, In the American Grain commences with 
Red Eric’s immersion in primary pleasures.  “Eric loves his friends, loves bed, 
loves food, loves the hunt, loves his sons,” we are told.
He is a man than can throw a spear, take a girl, steer a ship, till the 
soil, plant, care for cattle, skin a fox, sing, dance, run, wrestle, 
climb, swim like a seal.  A man to plan an expedition and pay for it, 
kill an enemy, take his way through fog, a snowstorm, read a 
reckoning by the stars, live in a stench, drink foul water, withstand 
the fierce cold, the black of winter and come to a new country with 
a hundred men and found them there. (Grain 2)
Boone was likewise immersed in the primary and removed from the 
mannered, monied classes on the seaboard.  “There was, thank God,” 
Williams declared, 
a great voluptuary born to the American settlements against the 
niggardliness of the damming puritanical tradition; one who by the 
single logic of his passion, which he rested on the savage life about 
him, destroyed at its spring that spiritually withering plague. (Grain
130)
Boone’s unity of purpose, his wholeness of being, the way in which “logic” 
and “passion” become one in him, was expressed in his solitary ecstatic 
immersion in the wilderness for three months.  It was what Williams calls the 
“great ecstatic moment of his life’s affirmation” (136).  Boone was “possessed 
. . . wholly” by the “beauty of a lavish, primitive embrace in savage, wild beast 
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and forest rising above the cramped life about him” (136).  “Filled,” Williams 
declared of Boone, 
with the wild beauty of the New World to over-brimming so long as 
he had what he desired, to bathe in, to explore always more deeply, 
to see, to feel, to touch – his instincts were contented.  Sensing a 
limitless fortune which daring could make his own, he sought only 
with primitive lust to grow close to it, to understand it and to be part 
of its mysterious movements – like an Indian.  And among all the 
colonists, like an Indian, the ecstasy of complete possession of the 
new country was his alone.  In Kentucky he would stand, a lineal 
descendent of Columbus on the beach at Santo Domingo, walking 
up and down with eager eyes. (137)
Boone was a case study in the visionary’s nature.  In sharp contrast to the 
Puritans’ abstinence and withdrawal, which was a fearful reaction to 
absorption and obliteration by the New World, Boone gave himself 
voluptuously to it.  He plunged in like the Spanish explorers who, Williams 
says, in contrast to the “parsimoniou[s] . . . slender Puritan fashion, . . . gave 
magnificently, with a generous sweep” (108).   In attaining a “new wedding” 
with the new land, Boone, “because of a descent to the ground of his desire,” 
remained “loaded with power . . .  to strengthen every form of energy that 
would be voluptuous, passionate, possessive in that place which he opened” 
(Grain 136, emphasis added).  Part of Boone’s passionate immersion was 
revealed in his appreciation of the Indian as “a natural expression of the 
place, the Indian himself as ‘right,’ the flower of his world” (138).  
Boone’s apprehension of the appropriate centrality of the Indian 
reprised Pere Sebastian Rasles’ similar sense in the prior chapter and 
established their joint superior moral position in Williams’ New World 
schema.  Frank made the same argument about Thoreau, noting that he 
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“almost alone among the cultured citizens of New England, prized the 
spiritual riches of the Indians” and “spent long months” with them at a time 
(154-55).  Williams depicted Rasles, who lived with the Indians from 1689 to 
1723, and described him in the same voluptuary terms as he characterized 
Boone.   Rasles and the New World he saw were a “living flame compared to 
[the Puritans’] dead ash” (Grain 120).  Rasles was “a spirit, rich, blossoming, 
generous, able to give and receive, . . . a new spirit in the New World” (120).  
Just as Boone’s contact with the “raw new” ("Background" 138) held a “moral 
and aesthetic” dimension,  so too did Rasles’ contact (Grain 136).  “Already 
the flower is turning up its petals,” Williams added, suggesting the reciprocity 
between Rasles and the New World – “It is this to be moral; to be positive, to 
be peculiar, to be sure, generous, brave – To MARRY, to touch – to give
because one HAS, not because one has nothing” (Grain 121, emphasis in 
original).  Alluding to Rasles’ life with the Indians, Williams added: “And to 
give to him who HAS, who will join, who will make, who will fertilize, who will 
be like you yourself: to create, to hybridize, to crosspollenize, -- not to 
sterilize, to draw back, to fear, to dry up, to rot” (Grain 121, emphasis in 
original).  This was the counterweight to the “tight tied littleness” (110) of the 
Puritans and their “very ugly,” even inhuman and immoral, recoil from contact 
with the New World (119).  
Williams likened Rasles and other visionaries to artists for their 
capacity to attain a reciprocity with the New World, to share and to give 
rather than take or withhold.  This is not surprising given Williams’ vision of 
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the artist’s regenerative function.  If we recall Pound’s insistence, published 
by Williams in Contact, on finding “men who can think with some clarity,” the 
imagery around artistic sight and insight resonates further.  We have already 
seen how Williams lauded Boone’s “voluptuous,” “passionate” embrace of 
the land, and his recognition of the “aesthetic” dimensions of the “difficulty” of 
grappling with the New World (Grain 136).  But Williams went further, 
evoking Boone’s “clear eye” and “symmetrical and instinctive . . . 
understanding” (137).  Rasles, too, “could open [his] eyes and heart to the 
New World,” contended Williams (120).  “Contrasted with the Protestant acts
[original emphasis], dry and splitting,” he added, “those of Pere Rasles were 
striking in their tenderness, devotion, insight and detail of apprehension” 
(121, emphasis).  “For everything his fine sense, blossoming, thriving, 
opening, reviving – not shutting out – was tuned” (121).  Providing an 
account of artistic receptivity to our environment, Williams continued: 
Nothing shall be ignored.  All shall be included.  The world is parcel of 
the Church so that every leaf, every vein in every leaf, the throbbing of 
the temples is of that mysterious flower.  Here is richness, here is 
color, here is form . . . – his passion held him a slave to the New 
World, he strove to sound its mettle. (Grain 121, emphasis added)
Williams evoked Champlain in similar terms.  “To me there is a world 
of pleasure,” he declared, 
in watching just that Frenchman, just Champlain, like no one else 
about him, watching, keeping the whole thing within him with amost 
[sic] a woman’s tenderness – but such an energy for detail – a love of 
the exact detail – watching that little boat drawing nearer on that icy 
bay. (Grain 70, emphasis added)
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When Champlain and his men later “arrive at the selected place” for where 
“Quebec shall stand,” Williams noted again Champlain’s eye for detail: 
how carefully he has noted every island, every tree almost upon the 
way and how his imagination has run west and south and north with 
the stories of the Indians, surmising peoples, mountains, lakes, some 
day to be discovered, with the greatest accuracy . . . . He knew our 
North Atlantic coast from end to end . . . [a]nd in addition, had left 
charts, maps, colored drawings . . . that are priceless now. (Grain 71-
72)
The voluptuaries’ “detail of apprehension” was revealed as well in 
Williams’ account of De Soto.  “She,” the speaking persona that Williams has 
given to the New World, tells the conquistador that “[n]one but you” “will 
recognize” the “native villages, swamps, . . . outlandish names” that the 
Spaniards will encounter on their trek.  “To the rest without definition,” “She” 
explained, “but to you each a thing in itself, delicate, pregnant with sudden 
meanings” (Grain 46).  This it is, then, to be giving, sharing – it is as much or 
more an emotional than an economic stance.
Williams’ contemporaries frequently attributed qualities of vision and 
even an eye for detail to passionate representative figures.  The figures’ 
passion was usually political and occasionally spiritual.  Parrington 
commented on Thomas Paine’s “keen eye for realities” (1: 331) and Frank 
lauded Lincoln’s “penetrating mind” and “his grasp of material details” (52).  
Lincoln, Frank declared, “had become full of a great vision” (53) and he 
rescued a practical world of reason by moving “at the behest of impulse, 
motive, vision beyond its domain” (51).  Vision was what Brooks contended 
that Whitman brought to America – giving to the “nation a certain focal centre 
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[sic] in the consciousness of its own character” (119).  Parrington, too, 
invoked passionate vision as a key characteristic of his sympathetic 
representative figures.  Roger Williams, who broke with the Plymouth Colony 
and founded Rhode Island as a haven for tolerance, was a “transcendental 
mystic” and “forerunner of Emerson” who “lived in the realm of ideas” (1: 62, 
64).  
Critically, the most notable fact of Williams’ and his peers’ schema 
was that the visionaries he highlighted were necessarily, tragically, loners.  
They were at odds with what Williams called, in his 1935 review of “Pound’s 
Eleven New Cantos,” the mainstream culture’s “murderous business” of 
usury.  It is clear that this did not comprise merely an economic position.  
Williams exposed, as well, the visionaries’ emotional reality, characterizing 
them as very much “alone” (Essays 167).  Part of the isolation of the 
visionaries was found in how they were betrayed, dispossessed, deceived, 
exploited, and finally obscured, lost, and buried.   They were ultimately 
thoroughly besieged, disowned, “done in,” by commercial powers and the 
mass of men the economic engine manipulated.  Parrington, for instance, 
saw Poe finding “few congenial spirits in a world of more substantial things” 
(2: 58).  “Homogenous America,” Frank declared, “had no thirst for 
[Thoreau’s] simple statement” (153).  Lincoln “moved through a doubting, 
wrangling world and he alone kept the faith.  His greatest trial was his own 
people” (Frank 53).  Parrington depicted John Adams as a loner who was 
rewarded with “personal unpopularity beyond any other” (1: 307).   And 
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Pound in Canto 62 echoed Parrington, reproducing what appears to be 
Adams’ own lament, recorded in his diary, of the sacrifices he incurred in 
serving in the Continental Congress in Philadelphia: “Integrity rewarded with 
obloquy” (62: 348).
In the American Grain illustrated on nearly every page the 
dispossession of Williams’ representative figures, which constituted a 
betrayal of the primary and democratic ethos that they represented through 
their “contact” and “touch.”  On the book’s very first page, in fact, Red Eric 
opposed his “single strength” to the “crookedness of their law” (Grain 1).  The 
cultural authorities “in effect have the power, by hook or by crook” and the 
bishops “lie and falsify the records, make me out to be what I am not – for 
their own ends” (1).  As Red Eric runs from Norway to Iceland to Greenland, 
the thought that “it only should be mine, cuts deep[,] . . . [a]nd it takes it out of 
my taste that the choice is theirs” (3).  “I have the rough of it,” added Eric, 
“not because I will it, but because it is all that is left, a remnant from their 
coatcloth.  This is the gall on the meat” (3).  Boone similarly resented the 
“chicanery of the law” by which, in his old age, “every last acre of the then 
prosperous homestead he had at last won for himself after years of battle in 
the new country” was taken (139).  “Boone’s lands would be stolen away 
from him by aid of unscrupulous land speculators with influence in 
Congress,” Williams added in "The American Background" (145).  In similar 
fashion, Columbus ended up with nothing, lacking even a roof over his head, 
and Sir Walter Raleigh saw the Queen desert him (61).  
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The visionary loners regularly were betrayed for money, power, or 
both.  Thus, we often find a specific property dispute at the center of the 
visionary’s life story.  “Fate,” in the form of those greedy mutineers “dogged” 
Champlain (Grain 72).  Champlain was not the only visionary to so suffer.  
Red Eric recognized himself as “a marked man” – “from that man one steals 
at will” (2).  Eric knew that when he killed Thorgest’s two sons in a struggle to 
reclaim his own property that they would brand him.  They have “separated 
murder into two parts and fastened the worse on me” (2-3).  Columbus’ story 
may be less bloody but the betrayal stings just the same – “Again and again 
he calls before his mind their agreements” (9).  “[H]is fellows turned against 
him like wild beasts,” Williams declared of Columbus (11).  When a local 
rebellion broke out in Puerto Rico, then governor Bobadilla helped himself to 
Columbus’ Santo Domingo home, “appropriated everything to himself” and, 
despite Columbus’ welcome imprisoned him and sent him back to Spain in 
this pathetic state (12).  All of this, of course, had the imprimatur of power – “I 
restrained myself when I learned for certain from the friars that your 
Highnesses had sent him” (12).  
But it was not only the monied and powerful who disowned Williams’ 
visionaries.  Red Eric’s own family converted to Christianity, deserting their 
father’s pagan, primary Gods to join the power structure of his enemies.  
“Why not?” he asked – “Promise the weak strength and have the strength of 
a thousand weak at your bidding.  Thorhild bars me, godless, from her bed.  
Both sons she wins to it.  Lief and Thorstein both Christians.  And this is what 
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they say: Eric, son of evil, come and be forgiven. – Let her build a church and 
sleep in it” (Grain 4).  Being a “marked man” like Red Eric, Columbus 
lamented that “there is no one so vile but thinks he may insult me” (11).  This 
was almost “natural” and “as much a part of the scheme,” Williams declared 
(11).  
Like Columbus, Washington, Jefferson, and Poe suffered the fate of 
tragic loners – they felt their fellow men, the populace, turn on them.  The 
first two felt how the “whole crawling mass gnaws on them – hates them” and 
they were “the typical sacrifice to the mob” (Grain 143).  For more obvious 
reasons, Poe and the masses eyed each other suspiciously – “Gape at him 
they did, and he at them in amazement.  Afterward with mutual hatred; he in 
disgust, they in mistrust” (Grain 226).  Refracting this conflict through its 
aesthetic dimensions, Williams evoked in contrast to the masses’ words 
“hung by usage with associations,” Poe’s own constant 
labo[r] to detach SOMETHING [original emphasis] from the inchoate 
mass . . . . He sought by stress upon construction to hold the loose-
strung mass off even at the cost of an icy coldness of appearance, . . . 
to get from sentiment to form, a backstroke from the swarming 
‘population.’ (221, emphasis added)
In a nation co-opted by capital and a secondary culture, visionaries 
could not help but be estranged, obscured loners.  The visionary’s distance 
from his public – in Poe’s case the distance from their words which he 
recognized as “the pleasing wraiths of former masteries” – speaks to this 
deeper cultural dilemma.  “Americans have never recognized themselves” 
and for that reason Poe is “unrecognized” (Grain 226).  The distance 
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between Poe and his fellow countrymen, or between other visionaries and 
their own contemporaries, then, directly reflected how “we recognize no 
ground our own” and float on the “unstudied character of our beginnings” 
(109).  Visionaries, with their unique ability to touch and make contact, 
inspired – or at the very least, have carried the weight of – their 
contemporaries’ and even subsequent generations’ fear of the primary.  It 
was on this fundamental basis, Williams felt, that our visionaries comprised 
an almost secret history, that they were “now lost in chaos of borrowed titles, 
many of them inappropriate, . . . nameless under an old misappellation” 
(Grain Preface).  Thus, “Poe must suffer by his originality” (Grain 226).  
“Invent that which is new,” Williams declared,
even if it be made of pine from your own yard, and there’s none to 
know what you have done.  It is because there’s no name.  This is the 
cause of Poe’s lack of recognition.  He was American.  He was the 
astounding, inconceivable growth of his locality . . . As with all else in 
America, the value of Poe’s genius to OURSELVES must be uncovered
from our droppings. (226, 219, emphasis in original)
In similar fashion, Sir Walter Raleigh, “alone with genius (Grain 62),” 
was identified as “this undersong” (59).  Whitman, Poe, Houston – they all 
know that they “must sink first” and then “[a]ll have to come from under and 
through a dead layer” of an “unrelated culture stuccoed upon” and obscuring 
the “primitive destiny of the land” (212-13).  “[W]hat Burr stood for – and . .  . 
this is typical of us – is lost sight of in the calumny that surrounds his name; 
through which the truth is not so easily to be discovered.  Let us dig and . . . 
see what is turned up – and name it if we can” (196).  
138
"The American Background" traced the trajectory of the visionaries in 
a condensed, even starker manner.  “It is the actuality of their lives, and its 
tragic effect on them, which is illuminating,“ Williams claimed:
The significance of Boone and of the others of his time and trade was 
that they abandoned touch with those along the coast, and their 
established references, . . . All of them, when they did come back to 
the settlements, found themselves strangers.  Houston, as late as at 
Lincoln’s time, lived apart from his neighbors, wearing a catskin vest, 
whittling a stick and thinking.  But the reason underlying this similarity 
of action . . . is not that they were outmoded but rather defeated in a 
curious way which baffled them . . . . Such men, right thinking, but 
prey to isolation by the forces surrounding them, became themselves 
foreigners – in their own country . . . . They themselves became part 
of the antagonistic wilderness against which the coastal settlements 
were battling.  Their sadness alone survives. ("Background" 140-41)
Ultimately, “disarmed by the success of their softer-living neighbors,” 
visionaries like Boone and Houston end up “oddly cut . . . off from the others” 
by virtue of their own “adjustment to the conditions about them” 
("Background" 141).  
The visionaries’ fate recalls Paul Mariani’s observation that “it was true 
from the start [that] the new consciousness” of Columbus and others “was 
subjected to the shock of misinformation, lies, myths incapable of sustaining 
the mind” (New World 283).  It was for this reason that Williams cherished 
the “importance of naming things correctly, of seeing what was there and of 
possessing one’s birthright” – and here’s the critical part, “with as little 
interference as possible from the special interest groups – the law, the 
church, the school, the economic structures” (283).  So it was that Williams 
warned us that our secret history must not be buried.  “History must stay 
open, . . . we should guard it doubly from the interlopers,” he contended 
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(Grain 189).  To bury Burr and the others of the visionary company under 
stones of economic self-interest may be to erase “our one hope for the 
future,” he claimed (190).  Looking beyond corporate capital, then, Williams 
urged us to preserve the liberty that Burr and others embody.  “The good 
which history should have preserved,” Williams declared of Burr, “it tortures. 
A country is not free, is not what it pretends to be, unless it leave a vantage 
open (in tradition) for that which Burr possessed in such remarkable degree” 
(197).  
Williams’ warning recalls his earlier assertion, in reference to Thomas 
Morton, that “in history, to preserve things of ‘little importance’ may be more 
valuable – as it is more difficult and more the business of a writer – than to 
champion a winner” (Grain 76).  That is, valuing just those things that have 
been dispossessed and buried may be the most significant thing we can do 
and the most critical part of our cultural and historical selves that we can 
recover.  Re-possessing our birthright from the corporate capital elite 
required this kind of adjustment in our history writing, in what we preserve 
and bring to the forefront.  Thus, we must show how “the cultural place” that 
Boone and others “occupy is the significant one” ("Background" 140).  As 
both emotive and economic models, Boone’s and other voluptuaries’ stance 
toward the New World of giving and sharing, of receptivity and reciprocal 
contact, would, Williams hoped, offer us much greater rewards than the 
Puritans’ stance of taking and withholding.  
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Chapter IV: Without “intermediate authority:” 
the Primary, the Democratic and 
Williams’ Participatory 
Aesthetics
Somehow when we put a book down, we forget that while we were reading, it was moving 
(pages turning, lines receding into the past) and forget too that we were moving with it.
- Stanley Fish, Self-Consuming Artifacts (401)
Of mixed ancestry, I felt from earliest childhood that America was the only home I could ever 
possibly call my own . . . expressly founded for me, personally, and that it must be my first 
business in life to possess it; that only by making it my own from the beginning to my own 
day, in detail, should I ever have a basis for knowing where I stood.
- William Carlos Williams, Selected Letters (185)
Never before has the historical writer been in position so favorable as now for bringing the 
past into such intimate relations with the present that they shall seem one, and shall flow and 
merge into our own personal history.  
- James Harvey Robinson, "The Newer Ways of Historians" (255)
‘They say, they say, they say.  Ah, my child, how long are you going to continue to use those 
dreadful words?  Those two little words have done more harm than all others.  Never use 
them, my dear, never use them.’  
- William Carlos Williams, In the American Grain (207)
In the previous chapter, I have examined how Williams reverses 
power relations to make economic enterprise the reflection of powerful 
underlying humanistic and emotive forces.  We turn now to consider the often 
idiosyncratic aesthetic techniques that Williams employed to make his 
affective economics resonate with readers in new and powerful ways even as 
he wrote history based on many of the same economic and historical 
premises that informed the polemics of the progressive historians and liberal 
literary critics.  
My central thesis in this chapter is that Williams crafted an inherently 
democratic, participatory aesthetic in which the reader is constantly called 
upon to choose between democratic versus capitalist impulses, touch versus 
withdrawal, and primary versus secondary culture.  Williams’ aesthetic
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encoded a democratic stance by how he manipulated primary source 
material, first continuously to confront us with this essential conflict, and 
second, to compel us to stake a claim in this ongoing economic, political and 
cultural battle.  As we are exposed to a diverse range of historical figures and 
contexts arrayed around these binaries, we have to evaluate the competing 
players and cultures that people the New World, decide between classic 
economic versus humanistic valuations as cultures collide in the Americas, 
and identify the history in us and ourselves in the history.  The complex and 
skillful aesthetic by which Williams manipulated primary texts to ensure our 
participation in history or history writing reveals that the drama of reading, 
itself, forms the heart of Williams’ concern.  
This participatory aesthetic was no accident, but rather perfectly 
complemented and underwrote the poet’s affective economics.  Williams’ 
affective economics revealed how the capitalist machine that’s co-opted 
America through secondary culture and money-madness in fact relied on a 
deeper human and emotive drama of fear and withdrawal.  The implication is 
that, if we can see this, we can correct for it and alter our course.  The active 
role implicit in Williams’ affective economics is called forth and made explicit 
by the very reading process that Williams structures.  As he develops his 
affective economics Williams simultaneously immerses us in a participatory 
aesthetic that seeks to awaken us, to make us now suddenly active in the 
reading, and by the decisions and judgments that we must make for 
ourselves, in the writing, of our history and our culture.    
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If culture has been co-opted as Williams detailed in "The American 
Background" and In the American Grain, if there had been a loss of individual 
liberty and initiative as he described in "Revolutions Revalued," Williams 
hands initiative and control back to us.  The participatory aesthetic can only 
be described as the stylistic corollary of his focus on primary culture and the 
democratic impulse.  Writing history becomes a humanistic enterprise that 
privileges writer and reader, now, in their own contemporary moment.  
Williams’ history, then, places the writer – and the reader –  at the center of 
the history, at the center of the history that gets written.  It thereby enables us 
to write the self and culture into clarity.  History is transformed from the 
province of the academic or elitist historian into a democratic enterprise that 
the reader must navigate and judge for himself.  Individual initiative of writer 
and reader shape and re-shape the historical narrative.  Nothing could be 
more inclusive, more anti-monopolistic, than to awaken the sodden mass to 
the poet’s now shared, now democratized, responsibility to act as a “social 
regenerator.”
Williams achieves all of this by means of a far-reaching and multi-
faceted kineticism, reflected in three particular aspects of his aesthetic.  This 
chapter will consider each in turn.  First, the kineticism resides in the 
aesthetic construction of the work itself.  Williams' aesthetic enacts an anti-
monopolistic view of art that undercuts stasis and accumulation by use of 
multiple characters and perspectives.  It also manipulates primary source 
material to structure the reader’s experience, specifically by making the New 
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World speak, offering invented dialogue between actual historical figures, 
staging debates and cleverly playing off of large verbatim passages.  
Second, the kineticism is found in the very terminology of valuation used to 
capture the wealth and promise of the New World.  Williams’ aesthetic effects 
a series of economic redistributions based on, for instance, using economic 
language for non-economic purposes, and contextualizing wealth.  Third, the 
kineticism inheres in how Williams’ aesthetic would have us place ourselves 
in the history – and the history in ourselves.  A series of revelatory 
encounters with our past and ourselves model a stance of responsiveness 
and adaptation for Williams’ readers that replicates the visionaries’ own 
determination to assert their relation to immediate conditions.  
In each of these aspects, Williams’ aesthetic is characterized by the 
use of language as a tool of primary experience that shifts us away from 
secondary culture, and from a reliance on cultural authorities.  Rather than 
lecturing or trying to inspire readers, Williams uses language to create vision 
and experience at multiple levels simultaneously.  His writing enacts the calls 
of his progressive peers for a “new history” and a “usable past.”  He thus 
extends the potential of language itself to begin the process of effecting the 
renewal, at the level of the res publica and res privata, that he and other 
progressives seek.  Williams’ aesthetic thus compels us to engage our world 
and ourselves in new ways, and, ultimately, makes us co-creators in 
fashioning our past and our future.  Williams moves beyond polemic or object 
argument to create an affective aesthetic experience that commands our 
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participation in a double process of reading and, as we read, writing history.  
The reading process itself becomes the key.
The kinetic quality of Williams’ style holds economic implications as 
well.  It threatens to undercut stasis or the status quo, and it is the opposite 
of huddling, erecting walls, and of careful thrifty accumulation of wealth and 
resources.  Cultural hegemony, of course, requires stasis, continuity – the 
illusion that the well-ordered past fits with the naturally sensible order of the 
present.  Williams recognizes that most belief systems tied to the status quo, 
including religions, “tend . . . to be monopolies . . . to bring . . . man under an 
economic yoke of one sort or another for the perpetuation of a priesthood –
largely predatory in character” ("Against" 216).  In this context, the 
democratic, participatory and kinetic stance of Williams’ aesthetic not only 
returns initiative and meaning-making to the individual, it also substitutes 
“action on the plane of the whole man” for cultural co-optation and economic 
monopolization ("Against" 210).  Commercial monopoly is displaced by a 
democratic, humanistic wholeness.  
In this way, Williams’ participatory aesthetic reflects his broader 
conception of art and the artist, articulated with specific reference to the war 
of corporate capital on democratic culture.    “We live under attack by various 
parties against the whole . . . . Parties exist,” Williams argues, “to impose 
such governments.  The result is inevitably to cut off and discard that part of 
the whole which does not come within the order they affect” ("Against" 210-
11).  But art battles this cultural co-optation and monopolization.  It is an 
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analogue of Lincoln’s Gettysburg Address: “government of the people, by the 
people, for the people.”  “The responsibility of the artist in face of the world is 
toward inclusion when others sell out to a party,” Williams declares (211).  
The monopolist seeks to control the whole or that part of greatest economic 
worth, discarding the rest, but the artist seeks a different kind of possession, 
a possession of the whole that is for everyone – for it is only the artist who 
“preserves him in his full sensuality, the man himself” (200).  “What does the 
artist do?,” asks Williams (199).  “He attacks, constantly toward a full 
possession of life by himself as a man” (199).  Here, then, Williams 
accomplishes a reversal in power position: “Those who possess the world 
will have it their way but in the conceit of the artist, generous enough, the 
actual and necessary government occupies only an incomplete segment of 
that which is just, in the full sense, and possible” (199).  
This recalls, of course, the Puritans’ “possession of the incomplete” 
(Grain 114) contrasted with Boone’s “complete possession” (137).  It is in this 
sense, then, that the “artist is to be understood not as occupying some 
outlying section of the field of action but the whole field, at a different level 
howbeit from that possessed by grosser modes” ("Against" 197).  As a 
seeker of “sensual ‘reality,’” uniquely attuned to the whole of the actual, he is 
necessarily inclusive (197).  This is what Williams means by “liberty” when he 
speaks of America’s independence from England –  the drama was not simply 
one of breaking away, of freedom, but it was a drama of “liberty to partake of, 
to be included in” (208).  “Liberty, in this sense,” Williams declares, “has the 
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significance of inclusion rather than a breaking away, . . . to maintain oneself 
under adverse weather conditions as still part of the whole” (208-9).
One final introductory word is necessary.  The democratic is 
predicated for Williams on the primary.  Williams reminds us in "The 
American Background" that democracy requires citizens actively engaged 
with the primary, with their own moment, independent of “all intermediate 
authority” or “unrelated authority.”  Williams’ kinetic, participatory aesthetic 
encodes this democratic ethos of deciding for ourselves, be it competing 
characters, terms of valuation, or identifications; but, this does not happen in 
a vacuum.  Williams arranges and manipulates primary material as any 
author must do.  Bryce Conrad notes that Williams edits and plays with his 
sources in often peculiar and startling ways.  There are strategic 
compressions and expansions, omissions, intercalations of imagined 
dialogue, staged debates, and even invented dialogue (including with the 
land itself).  The point is that Williams is, himself, an intermediate authority 
who fundamentally shapes our reading experience.  He manipulates primary 
source material to create this experience of original texts, all the while 
interweaving his own commentary on the conflict of the democratic and the 
capitalist, the primary and the secondary, which he believes to comprise the 
substance of our past.  So even as Williams wants us to judge for ourselves, 
he is not beyond trying to guide us to corroborate his view of history and of 
what is at stake.  Nevertheless, I think it fair to say that, in contrast to his 
peers, the very kinetic and participatory nature of Williams’ stylistics are open 
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enough to enable us not simply to accept his formulations but to make our 
own.  The under-determined aesthetic, and this is especially clear in 
Paterson, requires the reader actively to write the history, to make the 
connections.  In "The American Background" and In the American Grain, for 
instance, the reader must decide what is significant, must settle debates, 
must judge which culture’s stance toward New World experience to embrace.  
Williams, then, does not act as an intermediate authority to box the reader in; 
quite to the contrary, he forces the reader to listen, judge, participate, and 
decide.  Initiative and control are returned to the reader – through the writer, 
and an inclusive, democratic, anti-monopolistic construction of history and 
historical meaning is crafted in relation to the readers’ own moment.  History 
and legacy are not handed down or received; they are constantly made anew 
at what critic Bryce Conrad calls the “loci” of each and every reader.  
* * * * *
The first element of Williams’ participatory aesthetic involves the 
aesthetic construction of the work itself.  Williams skillfully manipulates 
primary source material to examine multiple characters and perspectives 
characterizing American history and to compel readers to consider carefully 
various historical debates and contrasting stances toward New World 
experience.  Through careful manipulation of primary source material, 
Williams writes a history that subverts stasis.  “[H]e eschews,” argues Bryce 
Conrad in Refiguring America: A Study of William Carlos Williams' In the 
American Grain, “the standard practices by which historians create the 
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illusion of a well-ordered past” (8).  Contending that history must stay open, 
Williams “often plainly reveals the fictive and imaginative character of his 
construction of the past” and writes a history that is not simply “open to the 
language of the past, but one that is conscious of itself as language” (8).  
This sounds a lot like Stanley Fish’s expressed preference for “an 
acknowledged and controlled subjectivity rather than an objectivity which is 
finally an illusion” (407).  Critic Paul Giles similarly observes that Hart Crane 
and Williams shared the beliefs of philosopher Alfred North Whitehead and 
others of their time that reality consists of parts that have “a relative and 
constantly altering relationship to each other, and each of which modifies the 
other” (22).  In a world in which “‘concrete fact is process,’ all objects become 
insubstantial and dependent for their existence upon the standpoint of the 
observer,” who provides a “provisional realism” (22).  
Williams, of course, provides us his own provisional realism; his own 
view of historical themes and events is not difficult to identify.  But, more 
critically, he pushes us to define our own view.  His participatory aesthetic 
requires an ability to adapt and adjust.  It calls for extreme responsiveness.  
This is what Williams privileges – it is what he selects from history in the 
visionary loners and it is what he demands from readers.  When we consider 
Williams’ aesthetic in this light, it cannot but recall Stanley Fish’s view, 
expressed in Self-Consuming Artifacts, of texts as kinetic.  “Literature is a 
kinetic art, but the physical form it assumes prevents us from seeing its 
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essential nature, even though we so experience it.  The availability of a book 
to the hand,” Fish argues,
its presence on a shelf, its listing in a library catalogue – all of these 
encourage us to think of it as a stationary object.  Somehow when we 
put a book down, we forget that while we were reading, it was moving 
(pages turning, lines receding into the past) and forget too that we
were moving with it. (401, emphasis in original)
As we constantly adapt to new cultures, new people, and changing styles, 
our reading career necessarily recapitulates the drama of past visionary 
figures.  Williams implicitly acknowledges this kineticism – “all I am doing,” he 
attests, “is making notes, confused accuracies” – all the while knowing that 
“intestinal toxemia and mastoiditis are more important to a  prosperous 
community than impalpable directions and invisible (but damned important) 
pitfalls” (Letters 92).
Williams uses primary documents in peculiar ways to place the reader 
directly in the drama of adaptation at several levels.  While Williams exhibits 
a thematic cohesion, if not unity, around the drama of adaptation as captured 
in the opposition of those who touch versus withdraw from the New World, 
so, too, does he use an aesthetic that can only be described as multi-
perspectival.  Thus, consistent metaphors, such as facing inland, and 
conceptual elements, such as approaching American history through 
representative visionary loners, are balanced against a series of shifts in 
perspective, voice, and method that complicate any neat reading of American 
history.  
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Shifting perspectives and voices are found immediately in the simple 
fact of whom Williams includes in the history.  He commences In the 
American Grain with Red Eric and four Spanish conquistadors in the 
chapters that immediately follow.  Already, the New World is being drowned 
in a plethora of voices and cultures – and, following immediately on their 
heels, are English explorers like Sir Walter Raleigh, persecuted Puritans 
seeking asylum in a new land, French explorers, French Jesuit missionaries, 
backwoodsmen, colonial aristocrats, slaves, and literary men.   Not only is 
there a multiple cast of characters, but the variously faceted conflicts 
augment our sense of multiplicity and complexity.  Indians battle with English, 
Spanish, and French – all of whom are at odds with one another; English 
even dispute with one another as witches are burned at Salem and Morton is 
deported.  
The conflicts, however, are not limited to these kinds of ethnic, 
externalized, strife.  A series of complex textual manipulations (and, later, a 
series of identifications that Williams explores as revelatory encounters with 
our past and ourselves) mean that competing voices and perspectives play 
out psychically or internally as well.  Williams’ participatory aesthetic places 
us right in the conflict, and it places the conflict right in us; we are compelled 
to listen, question, judge, and finally decide.  Williams invokes several 
aesthetic techniques and manipulates primary texts in a variety of ways to 
ensure our participation as readers, and this explains the repeatedly shifting 
perspective and voice in the narratives.  
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Let us start with the chapter on Christopher Columbus.  He 
commences with a third-person narrative description of how in “those times” 
the New World existed 
beyond the sphere of all things known to history . . . as the middle of 
the desert or the sea lies now and must lie forever, marked with its 
own dark life which goes on to an immaculate fulfillment in which we 
have no part. (Grain 7)
But Williams quickly turns to first-person excerpts from Columbus’ journal of 
his voyages, and, in fact, the remainder of the chapter shifts back and forth 
several times between first-person and third-person narrative.  These shifts 
and the fact that Williams crafts the chapter so that the explorer’s first 
encounter with the New World comes only after his account of the 
deprivations and betrayals he subsequently endures, has several critical 
effects.  First, it erects a tension between Columbus’ knowledge and our 
own.  His valiant, necessarily ill-fated, efforts only make us appreciate more 
poignantly the tragic nature of his fate.  Second, it simultaneously suggests 
how the discovery, the beauty, remains the most important thing despite all 
the hardship he suffers.  For the felt impact of the New World’s beauty 
remains undiminished despite the hell Columbus endures in discovering it 
and in bringing back to Spain word of its discovery.  Third, in shuttling 
between Columbus’ own journal and Williams’ critique of the Spaniard’s 
experience, the reader must weigh the costs of what Columbus incurred in 
Spanish society and the Court against the worth, and particularly the 
emotional resonance, of what he discovered.
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More radically, Williams uses invented dialogue to give voice to the 
imagined fears of his crew, and the reader must decide here whether Peter 
Gutierrez, an actual crew member, or Columbus gets the better of an 
argument.  In answer to the crew member’s inquiry as to whether he has 
“staked” his life and that of his “companions, upon the foundation of a mere 
speculative opinion,” Columbus replies that this may be so but in turns asks 
“in what other condition of life we should pass . . . [our] days” (Grain 22-23).  
Columbus argues that the voyage preserves them all from “tedium” and 
“makes life dear to us, makes valuable to us many things that otherwise we 
should not have in consideration” (22-23).  This imagined dialogue enables 
Williams to give actual voice to both the crew and their leader – he lets us 
hear their homesickness and apprehension, and he dramatizes this in 
relation to Columbus’ vision.  The opposition of Columbus’ visionary stance 
with his men’s fear is a small illustration of how Williams repeatedly stages 
conflict between contact and withdrawal throughout In the American Grain.  
Using another device in De Soto and the New World, Williams 
intersperses the voices of the conquistadors with the voice of the land itself.  
Interposing speaking parts for the New World (“She”) with occasional journal 
entries from one of De Soto’s men, Williams presents history as inclusive 
dialogue.  The “field” of the whole, in this case, the neglected New World, is 
literally empowered to speak.  And “She” speaks quite forcefully -- “You will 
not dare to cease following me,” she tells DeSoto, “but you, Hernando de 
Soto . . . you are mine, Black Jasmine, mine” (Grain 45).  Williams uses 
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shifting voice and perspective throughout the chapter to add force and 
momentum – both voices, for instance, invoke the river repeatedly in the last 
third of the chapter, setting the stage for de Soto’s being committed “down 
into the liquid, the formless, the insatiable belly of sleep” (Grain 58).  The 
land comes to seek the joining; the conqueror seeks to be merged.  The 
sexual consummation of conqueror and conquered makes it difficult, if not 
impossible, to identify who possesses whom.  And its consensual nature may 
render the question moot.  The main implication of personifying the land is to 
raise the reader’s appreciation of the primary as an active, living, 
participating entity.  Land, like the reader in Williams’ aesthetic, is 
transformed from a passive to an active stance.  Both are “quickened” like a 
fetus first showing signs of life or like the “roots” in the poem “By the road to 
the contagious hospital” that “grip down and begin to awaken” ("Spring" 96, 
emphasis added).  
In two instances, Cotton Mather and Ben Franklin, Williams uses an 
aesthetic of the verbatim to place us in history.  Critic Bryce Conrad 
characterizes In the American Grain as "a book of the library," and notes that 
"[s]ome of the book's most striking chapters . . . are those in which Williams 
makes the purely bibliographical thrust of his enterprise starkly apparent" 
(156-57).  The Cotton Mather chapter nicely illustrates this by how Williams 
selectively "cuts and pastes" into In the American Grain a combined twenty 
pages from Mather's two-hundred-page volume Wonders of the Invisible 
World, "on the evidence and occurrences of witchcraft" (Conrad 157).  
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"Williams structures his library," Conrad generally claims, "to initiate us as 
readers of early American texts, asking us to begin our own studies in the 
verbal grain of America" (158).  Conrad aptly contends that the "task of 
reading the documents – the act of making history mean – is left to us alone" 
in these verbatim passages (158, emphasis in original).  I agree, and this is 
consistent with the participatory aesthetics that Williams structures.
But the aesthetic approach of the verbatim is peculiarly well-suited to 
the Puritan thinkers, beyond simply initiating us as readers of primary texts.  
Here Williams’ text is remarkable for how it suddenly offers no shift in 
perspective or multiplication of voice and vantage point.  Conrad suggests 
that Williams uses the "lengthy excerpts from Cotton Mather's record of the 
witchcraft trials," to "document the devastatingly violent effects of Puritan 
dogma" (44).  The Puritans’ inability to open themselves to the land or even 
to “see” the Indian as anything other than an unformed Puritan, I believe, is 
best captured by such a single focus in aesthetic technique.  But I would 
argue that the verbatim exposes the internal violence as much as anything 
else, the psychic pressure of the Puritan stance toward the New World.  This 
makes the reader experience first-hand how, as Williams argued, the 
Puritans praised a zero in themselves and how their beliefs comprised a 
strike inward toward the “confinements of a tomb” (Grain 66).  
Conrad observes that "[o]ther than establishing a context in which the 
documents might take on particular resonances, Williams offers virtually 
nothing in the way of explicit interpretive comment or directive" (158).  But, 
155
context is "directive" as how Williams carefully frames Cotton Mather’s self-
contained world speaks volumes.  Chapters on Samuel de Champlain and 
Thomas Morton, in fact, precede Mather, and chapters on Pere Sebastien 
Rasles and Daniel Boone follow Mather.  Morton, Rasles, and Boone are 
especially notable for how they forge unique relationships with the Indians, 
and Champlain is portrayed as the romantic gardener of the New World, a 
fact in which Williams takes great pleasure -- “‘I was in a garden that I was 
having prepared,’ he writes.  In a garden! That’s wonderful to me” (Grain 72).  
Thus, even where an individual chapter (like Mather) does not reflect the 
shifting perspectives typical of so many other parts of the book, the self-
referential world of the Puritans is buffeted by a variety of opposed forces in 
the surrounding chapters and by an array of counter impulses as other 
chapters expand out in each direction toward the start and end of the 
volume.  
In the chapter on Ben Franklin, Williams takes a slightly different 
aesthetic approach even as he continues to use a large block of primary 
source material, verbatim and unexcerpted.  Here, he first sets out the 
entirety of Franklin’s essay to those considering migrating to the New World, 
alerting them to the middle class industry and morality of life in the colonies.  
But Franklin gets less territorial integrity than Mather as Williams tacks on an 
additional five pages to expose Franklin’s “motion without direction,” charging 
that “[h]is energy never attained to a penetrant gist” (Grain  153).  The reader, 
then, finds himself on the far side of Franklin’s uninterrupted essay, suddenly 
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thrust into an argument.  After Williams’ initial sally, “‘He’s sort of proud of his 
commonness, isn’t he?,’” the reader must sort out Franklin’s contribution and 
the virtue of the middle class vision that he personified (153).  Ultimately, 
readers must choose whether to accept Williams’ thesis that “Franklin is the 
full development of the timidity, the strength that denies itself” (155).  Will 
they exchange the standard view of Franklin as the progenitor of American 
virtues and an authority on life in the New World for the poet’s trenchant 
critique of Franklin as mustering only “THRIFT” as his “mighty answer to the 
New World’s offer of a great embrace” (Grain 156)?  
Staged debates offer perhaps the most obvious method for Williams to 
draw readers in, to awaken them and make them participate in history.  In the 
chapter on Rasles, Williams transformed his own personal history into the 
raw material for a debate on American history.  “Le desert” on his 1925 
European tour was his introduction, by friend Adrienne Monnier, to Valery 
Larbaud, a Frenchman who possessed a deep passion for American 
literature.  Williams is recalled to himself and brought back on his continental 
sabbatical, by this conversation, to the “resistant core” of his New World self 
(Grain 105).    
At the outset, Williams and Larbaud contrast the superior Spanish 
embrace of the New World with their parsimonious English counterparts.  
Williams feels thrilled to find one of “this world” “not wishing so much to 
understand as to taste” New World “freshness” (Grain 108).  So Williams is 
brought up short when Larbaud asserts that Mather’s work is “very strong, 
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very real” and that “[t]here is vigor there – and by that, a beauty” (110).  What 
follows is a full-fledged debate over the place and merit of the Puritan 
typology – in history and in contemporary America.  As critical as the debate 
is, and Williams records closely for readers what Larbaud says and how he 
replies, Williams repeatedly conveys his palpable near-ecstatic response to 
the fact of the debate itself.  This excitement draws readers in, gets us to 
follow the arguments and to consider what is at stake.  When Larbaud 
mentions Cotton Mather’s Magnalia as a great American book, for instance, 
Williams self-consciously records his own intense reaction – “What!  Startled 
but thrilling with pleasure, I found that he had read the Magnalia.  No.  He 
had read it . . . THIS in Paris” (Grain 109-10, emphasis in original).  Williams 
adds: “My French became inspired . . . . I laughed to myself in my intense 
pleasure” (110).  
Larbaud lauds how the Puritans’ by the “strength of religion alone . . . 
surmounted all difficulties” and explained all things (Grain 110).  “[L]ike 
science at its best,” he declares, the Puritan’s thinking “is firm, it is solid, it 
holds the understanding in its true position” (110).  Williams responds by 
characterizing the Puritans’ “sureness which you praise” as “their tight tied 
littleness” (110).  When Larbaud designates the Puritans as “giants,” Williams 
objects that “they had their magnificent logic but it was microscopic in 
dimensions” (113).  Williams reverses Larbaud’s argument, recasting the 
Puritans from offering “clarity and distinction” in the “clear air” (110) to being 
“dwarfed” and, eventually "microscopic” (113).  Williams re-draws their 
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alleged “vigor” as “rigid clarity, . . . inhuman clarity,” and he eventually 
silences Larbaud for the second half of the chapter (111)(emphasis in 
original).    
Perhaps most interesting is how Williams augments the debate by 
pulling in the Puritans’ contemporary, Pere Sebastian Rasles.  Williams 
characterizes Rasles and Puritans in dialogic or binary fashion, noting that 
“[t]here was, to the north, another force, equal to the Puritans but of opposite
character, the French Jesuits; two parties with the Indians between them, two 
sources opposite” (Grain 116).  In his eloquent evocation of Rasles that 
follows, Williams contrasts for Larbaud, and readers “the Protestant acts, dry 
and splitting,” to Rasles’ “luscious fruit,” “humanity,” and “passion” (Grain
121, emphasis in original).  Williams pulls readers in not only by offering a 
scathing critique of the Puritans but by offering an eloquent elegy for Rasles.  
Rhetorically this is significant – for he offers a positive alternative to, rather 
than simply an attack on, the Puritans.  The chapter that started with Williams 
feeling himself “with ardors not released but beaten back, in this center of 
old-world culture” thus ends by touching again that New World “freshness,” 
and the point of presenting his argument with Larbaud has been to get the 
reader to do the same (Grain 105).  
The drama of reading is the focus again of Williams’ democratic, 
participatory aesthetic in “The Virtue of History,” where the poet engages an 
unnamed interlocutor in an argument over the value and fate of Aaron Burr.  
Personifying the other side of the argument in this chapter, as he did with 
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Larbaud, Williams moves from a bookish critique of deceased historians into 
a tense debate.  The contemporary necessity of reconsidering our history 
and how we write thus becomes increasingly clear, even pressing.  
Williams’ first premise, to suspect any unanimous “verdict” of history, 
is manifest throughout the chapter as a second speaker regularly quotes 
such “verdicts” for Williams to shoot down.  The first verdict offered is 
Alexander Hamilton’s characterization of Burr as a “‘dangerous man, one 
who ought not to be trusted with the reins of government’” (Grain 190).  
Complicating such conventional notions, Williams asks: “How dangerous, 
and to whom?  To usurpers?  Why did the Senate weep so uncontrollably at 
his farewell address?  Perhaps he had somebody’s number . . . they wept at 
a vital loss” (Grain 190).  This type of exchange is continuously replicated as 
Williams’ interlocutor, quoting passages drawn from conventional histories, 
repeats over and over again, “it says” (190-91) or “they say” (198).  The 
interesting question that emerges, then, is what we read and what we do with 
our reading – and the reader begins to suspect that the drama of reading is 
really what forms the heart of Williams’ concern.  For the interlocutor’s 
relatively uncritical acceptance of standard histories of Burr and his times 
eventually runs smack into Burr’s own death-bed admonition at the chapter’s 
conclusion: 
‘They say, they say, they say.  Ah, my child, how long are you going to 
continue to use those dreadful words?  Those two little words have 
done more harm than all others.  Never use them, my dear, never use
them.’  (Grain 207)
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In this sense, then, what Williams says of Burr, that he “knew what a 
democracy must liberate,” namely, “[m]en intact – with all their senses 
waking,” is what Williams himself seeks by way of his readers (206).  For he, 
too, seeks to awaken the reader to participate in this dialogic exchange.  We 
are called upon to make a decision, to choose between conflicting histories.  
Reading conflicting voices and perspectives becomes a matter of possessing 
the whole and withstanding the status quo, stasis, and cultural authorities 
asserting their own narrow self-interest.  Seeing the binary of Burr and his 
conniving contemporaries exposes the underlying economic versus 
democratic interests at stake and makes us decide which vision of America 
we will embrace.  Thus Hamilton is called “a balloon of malice” (190).  His 
desire to harness the great natural resources of the land to forge an 
economic and political empire, assisted by an accommodating, oligarchic 
political structure, is opposed to Burr’s vision of “America, as a promise of 
delight” (Grain 197).  
Moreover, in what is standard fare in In the American Grain, we must 
“dig” through our history and “see what is turned up – and name it if we can” 
(196).  Thus, in response to the quoted rebuke of Burr as a “‘great man in 
little things’” and a “‘really small’” man in “‘great ones,'” Williams answers 
“That’s Jeffersonian rhetoric: a well turned phrase, but what does it mean?” 
(191).  The message is that we cannot and should not accept pat 
explanations of historical events and figures.  Our past and our relation to it 
are kinetic, not static.  Where things went and could have gone have not 
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necessarily always been clear, and it is up to us where things go today.  As 
readers we play an integral part in judging our past.  What we choose to 
value and bring to the fore reflects our present and defines our future.  We 
act in this way to create or co-create, in a sense, our past and our future.  
“Which way will it go?,” Williams asks – implying equally the past and the 
future (192-93).  Williams urges us to take a look at “the whole period . . . not 
as history, that lie! but as a living thing, something moving, undecided, 
swaying” (192).  Consistent with critic James Longenbach’s conception of 
existential historicism, this constructs history-writing as an empathic 
encounter between the reader in the present and our past.  It also makes the 
past a contemporary phenomenon.  In this way, history must stay open – it is 
not decided by cultural authorities but is “something on the brink of the 
Unknown, as we are today” (Grain 193).  
The participatory drama of reading and choosing is also at the center 
of Williams’ chapter on Poe.  Williams’ aesthetic works here at two levels.  
First, Poe (like Burr and others) models the independent stance he hopes to 
have readers adopt.  Second, Williams compels readers to decide a historical 
debate between Poe and Lowell, based on his use of contending primary 
documents at the start of the chapter.  An exchange between Poe and Lowell 
in essays and poems sets the stage, and Williams encourages the reader to 
replicate Poe’s own “conviction that he can judge within himself” (Grain 216, 
emphasis in original).  
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Williams’ primary thesis is that Poe’s value resides in his ability to give 
expression to America in a “re-awakened genius of place” (Grain 216, 
original emphasis).  This transcends simply replicating European modes in a 
New World atmosphere, such as Hawthorne did.  Thus, rendering Indians 
and an American landscape is not the point – what is needed is a genuine 
expression of deeper New World forces.  This resides in Poe’s “scrupulous 
originality,” in his “legitimate sense of solidity which goes back to the ground” 
(216).  Williams immediately pulls the reader into the debate by emphasizing 
Poe’s peculiar provincialism.  He foregrounds Poe’s belief in “the necessity 
for a fresh beginning, backed by a native vigor of extraordinary proportions,” 
and “corollary” conviction that “‘colonial imitation’ must be swept aside” (219).  
This “strong sense of a beginning” that “is in no one  else before him” in 
American literature makes Poe resemble Christopher Columbus and de Soto 
(222, original emphasis).  It also enables Williams to position Poe as pre-
Modernist.  “With Poe, words were not hung by usage with associations,” 
Williams contends,
the pleasing wraiths of former masteries, this is the sentimental trap-
door to beginnings.  With Poe words were figures; an old language 
truly, but one from which he carried over only the most elemental 
qualities to his new purpose; which was, to find a way to tell his soul.  
Sometimes he used words so playfully his sentences seem to fly away 
from sense, the destructive! with the conserving abandon, 
foreshadowed, of a Gertrude Stein.  The particles of language must be 
clear as sand.  (Grain 221)
The debate starts in earnest when Williams quotes Lowell’s caustic 
broadside against Poe:
Here comes Poe with his Raven, like Barnaby Rudge –
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Three fifths of him genius, and two fifths sheer fudge;
Who talks like a book of iambs and pentameters
In a way to make all men of common sense damn meters
Who has written some things far the best of their kind;
But somehow the heart seems squeezed out by the mind.  (Grain
217)
Poe responds that “‘profound ignorance on any particular topic is always sure 
to manifest itself by some allusion to ‘common sense’ as an 'all-sufficient 
instructor’” (Grain 217, original emphasis).  He lambasts Lowell for having 
“‘meddled with the anapestic rhythm’” which is “‘exceedingly awkward in the
hands of one who knows nothing about it and will persist in fancying that he 
can write it by ear’” (217, original emphasis).  Poe asserts that Lowell would 
be well served to “‘leave prose, with satiric verse, to those who are better 
able to manage them; while he contents himself with that class of poetry for 
which, and for which alone, he seems to have an especial vocation – the 
poetry of sentiment’” (217, original emphasis).  
But Williams does more than simply replicate Poe’s and Lowell’s 
arguments.  His own role in the argument, in fact, becomes clear at multiple 
levels.  We see him providing a sort of running commentary on the Poe-
Lowell debate.  Williams relishes how, for instance, that Poe “tears L’s 
versification to pieces” (Grain 217).  Further, Williams strategically augments 
Poe’s argument, even going so far as to reach beyond the immediate 
controversy to pull in other arguments and texts by Poe.  “But Poe might 
have added finally, in his own defense” Williams asserts, “what he says 
elsewhere” (Grain 217).  In this way, Williams simultaneously manipulates 
and comments on several primary texts.  By pulling in additional Poe texts 
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beyond the immediate compass of his feud with Lowell, Williams cleverly 
expands Poe’s argument.  So it is that he quotes Poe’s assertion that “‘[o]ur 
necessities have been taken for our propensities’” (218).  “‘Having been 
forced to make railroads,’” Poe asserts,
it has been deemed impossible that we should make verse.  Because 
it suited us to construct an engine in the first instance, it has been 
denied that we could compose an epic in the second.  Because we 
are not all Homers in the beginning, it has been somewhat rashly 
taken for granted that we shall be all Jeremy Benthams to the end.  
(218)
Ultimately, Williams skillfully presents the Lowell-Poe debate to achieve two 
ends.  First, he would have the reader join the argument, see what is at stake 
and “judge within himself” (216).  Second, Williams uses Poe to underscore 
his own argument of the primacy of the “local” (218, emphasis in original).  In 
either case, the reader does not just get a synopsis of an argument but rather 
gets an argument that has been carefully presented through skillful 
manipulation of primary texts and insertion of Williams’ own voice to achieve 
his two ends.  There exists, as always, the tension between Williams’ 
manipulation of texts to provide a primary experience for readers, to have us 
judge for ourselves, and his interest in guiding us to corroborate his own 
values and vision.
* * * * * 
The second element of Williams’ democratic, anti-capitalist aesthetic 
involves an economic redistribution of values.  Using language as a tool of 
primary experience, creating vision, Williams shifts us away from secondary 
culture and corresponding cultural authorities.  We are directed away from 
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economic to larger human, emotive valuations at several levels.  The same 
participatory ethic is at play here as well.  Williams would have readers 
recognize the different modes – economic and human – of valuation and he 
would have them, even as they judge for themselves, embrace the latter.
The wealth of the New World, for instance, is contextualized in the 
humanity of Montezuma, who is the fullest expression of a culture of this 
continent.  “‘You see that I am composed of flesh and bone like yourselves 
and that I am mortal and palpable to the touch,’” the chieftain tells Cortez 
(Grain 31).  “‘They have told you that I possess houses with walls of gold and 
many other such things and that I am a god or make myself one.  The 
houses you see are of stone and lime and earth’” (31).  The wealth that 
obsessed Cortez is displaced by Williams’ sense of Montezuma as the 
embodiment of the New World – “rooted there, sensitive to its richest beauty” 
(32).  And Montezuma is the embodiment of his people; the
whole waking aspirations of his people, opposed to and completing 
their religious sense, seemed to come off in him and in him alone: 
the drive upward toward the sun and stars.  He was the very person 
of their ornate dream, so delicate, so prismatically colorful, so full of 
tinkling sounds and rhythms. (35)
The redistribution of values also entails an emphasis on craftsmanship 
over economic worth.  The entire chapter reads like an inventory of New 
World craft, and objects of Aztec art are notable for how they “imitat[e] in 
gold, silver, precious stones and feathers . . . every object in his domain” 
(Grain 35).  Aztec art is an expression of its climate in the fullest sense and 
economic valuation becomes impossible, even meaningless: “The houses 
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were so excellently put together, so well decorated with cloths and carven 
wood, so embellished with metalwork and other marks of a beautiful 
civilization” (Grain 30).  The “many beautiful and curious artifices ‘of so costly 
and unusual workmanship . . . considering their novelty and wonderful 
beauty’” make it such that “‘no price could be set on them’” (31).  For a 
moment, the New World seems nearly to elide translation into economic 
terms, to escape its corresponding debasement and exploitation.  
Williams’ redistribution of value is expressed as well in certain 
strategic compressions and expansions.  “The Destruction of Tenochtitlan” 
offers an expansive inventory of New World artistry and craftsmanship; 
nearly two pages are given over to describe the gifts Montezuma sends 
Cortez to discourage the Spaniard’s journey “into the back country” (Grain
28).  By this inventory Williams attests to the wonderful strangeness of the 
encounter for the newcomers, and he establishes the complex voice of the 
New World – how Montezuma speaks in a richly complex yet simultaneously 
simple voice through these gifts.  New World behavior is both naïve and 
ironic for Montezuma seems not to recognize that such gifts will not dissuade 
but only hasten the Spanish incursion.  It suggests, as well, that the Aztec 
leader may view the elaborate crafts and gifts that he sends in an entirely 
less acquisitive and more human light than the Spaniards.  Indeed, his gift 
may reflect a miscalculation based on an inability to imagine how Cortez 
would view and react to such a gift.  
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The poet also minimizes the economic in an analogous way.  It is 
noteworthy that next to his lengthy testament to Aztec skill and ingenuity 
Williams offers a strategically reduced account of acquisitive, exploitive 
enterprises.  Williams minimizes Cortez, noting that he “was one among the 
rest” (Grain 27) and the “advance” of Cortez’s army on Tenochtitlan “was like 
any similar military enterprise” (29).  In a related vein, Williams considers the 
fate of Cortez and Tenochtitlan with a brief notation – “And then the end” 
(36).  Contrasting passages such as these suggest the relative spiritual, 
cultural poverty of the Spanish imperialist design next to the deep native 
richness of the Aztecs.    
Williams effects a redistribution of value, too, by usurping economic 
language for non-economic purposes – that is for non-economic subjects and 
usages.  Thus, Williams refers to the “richest” beauty of Aztec civilization 
and, lamenting how the Aztec world “sank back into the ground to be 
reenkindled, never,” he describes its “spirit mysterious, constructive, 
independent, puissant with natural wealth” (Grain 32, emphasis added).  
Similarly, “She,” the New World voice in the DeSoto chapter, invokes a 
language tinged with economic resonances as she enacts a drama of taking 
and giving.  At the start of the chapter, “She” tells the explorer: “I am beautiful 
– as ‘a cane box, called petaca, full of unbored pearls.’  I am beautiful: a city 
greater than Cuzco; rocks loaded with gold as a comb with honey.  Believe it” 
(45).      
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There is a similar inversion or play with economic terms in “The 
Founding of Quebec.”  Here, Williams calls Champlain’s annoyance at a 
Basque uprising “a treasure,” and the Frenchman’s lenience toward the 
Basque, “a thing priceless,” even as he recognizes “these things are costly” 
(Grain 71).  Columbus also appropriates several terms from the economic 
lexicon to justify the point of his voyage to Peter Gutierrez – “Should no other 
fruit come from this navigation,” Columbus declares, 
to me it appears most profitable inasmuch as for a time it preserves us 
free from tedium, makes life dear to us, makes valuable to us many 
things that otherwise we should not have in consideration. (Grain 23, 
emphasis added) 
Williams turns to language tinged with economics as well to evoke the 
spiritual poverty of the Puritans.  “[P]rais[ing] a zero in themselves,” the poet 
characterizes them as “particles stripped of wealth” (Grain 63, 65).  This fits 
with their “possession of the incomplete” that Williams contrasts with Boone’s 
own “complete possession” (114, 137).  The Puritan’s enduring legacy of 
poverty is found in how American girls are alienated from their own sexuality 
– by instilling fear, the culture makes “unprofitable” any expression of desire 
(183).    
* * * * * 
The third element of Williams’ kinetic and participatory aesthetic 
involves a series of revelatory encounters with our past and ourselves.  
Language works as a tool of primary experience at several levels.  In the 
American Grain presents primary textual documentation of representative 
figures’ encounter with the raw new.  It is, simultaneously, meta-encounter as 
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Williams gives the account of his encounter of these representative figures’ 
encounters with the primary.  The reader, moreover, enters the picture at one 
remove, one further concentric ring out, as Williams shapes our encounter of 
his encounter of the historical figures’ encounter.  It is worth noting, of 
course, that to the extent that we encounter and identify with primary texts, 
they have been manipulated and mediated by Williams, as critic James 
Breslin notes, to make history tell itself right.  At the center of Williams’ and 
our own encounters is the question of what identifications are made.  In the 
course of this aesthetic journey, two democratic elements get played out.  In 
other words, In the American Grain may be said to comprise a deeply 
democratic, individualistic endeavor at two levels.  
First, In the American Grain comprises the story of one man, here the 
poet, simultaneously writing himself and his culture into existence along more 
vital lines, based on the identifications he makes.  At one level, then, 
Williams shapes his own history – and himself – engaging in polemics, 
heaping ridicule on the Puritans and their legacy, and lauding Rasles and 
others who can make “contact.”  Second, the reader is asked, even 
compelled, to do the same.  Williams in his meta-encounter, and readers in 
our meta-meta-encounter, must wade through the same conflict that Williams 
describes “newcomers” having to confront – that is the “conflict between 
present reliance on the prevalent conditions of place and the over-riding of 
an unrelated authority” ("Background" 143).  We must find a usable past 
consisting of those figures as alive to their own moment as we must be to our 
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own.  The visionaries Williams identifies with, and would have us identify 
with, assert such an unmediated relation to the conditions at hand, apart from 
the dominant interests of mercantilists, federalists, puritans, land speculators 
and so forth.  Williams’ aesthetic technique requires us to enter the historical 
debates and decide for ourselves what both our history and present moment 
are and should be, based on the identifications we choose to make.  We may 
say of In the American Grain, then, what Williams identifies in "The American 
Background" as the “American addition to world culture” ("Background" 143): 
“What it is actually is something much deeper: a relation to the immediate 
conditions of the matter in hand, and a determination to assert them in 
opposition to all intermediate authority” (143).  The irony, of course, is that 
Williams is the mediating authority for his readers, and even his presentation 
of primary documents encodes the poet’s values and implies the positions he 
would have us adopt.  Williams, needless to say, has some interest in seeing 
our meta-meta encounter mirror or confirm the findings of his own meta 
encounter.
Through a series of revelatory identifications, Williams models a 
stance of responsiveness and adaptation for his readers that replicates the 
visionaries’ own determination to assert a relation to immediate conditions.  
Williams seeks to reconcile American culture to its visionary loners, to 
reconstitute our culture on that basis.  The artist would be, then, at the 
center, after what Williams calls his “brutalizing battle of twenty years to hear 
myself above the boilermakers in and about New York” (Grain 105).  As 
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social regenerator, the poet would be relieved of the Hobson’s choice either 
to “scream like a locomotive or to speak not at all” (108).  Ultimately, 
Williams’ revelatory identifications and encounters mean that what Stanley 
Fish describes of a reader-response critical method is true as well of 
Williams’ aesthetic, for both Williams and his readers: “it is a method which 
processes its own user, who is also its only instrument.  It is self-sharpening 
and what it sharpens is you.  In short, it does not organize materials, but 
transforms minds” (Fish 425, original emphasis).
The exigencies of Williams’ own position as an American and as an 
artist shape his revelatory identifications with past visionaries and peoples.  
Regarding the former, Williams inserts Ezra Pound’s rebuke in the prologue 
to Kora in Hell – “And America? . . . what the h—l do you a blooming 
foreigner know about the place” (11).  America only interests Williams, Pound 
charges, “as something damned but exotic” (Witemyer 76).  Williams 
describes his strikingly deliberate efforts to domesticate the place –  or 
himself to the place – noting: 
Of mixed ancestry, I felt from earliest childhood that America was the only 
home I could ever possibly call my own . . . expressly founded for me, 
personally, and that it must be my first business in life to possess it; that 
only by making it my own from the beginning to my own day, in detail, 
should I ever have a basis for knowing where I stood.
(Letters 185)
Elsewhere, Williams writes that “Nothing in school histories interested 
me, so I . . . [went back to] source material [and tried] to establish myself
from my own reading, in my own way, in the locality which by birthright had 
become my own” (Letters 185, emphasis added).  Establishing oneself by 
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one’s own reading – and writing – is the epistemology that Williams 
developed in The Embodiment of Knowledge.  We “are at the center of the 
writing, each man for himself but at the same time each man for his own age 
first,” he declared (Embodiment 107).  In writing, we are “attempting to strike 
straight to the core of [our] inner self” (105).  Recognizing that “[t]o live 
cannot be learned from the writings of others (106),” Williams lauded the 
“characteristic American position of the intelligence – the pioneer turn of mind 
– the individual superior to authority.  No external to it” (9).  In his 
epistemology, the self is the locus of knowledge – both as recipient and 
generator - and a “useful body of knowledge” is “made to serve the individual 
who is primary” (Embodiment 9, emphasis in original).  Williams’ subjective, 
impressionist history, then, makes sense; defining one’s place means 
defining the historical ground and to forge this path for oneself is necessarily 
the democratic, pioneer legacy.  Encountering primary texts, and locating in 
them the raw materials to stimulate revelatory identifications, Williams places 
himself and the culture on firmer, more vital ground.  Until he does this, both 
remain an enigma to themselves.  He comes to recognize that which was 
alive to its moment, and how he must be similarly alive to his own.  If 
Williams feels himself and the culture to be lost, adrift, lacking a sense that 
who we are has a relation to what we have been in the past, he can establish 
both by his reading and writing.  It is in this sense that Mariani calls Williams’ 
epistemology “another version of Adamic myth” (283).  
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But I noted above that the exigencies of Williams’ situation as an artist 
also drive his revelatory encounters and identifications with past visionaries.  
For just as Burr, Boone, Poe, Rasles, Red Eric and others were loners and 
outcasts, so, too, Williams views himself.  Pound calls Williams “the keeper 
of the lonely lighthouse,” and Williams would not dispute that characterization 
(Witemyer 77).  Williams calls himself a “stick in the sides of the populace 
here” (74).  In his 1936 speech at the University of Virginia, "Revolutions 
Revalued," the poet shared his frustration and isolation with his audience.  
“For the past thirty years,” he confessed, 
I have never been able to get one first-rate poem published in a 
commercial magazine.  I have never been able to get a single book of 
poems, no matter how small, published except by paying or partly 
paying for it myself or having it published by a friend or group of 
friends. ("Revolutions" 107-8)  
Williams acknowledged that 
[t]hey did not sell, they were not bought, because the market for 
them did not exist [as they] are different in character from the 
volumes upon volumes of verse commercially published in that . . . 
the intention has been to make them accurate to the day, in form as 
well as content. ("Revolutions" 108)  
As such, Williams recognized, they do not meet the “sole criterion today as to 
a book’s value . . . . ‘Will it sell and pay a dividend?’” ("Revolutions" 108).  
“Romantic starvation . . . does not appeal to me,” Williams noted with similar 
frustration in a letter to Pound (Witemyer 57-58).  “My hysteria,” he 
confessed, “is just a matter of cash.  I can’t live without my trade, can’t 
continue at my trade and find time for writing” (73-74).  This is precisely the 
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kind of “rigid limiting of . . . incentives” for the poet that Williams lamented in 
"Revolutions Revalued" (108).
In the context, then, of Williams’ own position as an American and as 
an artist, his revelatory identifications with past visionaries and peoples 
enable him to locate himself in the American past and the past in himself.  
But, too, they enable him to re-define the culture.  He will bring the culture to 
him if he cannot meet it on its own economic, secondary terms.  Williams 
would surely embrace James Harvey Robinson’s observation that “Never 
before has the historical writer been in position so favorable as now for 
bringing the past into such intimate relations with the present that they shall 
seem one, and shall flow and merge into our own personal history” ("Newer 
Ways" 255).  Reconstituting the culture to reconcile it to its visionary loners 
offers Williams an opportunity to leave the lonely lighthouse for a position at 
the center.  A newly vital culture, constituted along the lines of contact with 
the primary, makes the poet a critical player.  This is necessarily a 
democratic impulse, for reconstituting culture along the lines of the poet 
means re-orienting it along the lines of the “pro-social” individualism of the 
artist, who alone can withstand the pull of the age toward fascism on the one 
hand or communism on the other ("Revolutions" 101).  Perhaps it was this 
Williams had in mind when he told an FBI agent who was questioning him 
during or just after World War II about his friendship with Pound that he had 
“spent my whole life, generally speaking, for my country, trying to serve it in 
every way I know how” (Autobiography 317-19).  
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Identification is part of this reading drama from the start.  “The plan 
was to try to get inside the heads of some American founders or ‘heroes,’” 
Williams notes of In the American Grain, “by examining their original records.  
I wanted nothing to get between me and what they themselves had recorded” 
(Autobiography 178).  More revealing still is Williams’ acknowledgement –
I want to give the impression, an inclusive definition, of what these 
men of whom I am writing have come to be for us.  That they have 
made themselves part of us and that is what we are.  I want to make it 
clear that they are us, the American make-up, that we are what they 
have made us by their deeds. (236)
In getting inside the heads of the explorers, certain visionaries, and 
even the Puritans, Williams works to counteract how he and the primary 
culture have been obscured and buried.  In a culture of corporate capital, the 
artist, perhaps any individual, will be dispossessed, or lost in some measure 
to himself.  As Williams seeks to claim a ground that is his own, he seeks, 
too, to have us do the same.  As he shares his revelatory identifications, we 
must recall that what Williams says in "Spring and All" applies to the 
identifications, the meta-meta encounter that he structures for us throughout 
In the American Grain: “In the imagination, we are henceforth (so long as you 
read) locked in a fraternal embrace, the classic caress of author and reader.  
We are one.  Whenever I say, ‘I’ I mean also, ‘you’” (89).   
The poet’s discoveries in his meta-encounter with past records 
replicate the vistas that open before (and the contact that is attained by) the 
historical figures whom he reads and about whom he writes.  In the 
revelation, of course, is the sudden recognition of contact between self and 
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other.  Williams, for instance, evokes Champlain’s “watching, keeping the 
whole thing within him, . . . such an energy for detail – a love of the exact 
detail” (Grain 70).  “This is the interest I see.  It is this man.  This – me,” 
declares the poet (Grain 70, emphasis added).  “Here is a man after my own 
heart,” Williams earlier attests, “Here at least I find the thing I love (Grain 69, 
emphasis in original).  Recalling his definition of a usable past as one that is 
as alive to its time as we should be to our own, Williams asserts of 
Champlain: “I mean here is the thing, accurately, my own world, the world in 
which I myself breathe and walk and live – against that which you present” 
(Grain 69, emphasis in original).  Williams identifies with Burr in similar 
fashion – “He’s in myself and so I dig through lies to resurrect him” (Grain
197).  We can speculate that Burr’s “clarity” (like Champlain’s) and his 
“disrespect for the applause of the world” is part of the basis for Williams’ 
identification (Grain 200).  The way in which Burr “loved and [went] straight to 
the mark,” recalls Williams’ own description of writing as “attempting to strike 
straight to the core” (Embodiment 105).  
Other identifications are not so much a matter of obvious choice or a 
desire to connect his own work to that of visionaries with similarly gifted sight.  
Williams’ identifications, then, can also reflect how the primary (and the 
secondary) necessarily resides in each of us, even if only as a matter of 
obscured and unrecognized cultural heritage.  This heritage is decidedly 
mixed – we are, each of us, part conquistador, Indian, and Puritan.  In “The 
Fountain of Eternal Youth,” Williams identifies us with the Indians who rush to 
177
meet Ponce’s men wading ashore – “It is we who ran to the shore naked, we 
who cried, ‘Heavenly Man!’” (Grain 39).  “No, we are not Indians,” Williams 
explains, “but we are men of their world” (39).  In other words, sharing their 
land, their continent, even after generations upon generations, “the ghost of 
the land moves in the blood, moves the blood” (39).  The result – “[t]hese are 
the inhabitants of our souls” (39).  But, Williams adds, “our murdered souls 
that lie . . . ahg.  Listen!” (39).  What would Williams have us attend to?  The 
fact that our cultural legacy is expressed as a deep conflict within our very 
own blood.  For our murdered souls do not tell the full story – because “[w]e 
are, too, the others . . . . We are the slaughterers” (41).  
The soul of the New World, our souls, then, are “tortured” (41).  Even 
as we are the bloody conquerors, we are, ourselves, the conquered.  “Fierce 
and implacable,” Williams explains, “we kill them but their souls dominate us.  
Our men, our blood, but their spirit is master.  It enters us, it defeats us, it 
imposes itself” (40).  “In the heart,” Williams explains, “are living Indians once 
slaughtered and defrauded – Indians that live also in subtler ways” (Grain 
42).  Our “murdered souls” that “lie” with the truth of our brutal slaughter of 
the Indians are also occupied by resurrected, or “living” Indians.  
But, pulled between the murdering Spaniards and the Indian spirit-
master of our souls, Williams does present an act of volition.  Detailing how 
the Spanish interrupted their full retreat to rescue “the precious Berrescien,” 
Ponce’s “damned bloodhound,” Williams describes how the dog was gaining 
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on his Indian victim in the water (40).  “But, O Soul of the New World,” 
Williams declares,
the man had his bow and arrow with him as he swam . . . . He 
stopped, turned, raised his body half out of the water, treading it, and 
put a bolt into the damned hound’s throat – whom sharks swallowed.  
Then to shore, not forgetting – leaping to safety – to turn and spit back 
the swallowed chainshot, a derisive yell at the Christians. (41) 
“If men inherit souls,” Williams concludes, “this is the color of mine” (41).
In the Rasles chapter, Williams similarly explores several complex 
identifications.  Reflecting his nervous state before the learned Frenchman, 
Larbaud, Williams likens himself to “the brutal thing itself” (Grain 107).  “The 
lump in my breast hardened and became like the Aztec calendar of stone 
which the priests buried because they couldn’t smash it easily,” though “it 
was dug up intact later” (107).  And in strange fashion, Larbaud actually 
proposes to Williams that the American poet carries within himself at least 
three strains of New World life.  “This interests me greatly,” he tells Williams,
because I see you brimming – you, yourself – with those three things 
of which you speak: a puritanical sense of order, a practical mysticism 
as of the Jesuits, and the sum of all those qualities defeated in the 
savage men of your country by the first two.  These three things I see 
still battling in your heart. (116)
Larbaud may simply possess the greater insight of a disinterested outside 
observer.  Or Williams, desperately seeking to place himself in the American 
grain, may place this somewhat ambitious identification in Larbaud’s mouth 
as an indication that he cannot quite buy it or make it fully fly.  
I noted above that Williams’ identifications also reflect the Puritan 
legacy.  The Puritan still “keeps his frightened grip upon the throat of the 
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world” (Grain 68).  This is exhibited in the “niggardliness of our history, our 
stupidity, sluggishness of spirit, the falseness of our historical notes” (157).  
Aside from the conspicuous Puritan presence in our predominant economic 
culture, the Puritan keeps his grip internally as well.  This identification of our 
soul with the Puritan need not be voluntary; it is, in some measure, 
inescapable.  The Puritan’s “misfortune has become a malfeasant ghost that 
dominates us all” (66).  Clearly echoing Waldo Frank’s extroversion thesis, 
Williams attests that the “agonized spirit . . . has followed like an idiot with 
undeveloped brain, govern[ed] with its great muscles, babbling in a text of 
the dead years” (68).  
The identifications that Williams discovers in his meta-encounter with 
past figures and texts seek to redress the effect of the Puritan legacy and the 
triumph of capital.  “[D]amned” by Puritan “abstinence, removal from the 
world, denial,” we are “forced within ourselves upon an emptiness which 
cannot be supplied,” which is the “soul, according to their tenets” (Grain 128).  
It is for this reason that Williams describes us as “[l]ost in this (and its 
environments) as in a forest” and characterizes “the average American” as 
“an Indian robbed of his world” (128).  Williams’ own revelatory 
identifications, and those he structures for us as readers, aim to restore to 
the common man his land and his soul.  
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* * * * *
In this and the prior chapter we have seen how contact with and 
recovery of the primary, the non-economic, characterizes Williams’ entire 
program in "The American Background," In the American Grain, and other 
works.  Williams worked in a variety of complex ways to move beneath and 
beyond economics.  His affective economics and participatory aesthetics are 
intended to make us examine “the quality of [our] beliefs” ("Background" 
149), and to help us attain a “complete possession” of our own world as 
Boone did when he “descended to the ground of his desire” (Grain 136-37).  
In the chapter that follows I will examine how Williams developed these 
themes in Paterson in the final phase of his career.
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The writing is nothing, the being/ in a position to write (that’s/ where they get you) is nine 
tenths/ of the difficulty: seduction/ or strong arm stuff.
- William Carlos Williams, Paterson (3:113) 
[W]e do not know (in time)/ where the stasis lodges.
- William Carlos Williams, Paterson (1:34)
’I’ll die before I’ve said my fill about women.’
- William Carlos Williams (Nay 45)
A dissonance/ in the valence of Uranium/ led to the discovery/ Dissonance/ (if you are 
interested)/ leads to discovery.
- William Carlos Williams, Paterson (4:175)
“Intelligence always has to give way to the masses,” Williams declared 
late in his career.  “Get on with your fellowmen,” he continued, “the 
characteristics of the age help your writing when you go along with them; . . . 
the age should govern what you write” (Interviews 79).  This was more than a 
simple statement of democratic sympathy; Williams defined the poet as a 
“social regenerator” ("Revolutions" 109) and “passionate regenerative force” 
("Revolutions" 106, emphasis in original) whose poem is “a social instrument” 
(Letters 286) or “active agent, sometimes of a basic attack” (Autobiography
341)(emphasis in original).  It is the fire meant to animate the leaden mass of 
men Williams depicts in "Sunday in the Park" in Book II of Paterson: “Minds 
beaten thin/ by waste,” for he claims that “among/ the working classes SOME 
sort/ of breakdown/ has occurred” (2: 51, emphasis in original).  Paterson
explores this breakdown in detail, revealing a democratization of the 
dispossession that characterized the most isolated of the representative 
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voluptuaries of In the American Grain.  In the way that these glorious but 
tragic figures were lost to the culture, so the mass of men are lost to 
themselves in Paterson.  “They may look at the torrent in/ their minds/ and it 
is foreign to them” the poet notes, alluding to the falls of the Passaic (1:12).  
“The language, the language,/” he explains, “fails them/ They do not know 
the words/ or have not/ the courage to use them/ . . . they die also/ 
incommunicado” (1:11).  The masses are desperately in need of what the 
poet as social regenerator can offer – words of, words to effect, “release” and 
“relief.”  Williams thus declares in Book III: “The writing/ should be a relief,/ 
relief from the conditions/ which as we advance become – a fire,/ a 
destroying fire.  For the writing/ is also an attack” (3: 113).  For this reason, 
defenders of the secondary culture and the status quo, according to Williams, 
will try to find the “means . . . /to scotch it – at the root/ if possible” (3:113).  
This explains Williams’ declaration: “The writing is nothing, the being/ in a 
position to write (that’s/ where they get you) is nine tenths/ of the difficulty: 
seduction/ or strong arm stuff” (3: 113).  Paterson, then, comprises both 
diagnosis and treatment, recognition and counter-attack.  The poet explores 
and defines the local conditions as he simultaneously seeks a cure.  
Part of the complexity of Paterson resides in the question of who is 
“the poet.”  The poem is both Paterson’s “autobiography, schematized and 
translated into symbolic terms, and a poem about itself” (Sankey 2).  It is the 
story of Paterson’s “struggle with himself to accept his present world, . . . [by] 
giv[ing] meaning to it, [by] discover[ing] a language appropriate to it” (2).  It is 
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in this vein that I refer to the “poet” or “the figure of the poet” in Paterson.  
Even as the doctor-poet closely resembles Williams himself, I believe that 
Williams has created a fictive figure, and that it would be a mistake to read 
“the poet” as being Williams himself.  Projecting from himself the character of 
Paterson as a fictive alter-ego enabled Williams simultaneously to dramatize 
and gain distance from his own search for a writing of release and relief, of 
personal and social regeneration.  
As with the speaker of In the American Grain, Paterson seeks contact 
or touch, and opposes these ideals, which he calls “love,” to the “divorce” 
that he identifies through all five books of the poem.  “Let the words/ fall any 
way at all,” declares the poet, “that they may/ hit love aslant” (3: 142).  This 
genuine contact or “love” requires a release from old forms.  “[U]nless there 
is/ a new mind there cannot be a be a new/ line,” Paterson argues, “the old 
will go on/ repeating itself with recurring/ deadliness” (2:50). “The words will 
have to be rebricked up” and must “break loose,” he attests (3:143).  The 
point is that the poet must effect a release through his writing and he is less 
interested in the “finished product” than in the “bloody loam” – what is 
organic, of the moment, and of his age (1: 37).  Thus, Paterson asserts that 
he must write “carelessly so that nothing that is not/ green will survive” 
(3:129).    
The vitality of the progressive vision of the historians and literary 
critics is not simply retained in Paterson, but is rendered in ways more deeply 
personal to Williams and the character of the poet, in the figure of Paterson.  
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Many of Williams’ peers had mostly completed their active careers when 
Books One through Four of Paterson were published from 1946 through 
1951, and Book Five was published in 1958.  The vision of Williams’ 
progressive peers of writing a usable past, however, continued to animate 
Williams’ poetic.  His history-writing project in Paterson is to defend individual 
liberty and initiative against a culture of corporate capital, here by placing the 
fictive poet as common man at the conspicuous center of a meaning-making 
drama.  Paterson is of a piece with In the American Grain, and we can see 
Williams’ major poetic work come into relation to his earlier prose around his 
exploration of democracy and a usable past.  Writing is a matter of civic 
engagement, even rescue by the poet-regenerator (Williams and Paterson)
as he, himself, and his mass of fellow men must find relief and release from 
the stasis imposed by the present and the past, what critic John Beck calls, 
“atrophied lives, brutalized environments, and corrupted beginnings” (155).  
Earlier critics of Paterson and Williams’ poetics, such as Randall 
Jarrell, lamented the introduction of material on Credit and Usury, “‘those 
enemies of man, God, and contemporary long poems’” (qtd. in Conarroe 
117).  Conarroe notes as well how Vivienne Koch described the “‘explicit 
pseudoscientific diagnosis of our present economic ills’” as a “‘serious 
weakness . . . got like a contagion from Pound’s Cantos’” (qtd. in Conorroe 
117).  Critic John Ulrich observes in "Giving Williams Some Credit: Money 
and Language in Paterson, Book Four, Part II," that “literary critics have 
regarded Williams’ interest in economic theory with disdain, attributing that 
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interest solely to the influence of Ezra Pound” (122).  Even a critic such as 
Joel Conorroe, who admits that Paterson would be incomplete without the 
economic motif because it “reveals the man and his world so thoroughly,” 
characterizes the poem’s economic motif as a “frayed green thread . . . 
peculiarly unsuited to poetry, even for a writer with the habit of finding poems 
in the most unlikely places” (130).  
By contrast, more recent critics like Beck, Ulrich, Brian Bremen, and 
Alec Marsh recognize the progressive, civic and economic character, and the 
reformist impulse, of Williams’ poetics, and my own study is broadly 
consistent with their critical approach.  The point for more recent critics is not 
the rigor of Williams’ (and Pound’s) economic analysis, how trenchant or 
even accurate it is, but rather what purpose and intent the economic critique 
reflects, and what animating concerns it addresses.  Williams’ purpose or 
intent is to assert the democratic, to preserve individual liberty and 
prerogative in an age of corporatism, whether in the form of fascism, 
communism, or capitalism.  We should view Williams in the same way that 
he tells Pound to view himself: “as a poet, incidentally dealing with a messy 
situation re. money” (Witemeyer 171).  Williams knew that he was not, and 
was not attempting to be, a “trained economist” (171).  “What I want out of 
you is not economics,” Williams cautioned Pound,  “but the poem” (Mariani, 
New World 713).  
Marsh notes that the “populist critique of ‘finance capitalism’ is never 
far away in Williams’s work,” and, quoting John Dewey, calls Williams’ 
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undertaking “an epic of the local” that explores the “‘fundamental defect of 
our civilization,’” namely the development and products of a “money culture” 
(qtd. in Marsh, Money 195, 203).  Marsh explores Williams’ economic motif in 
the larger context of Jeffersonian agrarianism and reveals how the economic 
theme fits with Williams’ view of the “role of the modern poet” to “restore true 
aesthetic, ethical and moral values” (Money 5).  Thus, Marsh concludes that 
the Social Credit critique of industrial capitalism was “sound as far as it goes” 
(5), and that both Pound and Williams “used Jeffersonianism to interpret 
modernity” and “modern capitalism” (9).  
John Beck likewise notes that Williams’ economic motif – what he 
calls Williams’ and John Dewey’s “socialism” – is “more rooted in 
Jeffersonian virtue than Marxian dialectics” (109).  Beck disavows 
“presenting Williams as a systematic political or philosophical writer who 
uses poetry merely as a platform for socioeconomic arguments” (2).  The 
point of the economic analysis contained in Williams’ and Dewey’s “social 
progressivism,” Beck asserts, is, “in the face of growing social fragmentation 
and alienation,” to find a “stability and security” to "anchor society and protect 
individual liberty from growing capitalist incorporation” (3).  Beck 
characterizes Paterson’s  ambitions as being “in large part, the agonized and 
unfulfilled ambitions of American progressivism” (137), and broadly asserts 
that to “write an epic is to deliberately engage in the affairs of society, to tell 
the tale of the tribe” (136).  “Williams’s avant-garde critique of modern 
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America,” Beck claims, “depends on individual agency in an age in which 
such agency is thwarted at every turn” (155).    
My study builds on the recent work of Beck, Marsh, and others by how 
I set Williams’ economic motif in the broader context of his assertion of 
democratic values and imperatives.  In particular, I believe that I can 
complement their excellent studies by considering how Williams reveals the 
human conditions and emotions, especially fear, that drive our culture of 
capital.  Recognizing what I have called Williams’ “affective economics” 
enables us to apprehend how Williams structures an aesthetic that returns to 
us as readers the ability to shape our culture and our future.
This chapter will explore how, like In the American Grain, Paterson
articulates an affective economics through a participatory aesthetic.  Williams 
transposes in Paterson the themes that preoccupied him in "The American 
Background," "Against the Weather," "Revolutions Revalued," and In the
American Grain.  Fear of the primary, which played so central a role in In the 
American Grain, gets further compounded in Paterson with fear of the 
secondary.  Economic stances towards New World experience are imbued 
with a deeper emotional resonance through a series of representative figures 
– just as in In the American Grain.  But, in Paterson, the poet’s own 
experience is more personally rendered as the representative figures 
become radically gendered as female.  The revelatory “empathic 
identification[s],” as Bremen calls them, characterizing the aesthetic of In the 
American Grain, that were so emblematic of how that earlier work sought 
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contact through locating likenesses with dispossessed voluptuaries of the 
past, is transfigured in Paterson (160).  Identifications are resisted and 
haltingly reached only incident to, and after, much dissonance and conflict.  
As in In the American Grain, the poet still acts as a regenerative force 
defending individual liberty and initiative against a capital culture, but in 
Paterson he figures both women and writing itself as the “primary,” to borrow 
the terms he uses in "The American Background."  Critics have long been 
interested in Williams’ construction of gender in Paterson and throughout his 
career.  I want to develop this aspect of Williams criticism by further exploring 
how his fearful, dissonant encounters with women as representatives of the 
primary orient the poet back to an affective economics.  Contemporary 
female figures make us connect with the primary and represent the affective 
values beneath or beyond the economics.  This has everything to do with 
how the fear of the primary and how the deeper emotional stances get 
played out.     
In truth, women have always been linked to the primary in Williams’ 
history-writing, and what difference we find in Paterson from earlier works is 
best understood as a shift in emphasis from past to present, from the 
somewhat easy and ecstatic identifications with various representative men 
of In the American Grain to the disconnects and conflicts with women in the 
latter work.  In both In the American Grain and Paterson, Williams depicts 
male incursion into, and conquest of, a feminized land.  Jacataqua, whom 
Burr encountered, was the female embodiment of the New World; so, too, 
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was “She,” who wooed DeSoto to his resting place on the river’s bed.  Not 
surprisingly, representative loners like Rasles and Champlain who make 
contact with the land become, themselves, feminized.  Williams depicts this 
by their tenderness, their attention to detail and beauty.  
But in Paterson we find a subtle shift in emphasis.  In the American 
Grain offered us a panoply of male figures – Puritans and visionary loners 
who, respectively, failed or succeeded in making contact.  The land was, for 
the most part, a singular presence.  “She” spoke to DeSoto but Jacataqua 
was silent.  The feminine primary made itself felt by how it insinuated itself 
into the sensibilities of men like Rasles and Champlain.  The poet 
experienced a variety of complex and contradictory identifications, seeing 
himself in the slaughtering Spaniards and the slaughtered Indians who ran to 
shore to greet them.  The land thus seemed to speak mostly indirectly, 
through the loners it touched and who touched it.  
In Paterson, by contrast, the female primary is multiplied as the figure 
of the poet encounters Cress, “She,” Beautiful Thing, Curie, Bessie Smith, 
and the lady who disappears as soon as she is glimpsed in Book Five.  This 
multiplication of the feminine is complemented by a reduction to one of the 
major masculine incursive figures, namely Paterson.  The shifts in the male-
female presence in the poem are fitting because Paterson is the story of the 
poet’s encounter with his world in the present moment.  History offers 
positive examples (e.g., Andrew Jackson) and cautionary notes (e.g., Sam 
Patch and Sarah Cummings), but the drama consists of the poet navigating 
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his own world now.  The representative figure of the poet, which was implicit 
and occasionally made explicit in In the American Grain, is altogether the 
center of the action in Paterson.  The multiplication of the feminine as 
primary in Paterson enables Williams to convey the challenges his fictive 
poet faces in making contact.  The drama of making contact in the past –
which constitutes the usable past – has been more consciously crafted as a 
drama of making contact in the present.  Gendering the drama as “marriage” 
between a male poet and his variously voiced female primary world is critical; 
it invites all of the nuance of courtship, marriage, and sex.  It makes the 
drama more emotionally rich, nuanced, and real – there is attraction, the 
desire of courtship and wooing, fear of closeness, fear of losing oneself in the 
other, even loathing and repulsion.  
Moreover, Paterson’s interactions with the various aspects of the 
female primary are dissonant and conflictual affairs.  In some ways they echo 
the stylistic disjunctions, the ragged edges and conflicting signals of the text 
itself, including its dialogic moves from prose to verse and discontinuous 
narrative juxtapositions.   I will examine, in particular, the dissonant 
encounters of Paterson with Cress, “She,” and Beautiful Thing.  His 
experience of Curie offers a different kind of dissonance – she serves as a 
model of discovery based on recognizing differences or dissonances, the 
kind of attention to detail represented by Rasles or Champlain in In the 
American Grain.  Paterson’s experience of the glimpsed lady in Book Five 
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also offers less a “dissonance” than a disconnect that suggests again the 
challenge and mystery of the primary.
Paterson offers a continuity with Williams’ earlier works insofar as it 
enacts an aesthetic of participatory discovery.  Williams’ aesthetic makes us 
read the poem including history in an historical manner as tropes and figures 
resonate and reappear.  But as the threads are less than obvious in a 
narrative that is radically discontinuous, if not purposely under-determined, 
the reader is faced with apparent discontinuities all the time.  Bremen 
effectively argues that in “order to break up the staleness, destroy these old 
customs and habits, Williams needs to use violence if he is to begin to 
change history” (36).  We are thus always seeing new things and things 
anew – having to relate what is now before us in a constantly altering present 
to what’s come before.  There is a sense, then, that it is the reader who, 
repeatedly called on to adapt and to relate the now to the then, is truly 
constructing the (or at least a) narrative.  This comprises a challenge not 
simply for the reader – “That God damned Paterson,” Williams admitted to 
his publisher, James Laughlin, “It’s all shaped up in outline and intent, the 
body of the thinking is finished but the technique, the manner and the method 
are unresolvable to date.  I flounder and flunk” (MacGowen xi).
Williams’ participatory aesthetic, based on his conception of writing 
not as a representation of reality but as primary, as a creation coterminous 
with reality, fundamentally underwrites his economic vision and his assertion 
of individual initiative and liberty in the face of corporate capital.  The radical 
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discontinuity or disjunction, felt even in the individual psyche of Paterson 
himself and, by extension perhaps, in the reader, makes the writer’s and the 
reader’s enterprise “primary.”  The reader is compelled by the poet into an 
act of narrative creation.  Self-consciousness and self-examination replace 
absorption into some kind of authoritative text.  The reader necessarily finds 
himself joining the poet in regularly wondering how to “move the mind” 
(4:198) and in always facing the task of “pulling the disparate together to 
clarify/ and compress” (1:19).  The reader experiences in Paterson’s radical 
aesthetic dissonance the same “torsion of the spirit” that the first Puritan 
settlers of the New World find in confronting the “raw new.”  The primary 
materials that the poet marshals (e.g., verbatim transcription of Ben 
Franklin’s advice to prospective European settlers, extracts from Columbus’ 
journals, excerpts from Cotton Mather’s Magnalia) engage the reader in the 
same hard work that these early settlers faced in confronting the primary.  
The primary materials, then, represent the local that Williams is so fond of 
asserting.  
There is a corresponding phenomenon of the local in the reader as the 
text throws him or her back on his or her own local resources, own past and 
present self, to make sense of it all.  The aesthetics make the reader make 
meaning and make the reader aware that he or she is making meaning.  The 
reader is struggling always to navigate abrupt changes in tone and vantage 
point and shifts from prose to verse, as well as to identify at any given point 
in whose company he or she is and what voices are being heard.  The result 
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is that anti-monopolistic principles inhere in the very aesthetic structure of the 
work itself.  In many ways Williams is less authorial, and monopolizes less 
the construction of meaning than what we might expect in a more 
conventional, less experimental text.  Paterson brings hierarchical structures 
into question, critic Elizabeth Gregory aptly asserts in "Figures of Williams's 
Modernist Ambivalence: Poetic Lineage and Lesbians in Paterson."  
Paterson questions “any and all structures that assign value on exclusionary 
principles;” at the “structural level” this is expressed in his juxtapositions 
between poetry and prose (39).  Meaning resides with individual initiative –
both the poet’s and the reader’s own narrative creation.  Meaning is not a 
commodity, is not commodified, but is forged anew each time, with each 
reading, and for each person.
This is important because Paterson struggles with contact with the 
primary in the context of writing the poem.  Williams believed that writing 
enabled the writer to "strike straight to the core of his inner self, by words” 
and that “WE are at the center of the writing, each man for himself” 
(Embodiment 105, 107).  Paterson demonstrates a fictional poet’s efforts to 
do just this.  But aside from how Paterson may have been primary for 
Williams in the writing of it, and how it illustrates a poet’s, Paterson’s, writing 
as being part of the experience of the primary, Paterson also equally takes 
up the drama of the reader.  Because Williams believes that the poem is a 
“social instrument,” part of Paterson’s dilemma centers on how to find a 
meaningful language – “What common language to unravel?” (1: 
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7)(emphasis added).  If writing is primary and is intended as a “social 
instrument,” then the real challenge a poet faces is to write so the reading of 
the poem remains as primary as the writing of it, to write so as to not lock in 
the reader.  Here is where Paterson’s own anxiety of stasis and capture in 
the library in Book Three has to be factored in and countered by the aesthetic 
structure and principles of the poem.  How to write for the ages, for 
subsequent eras without enslaving them, is a severe challenge, and one that 
makes Paterson, at times, lose heart.  An oracular voice in Book Three tells 
him to “Give it up.  Quit it.  Stop writing/ . . . Give up/ the poem.  Give up the 
shilly-/ shally of art” (3: 108-9).  But the poem continues to chronicle 
Paterson’s, and to facilitate, in its aesthetics, the reader’s own, contact with 
the primary.  Paterson’s incorporation of prior primary texts captures earlier 
authors’ experiences of the “raw new.”  The poem is thereby always making 
itself new, approaching the past as a series of present moments of touch (or 
withdrawal), and assuming the ever current or fresh stance of the daily 
newspaper, which Marsh argues John Dewey understood as a metaphor for 
our culture (Money 194).  Truth, ultimately, may reside somewhere between 
“She’s” intonation to “Go home, Write, Compose” and the voice in Book 
Three that compels Paterson to seek from the “river for/ an answer/ for relief 
from ‘meaning.’” (3: 111-12).  That Paterson perseveres suggests that writing 
and reading the poem are both primary, as matters of making “contact” and 
wielding art as a “social instrument.”  To give up the poem would mean to 
195
give up meaning-making or to give up structuring a meaning-making process 
for readers in generations to come.  
In this chapter, I will first consider Paterson’s dialectic of fear.  There 
exists the poet’s fearful reaction to the primary as well as to the stasis 
represented by the secondary, the latter of which simultaneously affects the 
mass of men and is embodied in historical texts and traditions.  The essential 
question for Paterson is how to be in his age but not of it, or how in the 
American landscape to avoid being silenced like past figures and the present 
mass of men.  Then I will look at how Paterson’s fear of the primary is played 
out in conflict with a series of representative female figures.  I will explore 
how these dissonant encounters, which are often specifically economic in 
nature, enact an affective economics and move Paterson, and hopefully the 
reader, beyond the culture of corporate capital.  In all of these aspects, and 
critically, in the aesthetics, Paterson enacts a release and relief consistent 
with the poet’s regenerative function; he does this for himself and his fellow 
men.  Aside from being the representative common man, the poet as 
regenerator must do more than, and more for, most men.  Thus, he defines 
the problem of achieving “contact” in the modern world as falling within his 
domain of language and seeks to make the substance of the history he 
writes and how he writes it elemental and transforming.
* * * * *
We know from the affective economics of In the American Grain that 
fear in the face of the primary drives the secondary money culture.  
Corporate capital and the economic engine are thereby made dependent on 
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the affective, and brought within our potential control.  In Paterson, fear is not 
simply a thread abstractly considered to run through the course of American 
culture and history but is more personally located in the figure of the poet, in 
Paterson, in two specific ways.  Paterson thus enacts what has been 
previously theorized.  First, the fear of the primary, exhibited and explored in 
others in In the American Grain, comes to reside now in Paterson himself 
and is exhibited by his fearful reaction to the streets, the falls and a series of 
women who represent the primary.  Second, Paterson fears the sterility and 
stasis of the secondary, which he identifies with the present mass of men 
and the texts and figures of the past.  Thus, the poet is associated from the 
first page of Book I with the “automatons” of the city who “walk outside their 
bodies . . . unroused” (1: 6).  Paterson frets over being “ice-bound” like the 
dramatic eighteenth century figure of Sam Patch and the more mundane 
figure of Sarah Cummings, who leaped and slipped, respectively, into the 
maw of the primary.  In an image that neatly combines the poet’s fear of the 
primary, in the form of the elemental force of the Passaic falls, with his fear of 
the secondary, in the form of the falls whose power can be harnessed for 
economic ends, Paterson considers the historical figure of an unknown man 
“lodged between two logs” visible in the “chasm near the wheel house of the 
water works” and perched “over the precipice” (1:35).  The combined effect 
of Paterson’s twin fears reveals how much more difficult is the struggle for 
the poet than what seemed the case in Williams’ earlier work.  Paterson
becomes a self-reflexive chronicle, the narrative of its character’s own 
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struggle to survive and to write his chronicle, in the face of these twin fears, 
these twin forces.  Putting the twin aspects of the poet’s fear together in the 
poem generates a dissonant dialectic – the poet bounces back and forth in 
suggestive ways between fear of the primary and fear of the secondary.  This 
is a continuation and more deeply personal elaboration of "The American 
Background’s" articulation of primary and secondary culture.  
Better to understand how Paterson’s fearful encounters with a series 
of women representing the primary articulate an affective economics, it is 
critical first to examine how this dialectic between fear of the primary and fear 
of stasis forms the essential drama of the entire poem.  The five books of 
Paterson offer dramatic illustrations of this dialectic of fear, even apart from 
the poet’s encounters with the representative primary females.
Book I, section three, for instance, illustrates how even in a single 
passage the poem simultaneously evokes potential and movement as well as 
deadening stasis and sterility.  In this part of the poem, Paterson has 
contrasted several instances of primary and secondary culture by using 
language itself as a metaphor.  Thus, he compares the automatons of the 
modern city who have “no words” to the perpetual renewals “bespoke” by the 
picture of the “9 women/ of some African chief” (1: 13).  “Divorce” and the 
“green bud fallen upon the pavement its/ sweet breath suppressed” is 
contrasted with Paterson’s hopeful acknowledgement that he has “[o]nly of 
late, late! begun to know/ . . . whence/ I draw my breath or how to employ it” 
(1: 20-1).  At this early point – only 25 pages or so into the poem – Paterson 
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seems betwixt and between, unable to embrace either the primary or the 
secondary.  He is paralyzed by fear of the falls and fear of stasis such that he 
proclaims, “we do not know (in time)/ where the stasis lodges” (1: 34).  
Paterson commences the third section of Book One by asserting the 
supremacy of the “green, livid/ green” rose over the red rose of literature and 
the imagination (1: 29).  The poet thus exposes his own false “idiot” 
“mastery” and concludes “My whole life/ has hung too long upon a partial 
victory” (1: 29).  The reader is thus led to examine his own desire for the 
commodity of literary imagination, the secondary, in the form of the “red 
rose.”  This recognition suggests movement – the green rose, livid with the 
sap of life, is given priority over the “partial victory,” the “idiot” and the elusive 
“mastery” of literature’s red rose.
The suggestion of movement and potential in the ironically 
characterized “livid” green rose is implied in two subsequent broadsides 
against the academy.  “Idiot” is now used to refer to the universities, which 
Paterson accuses of being “spitted on fixed concepts like/ roasting hogs, 
sputtering” (1: 32), and whom he characterizes as “knowledgeable idiots” 
who “perpetuate . . . stasis and make it/ profitable” (1: 34).  The opening
image of the red rose and the latter portrait of the academy depict stasis and, 
by their recognition of this, a simultaneous suggestion of release and relief 
from that stasis.  Scenes that follow elaborate on sterility in the form of 
absent-mindedness (the doctor engaged in a distracted and detached effort 
to peel a label from an empty mayonnaise jar), absence (a “young colored 
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woman/ in a small voice standing naked by the bed” who asks “Will you give 
me a baby?”), and privation (a careful account of deceased Cornelius 
Doremus’ early eighteenth century estate contrasted with a vague accounting 
of hand outs to contemporary working folks in this “time of general privation”) 
(1: 32-33).  
Stasis appears to inhere as well in the poet’s personal envy of men 
like Pound and Eliot, “the men that ran/ and could run off/ toward the 
peripheries – to other centers, direct – for clarity (if/ they found it)/ loveliness 
and/ authority in the world” (1: 35).  The “springtime/ toward which their 
minds aspired” he can see “within himself” only as being “ice bound” (1: 35).  
The textual sequence intensifies the poet’s isolation in his ice-bound state 
and sterile world by bracketing it, on one side, with a scene of brutal waste 
and violence in which thousands of eels are clubbed and carted off from a 
drained lake bed, and, on the other hand, with the image of the man caught 
in the waterworks.  Paterson, then, is surrounded by privation and stasis, 
which is made all the more painful and ironic by the brutal, economically 
motivated, destructive waste of the natural bounty.    
It is fitting that the movement the poet envies in others but sees only 
“ice bound” in himself is captured as well in the prose-verse-prose movement 
of this passage; the two prose paragraphs of loss and waste seemingly block 
the poet’s egress.  Such sequencing reflects what Alec Marsh refers to as 
Williams’ “aversion to metaphors, and especially similes, because he 
connects their transformative powers to that of financial manipulation” 
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(“Stevens and Williams” 37).  Arguing that Williams believed that “[p]oetry 
ought to be concerned with actual, unspeculative, even physical relations to 
material things,” Marsh suggests both how the poet’s work is made more 
difficult by the absence of figurative connections, and second, though Marsh 
does not say it outright, how the sequence of smaller passages and of prose 
and verse are so critical (42).   The way in which the poet’s awareness of his 
own stasis, captured in verse, is sandwiched between the prose of the eels 
and the “crotch of these logs” in which “the body was caught,” also enacts 
the relationship that critic Brian Bremen posits between “the frozen violence 
of the prose documents and the violence needed to free the language, to 
break up those grammars of language that divorce us from our world” (37).  
The relationship of prose to verse in Paterson, however, cannot be reduced 
so simply, as elsewhere in the poem movement and release inhere in prose 
passages, in the form of letters from Cress and Allen Ginsberg.
Near the end of Book I, kineticism, release and relief return fitfully.  
“What more, to carry the thing through?” Paterson wonders (1: 36).  Portions 
from Williams’ correspondence with Pound, who dismisses his friend’s 
“interest . . . in the bloody loam,” in favor of the “finished product” are 
introduced (1: 37).  A cryptic rebuttal makes clear Pound’s way cannot be 
Paterson’s way: “Leadership passes into empire; empire begets in-/ solence; 
insolence brings ruin” (1: 37).  The section fittingly ends with Paterson’s own 
unsuccessful attempt to escape the “vulgar streets” for the peaceful “dream” 
of the “convent of the Little Sisters of St. Ann” (1: 37-38).  He is finally 
201
confronted, however, with involuntary movement, change – the 1737 
earthquake and the chattering and significantly, terrifying, sight of the falls.  
In this section, the poet has sought to clarify “where the stasis lodges” 
(1: 34).  Ultimately, the aesthetic construction of the poem itself brilliantly 
compels the reader to ponder this question with the figure of the poet at 
several levels.  Can the reader construct a narrative out of these different 
passages of elemental, primary, multifarious experience and dramatic shifts 
from verse to prose and back again?  Or do these component parts remain 
inert and unrelated?  In this sense, the question may be whether the stasis 
resides in ourselves as well as in the disparate pieces?  As poet and reader 
struggle to find “where the stasis lodges,” individual initiative and liberty are 
what are really being scripted, or better yet, enabled and compelled.  The 
text is less a commodity and more the “raw new” demanding engagement or 
surrender, such as the New World demanded of the Puritan and other 
settlers.    
Moreover, it is not even clear where stasis lies in the component parts.  
The doctor is described as more concerned with “detaching the label from a 
discarded mayonnaise jar . . . than to examine and treat the twenty and more 
infants taking their turn from the outer office, their mothers tormented and 
jabbering” (1: 32).  “He’d stand in the alcove,” we learn, “pretending to wash, 
the jar at the bottom of the sink well out of sight and, as the rod of water 
came down, work with his fingernail in the splash at the edge of the colored 
label striving to loose the tightly glued paper” (1: 32).  Even in this seemingly 
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sterile enterprise, however, we find redemptive water – and the effort to 
remove glued text recalls the poet’s belief that the “words will have to be 
rebricked up” and must “break loose” to effect a release and relief.  The point 
is that what looks static and sterile may contain the seeds of its own undoing, 
that release and relief may inhere if we look closer at the mayonnaise label, 
consider the “livid” rose, or listen more carefully to the “chatterer” in the falls.
In truth, the task of identifying “where the stasis lodges” occupies poet 
and reader throughout all of Paterson.  Just as the jar reveals how release 
may reside in stasis, we see in the poet’s ambivalence about the return to the 
sea in Book IV, section 3, that stasis may reside in what we believe to be 
release.  “I warn you, the sea is not our home,” Paterson asserts in 
opposition to another voice enticing us, “You must come to it.  Seed / of 
Venus, . . ./ Listen!/ Thalassa!  Thalassa!/ Drink of it, be drunk!/ Thalassa/ 
immaculate: our home, our nostalgic/ mother” (4: 199-201, emphasis in 
original).  This final debate follows a dissonant dialectic that is played out 
through the entire section of Book IV and that echoes the similar play 
between a fear of stasis and a fear of the primary that we have been 
considering in the first book.  Just as in that earlier book, the last section of 
Book IV requires the reader to discover the relation between disparate parts.  
Indeed, in the Book IV injunction to “Kill the explicit sentence, . . . expand our 
meaning – by verbal sequences.  Sentences, but not grammatical 
sentences,” the poem characterizes its own method for dislodging stasis (4: 
188).  Expanding meaning by “verbal sequences” suggests that the glue of 
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grammar – which prioritizes meanings and relationships by qualifying and 
ordering ideas – has been displaced.  The function of grammar is replaced 
by the reader who constructs relations between what Williams called 
"homologues" – co-equal blocks of verbal sequences – and thus gives 
meaning to the text he or she reads.  
* * * * *
“‘I’ll die before I’ve said my fill about women,’” Williams contends (Nay 
45).  Nothing proves this better than Paterson’s detailed account of his fearful 
encounters with the poetess Cress in Books I and II, “She” in Book II, 
“Beautiful Thing” in Book III, Madame Curie in Books III and IV, and the lady 
glimpsed in Book V.  The first three women, in particular, take the poet to 
task in one way or another for his alignment with or co-optation by values of 
corporate capital.  They variously expose his failure to make contact, to 
connect – they reveal that the “divorce” the poem polemicizes resides in the 
figure of the poet himself.  Paterson's underlying economic stance is 
revealed – he is lost and is, himself, dispossessed, headed in the wrong 
direction.  Dissonance resides in how the three women confront Paterson, or 
alternatively considered, how he uses them to confront himself, with his own 
sorry state.  The romantic identifications of In the American Grain give way in 
Paterson to a series of complicated, conflicted relationships, in which 
identification is simultaneously assiduously courted and strenuously resisted, 
and, ultimately, only fitfully achieved.  The poet does not want to be “semi-
roused” and “inarticulate” like the mass of men in the park in Book II, “ice 
bound” like historical figures such as Patch and Cummings, or captured by 
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the texts in the library.  It is not difficult, then, to see how, in Paterson, 
identification is a perilous business.  
Paterson’s aesthetic composition, and the demands it places on 
readers, has gendered implications, particularly for a masculine principle of 
incursion into a primary realm associated with the feminine.  Paterson notes, 
early in Book I, that the challenge is to “interrelate on a new ground, difficultly 
. . . a mass of detail” (1: 19).  Details offer but “an assonance, a homologue/ 
triple piled” compelling the poet and reader actively to pull the “disparate 
together to clarify/ and compress” (1: 19).  Critic Anthony Flinn, in “‘Laughing 
at the Names': The Blunting of Male Incursion in Paterson," aptly 
characterizes these “homologues” as “radically disparate images and voices 
linked by common elements abstracted by the reader” (17).  Reader’s 
perceptions are the key, Flinn argues, “to a ‘subjective animation’ which 
discloses non-hierarchical patterns whose source . . . is things themselves 
coming from a ‘comparative anatomy’ of experience” (17).  Readers navigate 
this array of detail – make contact in the “disarray . . . of unmediated 
experience” and it is this that Flinn contends permits the poem in “argument, 
structure, and pervasive imagery [to] discredit masculine authority” (15).  
Paterson’s aesthetic composition, then, resonates with the poet’s ambivalent 
and difficult relationships with the series of primary representative females.  
As with Williams’ earlier work, the regeneration for poet and reader 
derives from the meta-encounter and the meta-meta-encounter of the poet 
with his representative figures.  So Paterson’s narrative is really the story of 
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his story of his encounters; and it is the story of our story of his story of his 
encounters.  Dissonance is all around as Paterson must re-think himself in 
relation to the primary, through the various female figures, and would have 
readers similarly reconstitute themselves by their encounters with his 
encounters, the poet’s text, and themselves.  As with In the American Grain, 
Paterson’s meta encounters, and those he structures for the reader, are 
meant to effect a release from stasis; they seek to reveal the often obscured 
and dispossessed affective substratum below the culture of corporate capital.
Identification with the female primary, making “contact,” requires 
Paterson first to confront, and be confronted by, a series of primary female 
figures who reveal his “divorce” for what it is.  Contact, realized through 
eventual identification, then, is predicated on dissonance and difference.  
Critic Elizabeth Gregory aptly notes that Williams’ “[a]ttempt to acknowledge 
the feminine serves” as a metaphor for seeing “value in what had formerly 
been dismissed” (40).  I think this is right.  But it is also true, as critic Carl Eby 
asserts in “‘The Ogre' and the 'Beautiful Thing': Voyeurism, Exhibitionism, 
and the Image of 'Woman' in the Poetry of William Carlos Williams," that 
Williams’ “genuine respect for, love for, and identification with women . . . 
were nevertheless tempered by an element of unconscious hostility” (38).  
Paterson’s exploration of the primary through his encounters with “She,” 
Cress, Beautiful Thing, Curie, and the lady of Book V, illustrate both the re-
possession of that which has been obscured and the tension that Eby 
describes.  
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If In the American Grain was the story of the poet navigating our 
collective historical past, Paterson is the story of the poet navigating our 
present.  As it is the female that ties us back to the primary and the affective, 
release and the “‘radiant gist,’” it is fitting that Paterson's  representative 
women resemble the voluptuaries of In the American Grain (4: 185).  Cress 
and Curie possess the artist’s eye for detail.  Cress, as we will see, exhibits 
this in her nuanced insights into Paterson’s and her own emotional stances 
and states.  Curie’s sharp mind and eye for details are obliquely described by 
the poet in metaphorical terms: “Love is a kitten, a pleasant/ thing, a purr and 
a/ pounce.  Chase a piece of/ string, a scratch and a mew/ a ball batted with 
a paw/ a sheathed claw” (4: 175).  Paterson’s representative primary females 
are, like the voluptuaries of In the American Grain, similarly dispossessed.  
Beautiful Thing, a beaten, black woman traded between rival gangs, is the 
very picture of society’s margins.  Cress feels herself utterly abandoned, and 
“She” accuses the poet, “You have abandoned me!” (2: 84).  Even Curie is 
described as “upon/ the stage at the Sorbonne/ a half mile across! walking 
solitary/ as tho’ in a forest, the silence/ of a great forest (of ideas)/ before the 
assembly” (4: 171).  
The representative Paterson women also model the same stance of 
adaptation illustrated by the representative voluptuaries of In the American 
Grain.  Hence, Cress describes having “been forced, as a woman not content 
with woman’s position in the world, to do a lot of pioneer living” (2: 90, 
emphasis in original).  Curie makes her discovery by adapting to the 
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surprises her research brings.  Finally, Cress and the other representative 
women attain reciprocity with the New World and are not driven by economic 
motives.  Cress, in fact, indicts the poet for his economic motives, which 
contrast sharply with her own extreme aesthetic and personal honesty.  
“She” urges the poet to embrace his world, to “plunge” and “marry” (2: 82), 
and Curie labors away, becoming herself a “luminosity of elements” (4: 174).
* * * * *
I want to turn now to consider how Paterson uses his conflict with 
Cress to expose his failure to make contact, and to effect a release from his 
damnable stasis.  Section One of Book II weaves together three disparate 
strands – Paterson, Cress, and the masses – to investigate his stasis.  
Dissonance works both at the level of the conflict between the two writers 
and at the level of the aesthetic construction of the poem itself, which shifts 
back and forth between Paterson's verse and Cress’ prose.  So marked is 
this shift, and the interspersed evocations of the mass’ violent outbursts, that 
the reader, compelled to ask what relates these various passages, must 
apply the mortar between the bricks to construct a narrative that is at least 
minimally cohesive.  This is a difficult task – for while Cress argues for 
contact with the primary, and Paterson constructs his poem at several levels 
to enable just this contact, neither figure is easily identified more with release 
than divorce or visa versa.  Rather they are each using writing as the best 
means, in the real time of the narrative itself, to effect release from his or her 
own divorce.  Thus, Cress writes to the poet and the poet writes to the 
reader.  
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Only a few pages into Book II, Cress laments “the complete damming 
up of all my creative capacities in a particularly disastrous manner such as I 
have never before experienced” (2: 45).  She attributes this to Paterson 
“ignoring the real contents of my last letters to you,” which she believes has 
induced a “kind of blockage, exiling one’s self from one’s self” (2: 45).  Cress 
asks with a hint of sarcasm if Paterson has “ever experienced it,” and adds, “I 
dare say you have, at moments; and if so, you can well understand what a 
serious psychological injury it amounts to when turned into a permanent day-
to-day condition” (2:45).  Cress’ inquiry directs our attention back to the poet 
and we wonder if has he experienced this kind of internal divorce?  Before 
readers get an answer, we are given an illustration of a kind of futile, 
pointless, violent release -- “an infuriated mob” – “‘a great beast,’” quoting 
Alexander Hamilton – engaged in an 1880 property dispute (2: 46).  
Paterson’s turn does come, comprising the third strand of the narrative 
interrogation of stasis and release, when he describes a grasshopper 
alighting from the grass.  This sight recalls for him a “red-basalt, boot- long” 
grasshopper of Mexican art (2: 47).  Such an experience of the primary, both 
the poet’s immediate encounter with the grasshopper on his Sunday trek 
through the park, and his recollection of the Mexican art that captures it, 
suggests the release, the “livening” of the poet’s mind.  But, too, it 
simultaneously  induces fear.  For while Paterson experiences a kind of 
secular annunciation (“No flesh but the caress!/ He is led forward by their 
announcing wings”), he “is afraid!” and wonders, “What then?” (2: 48).  
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Paterson is pulled between his simultaneous delight in and fear of the 
primary.  
The quality of the verse as verse, of the poetic line, illustrates 
Williams’ contention that in “verse all can be touched, . . . verse is a release 
of the actual, of the living sap” ("Spring" 150).  The verse enacts the release 
it describes, consistent with Williams’ argument in "Against the Weather" 
(1939) that “materials and structure have a meaning” (208).  In a short 
passage, Paterson describes the grasshoppers, noting:
They fly away, churring! until      
their strength spent they plunge
to the coarse cover again and disappear
-- but leave, livening the mind, a flashing
of wing and a churring song . (2: 47)
Here the enjambments effect release, and the last word of the first 
three lines simultaneously moves the reader forward by suspending, ever-so-
slightly, the action at line’s end.  The effect is to build the reader’s interest 
and thus compel, or propel, him or her forward in a state of anticipation 
similar to that felt by Paterson as the grasshoppers whirl before him.  In 
addition, the caesura invokes a pause in the action, but only after we have 
moved down into the fourth line.  The word “flashing” at line’s end maintains 
suspense and the period in the sixth line seems almost to back off a few 
paces, the better to have a chance to slow things.  
Moreover, the narrative sequence, and the relationship of verse to 
prose, in particular, illustrate how the poem scripts release and stasis in other 
ways, capturing and even augmenting a dissonance between Paterson and 
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Cress.  Thus, the annunciation of grasshoppers’ wings abruptly hits the wall 
of Cress’ block of prose.  Paterson's verse runs smack into Cress’ paragraph 
contention that the effect of the “situation with you” was “to destroy the 
validity for me myself of myself” (2: 48, emphasis in original).  
But since your ignoring those letters was not ‘natural,’ it could not but 
follow that that whole side of life connected with those letters should in 
consequence take on for my own self that same kind of unreality and 
inaccessibility which the inner lives of other people often have for us. 
(2: 48)  
Paterson swiftly recovers himself, and resumes his verse, 
ambiguously likening the poet’s mind to the art that renders and retains 
something of the primary – “his mind a red stone carved to be/ endless flight/ 
Love that is a stone endlessly in flight” (2:48).   Whether the poet is static like 
stone or in kinetic flight is unclear; but “Love/ combating sleep” (2: 49) 
suggests Paterson has made contact, in contrast to the “[e]ternally asleep . . 
. unroused” masses who open Book I (1: 6).  The ambiguity surrounding the 
poet parallels the section’s later ambiguity surrounding the working masses.  
The men and women in the park are characterized as “Minds beaten thin/ by 
waste” (2: 51).  But, too, Paterson observes their “pitiful thoughts” 
“surrounded / by churring loves!,” which recalls the grasshoppers’ wings (2: 
52).  While “their thoughts alight” like the poet’s mind and the grasshoppers, 
ultimately, Paterson constructs his own superiority to the democratic mass –
“Gay wings” “bear them (in sleep)” while the poet is awake and "walking" (2: 
52).  
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Cress’ epistolary bricks not only indict Paterson for his own stasis, 
they take him to task for the stasis she claims he has induced in her.  There 
is a strange kind of reciprocal anxiety of influence between the two writers.  
Cress, for her part, fears Paterson's paradoxical capacity, by his indifference, 
to dam her up, to make her dispossessed from herself.  The “one thing that I 
still wish more than any other,” she claims, “is that I could see you . . . . [I]t is 
the one impulse I have that breaks through that film, that crust, which has 
gathered there so fatally between my true self and that which can make only 
mechanical gestures of living” (2: 76, emphasis in original).  Paterson's 
indifference can only be seen as a “divorce” from the primary when we 
consider him in contrast to Cress’ own self-characterization.  She claims to 
be “more the woman than the poet” and to be concerned “less with the 
publishers of poetry than with . . . living” (1: 7).  This self-description implicitly 
casts Paterson in a negative light and explains his fear of, or anxiety around, 
Cress’ epistolary indictments, especially when we factor in Williams’ 
characterization of the letters as “a reply from the female side to many of my 
male pretensions.  It was a strong reply . . . which sought to destroy me; . . .  
– an attack, a personal attack upon me by a woman” (qtd. in Bremen 177).  
The interaction between Paterson and Cress is further complicated by 
the fact that he seeks her influence.  In fact, some critics suggest Williams 
adapts, even re-writes, Marcia Nardi’s letters of 1943 to make himself (in the 
form of Paterson) look worse.  Paterson, then, uses Cress in paradoxical 
ways, including, according to Flinn, “on behalf of his own textual voice to 
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recover his own creative impulse, . . . tak[ing] on her knowledge and her 
power” (23).  Critics Gilbert and Gubar note in "Purloined Letters: William 
Carlos Williams and Cress" that beyond seeking her influence, however, 
Williams, in the figure of Paterson, “defuses his anxiety over Marcia Nardi by 
making her into a character he can control” (9).  This control is especially 
striking insofar as Paterson monopolizes the verse, and restricts Cress to 
biting prose only.  
Here, then, is the difficulty in clearly identifying contact or divorce with 
either Cress or the poet.  Cress ironically articulates contact by expressing 
her own divorce.  She speaks for the primary in her evocation of living and in 
her economic critique of Paterson at the end of Book III, which I will consider 
shortly.  Paterson approaches contact in his own verse sequences.  But in 
the way that he uses Cress’ letters to expose and thus interrogate his own 
divorce, the poet’s identification with the primary and release may be said to 
derive from Cress, even to comprise an identification with her through 
appropriation of her words and insights.  More interesting, still, is how all of 
this happens in an aesthetic of dissonance and dialectic.  The poet includes 
prose blocks that contravene his own verse sequences of release, written by 
a poetess, who, herself, seems to require the poet’s assistance to effect a 
release.  The poetess and the poet, then, need each other.
A tense dialogue with the New World “She” and a harsh five-page 
epistolary indictment by Cress conclude Book II, in what feels to Paterson 
like a personal ordeal by fire.  “A man is under the crassest necessity/,” 
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Paterson declares half way through section three, “to break down the 
pinnacle of his moods/ fearlessly --/ to the bases; base! To the screaming 
dregs” (2: 85).  Indeed, the entire section details Paterson’s dramatic and 
painful descent, at the bottom of which he encounters the female primary, 
and is confronted with the implications of his economic and affective stance.
A void opens and closes section three of Book II – it starts with the 
“nul” “that’s past all/ seeing/ the death of all/ that’s past/ all being,” and closes 
with Cress’ indictment of Paterson’s distance from life (2: 77, 87-91).  The 
initial evocation of the “nul” is complemented by an aphoristic gallows humor 
– “But Spring shall come and flowers will bloom/ and man must chatter of his 
doom” (2: 77).  The mood lifts only temporarily – “The descent beckons/ as 
the ascent beckoned,” we are told (2: 78).  The poet identifies the mind, 
specifically "memory,” as “a kind/ of accomplishment/ a sort of renewal/ even/ 
an initiation,” and declares that the “descent/ made up of despairs/ and 
without accomplishment/ realizes a new awakening : / which is a reversal/ of 
despair” (2: 78-9).   Palpable despair, nevertheless, soon settles upon 
Paterson once more and the generative, let alone the regenerative, faith of 
the “descent” passage is long fled.  The dogs, representing procreation, “and 
trees/ [that] conspire to invent/ a world” are “gone!/ Bow, wow! A/ departing 
car scatters gravel as it/ picks up speed!” (2: 79).  “[F]lowers uprooted, . . . 
dogwoods in full flower,/ the trees dismembered; its women/ shallow, its men 
steadfastly refusing – at/ the best” – the poet’s mood is as bleak as it has 
ever been (2: 81).  
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The “descent” that we were earlier told “beckons” is theoretical and 
abstracted next to the scenes that close out Book II.  This is because the 
explicitly dialogic aspects of Paterson’s encounters with the New World “She” 
and Cress at the nadir make the poet’s fate more deeply personal, disturbing, 
and real.  While “She” offers a New World embrace that recalls In the 
American Grain, particularly the DeSoto chapter, Cress intensifies and 
expands her own critique of Paterson.  In either case, though, Paterson 
confronts failure – or is confronted with failure by the female primary – based 
on what he cannot give.  The female representative figures of Paterson are 
dispossessed – and, here, they expose the poet as personally responsible 
for that dispossession.  They seek from the poet the affective sharing and 
giving stance of the voluptuaries of In the American Grain.  The drama, then, 
and the stasis, is lodged in the poet, in his stance, and in each of us.    
The exchange with “She” follows a repetitive pattern that highlights 
Paterson’s difficulty and impresses that the descent must be a right, a real, 
descent.  Notably, the poet starts off lost in himself – “[c]aught (in mind)/ 
beside the water he looks down, listens!/ But discovers, still, no syllable in 
the confused/ uproar: missing the sense” (2: 82).  In this last apostrophe 
Paterson renders his own divorce from the primary.  He is not utterly 
indifferent, however; indeed, he “shakes with the intensity/ of his listening” (2: 
82).  Paterson is simultaneously drawn to and repulsed by the primary of the 
falls – “Only the thought of the stream comforts him,/ its terrifying plunge, 
inviting marriage” (2: 82).  Through a series of iterations, “She” invites 
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Paterson to marry, to touch the primary: “Poet, poet! sing your song, quickly! 
or/ not insects but pulpy weeds will blot out/ your kind” (2: 83).  “Marry us!  
Marry us!/ Or! be dragged down, dragged/ under and lost,” she implores (2: 
83).   Again: “Go home.  Write.  Compose/ . . . Be reconciled, poet, with your 
world, it is/ the only truth!” (2: 84).  Ultimately, though, she loses hope, and, 
recalling the voluptuaries’ dispossession in In the American Grain, “She” 
declares: “You have abandoned me!” (2: 84).  As a final “pitiful gesture,” 
“She” will throw herself upon the bed and implore Paterson: “Invent (if you 
can) discover or/ nothing is clear – will surmount/ the drumming in your head.  
There will be/ nothing clear, nothing clear” (2: 84-5).  
The poet’s response is remarkably like that of the Puritans’ withdrawal 
before the unknown.  For a response the poet musters only what we might 
call a false descent.  When “She” urges on his song, “He all but falls” and 
when she intones to marry or be lost, we learn that “She was married with 
empty words:/ better to/ stumble at/ the edge/ to fall/ fall/ and be/,” and now 
we see the result, “-- divorced/ from the insistence of place --/ from 
knowledge/,/ from learning” (2: 83-4)(emphasis added).  Fittingly, the poet’s 
reply yields nothing of the primary – “the terms/ foreign, conveying no 
immediacy, pouring down” (2: 84).  Paterson offers only a cliché 
rationalization – “the language [is] worn out” – before fleeing to the “cool of 
books” of the Library in Book III (2: 84).  His response to “She’s” “pitiful 
gesture” of offering herself prone on the marriage bed is to flee, “pursued by 
the roar” of the falls, of the primary (2: 84-5).  “She’s” initial faith, then, in 
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Paterson’s work – telling him to “Go home. Write. Compose” – is not 
rewarded, and, appears entirely unwarranted.  The divorce is captured in a 
kind of sexual parody:
He Me with my pants, coat and vest still on!
She And me still in my galoshes! (2: 85).
“[U]nabashed, to regain/ the sun kissed summits of love!,” from the base, the 
“screaming dregs,” seems only an improbable hope.  Paterson closes out his 
encounter with “She” with a cryptic and tepid invocation of writing’s 
regenerative capacity:
-- obscurely
in to scribble . and a war won!
-- saying over to himself a song written
previously . inclines to believe
he sees, in the structure, something
of interest: (2: 86).
If “She” laments Paterson’s withdrawal and refusal, Cress indicts the 
poet in more direct economic terms for what he takes from, and how he 
exploits, her.  Where Paterson’s encounter with “She” has been dissonant in 
the sense that they could never quite get together, his relationship with Cress 
is outright conflictual.  Cress’ epistolary charges identify Paterson’s economic 
stance and the affective cost it has on her.  Cress’ earlier statements have 
given us hints of what to expect, especially her first passage in Book I, when 
she seeks the return of her property, namely her poems.  Cress implicitly 
compares herself to Paterson, noting “it was the human situation and not the 
literary one that motivated my phone call and visit” (1: 7).  Readers may well 
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ask  what motivates the letter’s recipient.  Is Paterson unwilling to return the 
letters, is he more concerned with publishers and publishing than “living?”  
Indeed, the Cress-Paterson exchange is nothing less than a clash of two 
standards of valuation.  Or, more accurately, that is how Cress characterizes 
her differences with Paterson, and, most critically, what Paterson uses her 
letters to expose about himself.  Cress conveys the notion of giving as 
conferring value; this is a rare commodity and at odds with a predominant 
ethos of taking.  Thus, she confesses: 
There are people – especially among women –  who can speak only to 
one person.  And I am one of those women.  I do not come easily to 
confidences . . . . I could not possibly convey to any one of those 
people who have crossed my path in these few months, those 
particular phases of my life which I made the subject of my letters to 
you. (2: 64)  
Cress recognizes all too well that her sense of value has consequences and 
costs as she expects to be “entirely misunderstood and misjudged in all my 
economic and social maladjustments” (2: 64).  She prefers to suffer such 
costs rather than betray her own standard of value (in both senses), noting 
that she would rather accept this than “ever attempt to communicate to 
anyone else what I wrote to you about” (2: 64).  
By contrast, Cress identifies in Paterson a taking, exploitative 
standard of valuation; and, critically, consistent with Williams’ broader 
affective economics, she makes Paterson’s standard of valuation dependent 
on his underlying fear and inability to “touch” or give.  Paterson, then, 
continues the affective economics of In the American Grain, revealing a 
dependence of the economic stance on underlying human dimensions.  
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“[W]riters like yourself,” Cress charges, “are so sheltered from life in the raw 
by the glass-walled condition of their own safe lives” (2: 87).  “You’ve never 
had to live, Dr. P,” Cress claims, “not in any of the by-ways and dark 
underground passages where life so often has to be tested.  The very 
circumstances of your birth and social background provided you with an 
escape from life in the raw” (2: 90).  
From this fearful divorce, Cress alleges, come two phenomena.  First, 
Paterson confuses protection from raw life with an “inability to live” (2: 90, 
emphasis in original).  This amounts to accusing the poet of an ironic sort of 
suburban prejudice of romanticizing poverty, and mistaking that for a cure for 
an erroneous belief in his own incapacity.  Cress exposes the poet’s 
premises as false.  “I’ve been looking at some of your autobiographical 
works, as this indicates,” she acknowledges, and concludes that he 
mistakenly and rather selfishly regards “literature as nothing more than a 
desperate last extremity resulting from that illusory inability to live” (2: 90).  
Cress, then, reveals that Paterson shares her condition, that he is alienated 
from his own self as she has described herself to be.  Diagnosing the poet, 
and ascribing to writing a larger diagnostic and prescriptive function, Cress 
indicts Paterson as well for his social failure.  Literature has a social function, 
she notes, as it is “more and more tied up with the social problems and social 
progress” and, thereby, offers the writer a means to make a contribution to 
the “welfare of humanity” (2: 89).  Such means Paterson sacrifices for his 
own economic motives.
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Thus the second phenomenon to come from Paterson’s divorce is his 
exploitative economic stance.  “My attitude towards woman’s wretched 
position in society,” Cress asserts, developing this theme further, “and my 
ideas about all the changes necessary there, were interesting to you, weren’t 
they, in so far as they made for literature? (2: 87, emphasis in original).  
Cress charges that Paterson is interested in her only to the extent that he 
can obtain from her thoughts and ideas “that too could be turned by you into 
literature, as something disconnected from life” (2: 87).  The poet, then, 
“withheld” what she really needed – i.e., some answer for her crushing 
loneliness and “some ways and means of leading a writer’s life, either by 
securing some sort of writer’s job . . . or else through some kind of literary 
journalism such as book reviews” (2: 88, emphasis in original).  But Paterson, 
holding an acquisitive view, saw in her only what Cress calls “the publication
of my poetry with your name lent to it” (2: 88).  “That literary man’s ego,” she 
later adds, “wanted to help me in such a way, I think, that my own 
achievements might serve as a flower in his buttonhole, if that kind of help 
had been enough to make me bloom” (2: 90).  Paterson has utterly failed to 
ameliorate her suffering, Cress charges, or to contribute to social progress, 
even though his training and experience as a doctor and poet, presumably, 
should enable him to do so.  
Cress, we see at the end of Book II, has tried, like “She,” to get the 
poet to engage the primary and the affective.  Cress repeatedly avows that 
she needs Paterson.  But, perhaps more to the point, is that he needs her.  
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Paterson privileges her standard of affective valuation by using her letters to 
try to effect his own release from stasis.  In this sense, Paterson is self-
diagnosing, even arguably, falsely self-diagnosing, insofar as the diagnosis is 
based on his appropriation of Cress’ words and sentiments.  He retains the 
letters because Cress’ analysis of the nature of his divorce and her expose of 
how he places literature over life contain some truths.  As Gale Schricker 
notes in “The Case of Cress: Implications of Allusion in Paterson," Cress’ 
letter of “righteous indignation” moves beyond the anger of “a woman 
scorned” to a “thematically appropriate” focus on the difficulty Paterson has 
“joining himself to the concrete female element” (22).  Anthony Flinn argues 
that Cress’ letters further his “anti-masculinist design” and his persona 
remains indicted for separating life from literature, the very divorce he rails 
against, making himself “part of the problem rather than a means of solving 
it” (25).  But Flinn notes that while Cress’ charge that Paterson is 
disconnected from life seems validated by his drawing on her letters for his 
poem, Paterson also permits Cress’ letters to take over Book II, her “life 
overwhelm[ing] [his] art” (24).  I think that this is right; Paterson’s 
incorporation of Cress’ letters – what Gilbert and Gubar call his digestion of 
Cress’ "political attitude" – are both an appropriation of her knowledge and 
power as well as a strategy of effecting his own release (9).  In accepting 
and, ultimately, appropriating her indictment, Paterson simultaneously seeks 
to acknowledge its acuity and use it to alter the circumstances of his own 
stance that account for that acuity.  If he can do the latter, this might just 
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render her critique obsolete and resolve the poet’s anxiety over Cress’ 
influence.
* * * * *
If “She” and Cress explicitly confront Paterson with pleas and 
charges, the poet’s encounters with Beautiful Thing in Book III play out 
almost entirely as an internal “torsion of the spirit” involving the human drama 
of fear.  The poet starts Book III seeking the “cool of books” in the library as a 
way to “lead the mind away” from the primary of the “streets” and the primary 
in his own mind.  His mind is, like the Passaic River, “a falls unseen” that 
“tumbles and rights itself/ and refalls – and does not cease, falling/ and 
refalling with a roar, a reverberation/ not of the falls but of its rumor/ 
unabated” (3: 97).  Ironically, Paterson is internalizing the primary, even as 
he continues to run from it.  His mind is like the water, the primary, but, too, it 
is “taken up” by another element, “the books’ wind,” suggesting here the 
secondary (3: 96).  It is in the context of this “torsion,” then, that the poet 
meets “Beautiful Thing.”  Fittingly, Paterson characterizes Beautiful Thing 
from the first in terms, like himself at times, of the primary elements of water, 
wind, and fire.  “Beautiful Thing, / my dove,” Paterson observes, ”unable and 
all who are windblown,/ touched by fire,/ and unable,/ a roar that (soundless) 
drowns the sense/ with its reiteration” (3: 97).  The elemental imagery 
reinforces the poet’s own identification with and fear of the primary, and 
recalls his own dim apprehension of the “springtime/ . . . which he saw,/ 
within himself – icebound” (1: 35).  
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Ambivalence, captured in the figures of Paterson and Beautiful Thing, 
is represented in the narrative structure itself.  The poem in section one of 
Book III proceeds by its dialectic swerves from a fear of the primary, 
including Beautiful Thing, to contemplations of risk, to marriage, and back 
again, exposing Paterson's own torsions of the spirit.  The poet must decide 
whether he will marry the primary of the falls or comfortably join his mind with 
the minds and books of the past.  The library is reassuring – “[b]ooks will give 
rest sometimes against/ the uproar of water falling/ and righting itself to refall
filling/ the mind with its reverberation/ shaking stone” (3: 97).  But this respite 
exacts a cost, which the poet dimly and incrementally recognizes.  Even the 
description of the library as “sanctuary to our fears” cuts both ways –
suggesting it relieves our fears and yet simultaneously embodies and houses 
them (3: 98).  The “stagnation and death” of the library emerge more fully as 
the section progresses; a “roar of books, /from the wadded library oppresses” 
the poet (3: 98, 100).  The “spirit languishes” from the press of the books 
which invite the poet to “loa[n] blood/ to the past, . . . risking life” and 
“enfeeble the mind’s intent” (3: 100-2).  Yet, at each instance in which the 
poet is captivated by his reading, his immersion in the past is abruptly 
interrupted by the ambiguous or cryptic – and as yet unembodied –
appellation, Beautiful Thing.  When the poet finds the "freshness" of a mind 
in touch with its own day or some detail in his reading that enables him to 
touch that earlier time, Paterson's “mind/ reels, starts back amazed from the 
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reading,” and his reading – only at times and with some risk - thus awakens 
to his own time (3: 98, 100).
Critically, Beautiful Thing, then, is vaguely associated with release in 
Paterson’s own mind.  Thus, Beautiful Thing, the primary and elemental, “a 
dark flame,/ a wind, a flood – counter to all staleness,” appears as Paterson’s 
“mind begins to drift,” as he considers the “mind’s intent,” or as he evokes the 
falls of the mind (3: 100).   “Springtime” is contained within, this implies, if 
Paterson can but find some way to release it, recalling the aphorism of the 
Preface: “we know nothing, pure/ and simple, beyond/ our own complexities” 
(3).  
The difficulty of Paterson’s challenge and the impending sterility of 
defeat are represented in the violent torture of American Indians, and the 
image of debased marriage – “Doc, listen – fiftyish, a grimy hand/ pushing 
back the cap: . . . / I got/ a woman outside I want to marry, will/ you give her a 
blood test?” (3: 103).  The poet’s task is set against a series of historical 
figures who risked everything to cross the falls, suspended on a tightrope 
with either a boy or even a  “cookstove” on their back (3: 104).  The poet 
seems ready to “[e]mbrace the foulness,” not to flee (3: 103).  As he prepares 
himself, the poet conflates the risk of the tightrope and the poem itself –
“reverie gains and/ your joints loosen/ the trick’s done!” (3: 104).  Crossing 
the tightrope suggests that Paterson is taking, or is willing to take, risks.  But 
the tightrope also reinforces his (mis)apprehensions about how to proceed 
and his fear of the primary.  The tightrope walk is not an actual descent but a 
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false marriage, like Ben Franklin's tinkering in In the American Grain with the 
new world only enough to run an engine with it, or like Paterson's stumble at 
the falls that comprises a "divorce" at the end of Book II.  
The ambivalence that characterizes Paterson's view of the library and 
crossing the falls is repeated in his encounters with Beautiful Thing as finally 
embodied in the figure of the young black woman.  Sergio Rizzo asserts in 
"The Other Girls of Paterson – Old and New" that “Williams would learn to 
associate black femininity . . . with rebellion, disinheritance, and resilience” 
(42), and it is easy to see all three aspects on display in Paterson’s 
encounters with Beautiful Thing.  The politics of Beautiful Thing's 
embodiment as a young black woman (“drunk and bedraggled to release/ the 
strictness of beauty/ under a sky full of stars”) [3: 104], recall Alec Marsh’s 
contention that “Williams’ muse” is typically a “[r]ecurrent female figure, . . . a 
working-class, usually non-white woman, culturally indigenous, the sublimely 
vulgar, untutored product of the purely local environment” (Money 185).  
Beautiful Thing's marginalized position impresses on the reader the 
dispossession of the primary that formed the center of In the American Grain.  
Paterson's fearful reaction is the same which the earlier volume typically 
catalogues in the face of the “raw new.”  Thus, sandwiched between the 
similar commands first to “embrace” the primary and later to “Stop writing” 
and to “Quit this place,” Paterson fearfully and angrily confronts Beautiful 
Thing with outright hostility.  Dissonance, as opposed to the identification 
found in In the American Grain, characterizes Paterson's first encounter with 
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Beautiful Thing.  His stance is like that of the Puritans’ toward the New World 
– seeking to control what they cannot understand.  Paterson orders her to 
remove her clothing, and demeans her by telling that “You smell as though 
you need/ a bath” (3: 105).  In a clouded fury, he yells: “”TAKE OFF YOUR/ 
CLOTHES! I didn’t ask you/ to take off your skin” (3: 105-06, emphasis in 
original).  But Paterson recognizes his own furious confusion and is 
remarkably self-conscious, noting: “I said. Then in a fury for which I am/ 
ashamed” and “Then, my anger rising” (3: 105).  Alec Marsh suggests that 
the poet wants to “strip away her clothes” to “get to the immediate,” 
consistent with Kenneth Burke’s assertion that “[p]eople try to combat 
alienation by immediacy” (qtd. in Marsh, Money 201).  But Paterson still 
assumes an authoritarian, fearful stance and, in short, is not ready or able to 
descend and make contact.  
Paterson does, however, spy something significant in his initial 
encounter with Beautiful Thing – “Haunted, the quietness of your face/ is a 
quietness, real/ out of no book” (3: 105). The narrative, even as it 
progresses, assumes an arrested quality in which the poet self-consciously, 
by repeating “I said,” identifies and slows to a halting pace his own dialogue.  
Anthony Flinn asserts that the repetition of “I said” in the poet’s first 
encounter with Beautiful Thing suggests that “[a]ttempts at contact and union 
are acknowledged failures” (26).  But this is not entirely true; in fact, I believe 
that Sergio Rizzo is correct that the poet’s interaction with Beautiful Thing, 
“while not a dialogue, is dialogic” in that it allows for “irony, humor, and self-
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parody” and has the capacity to “change him” (50).  Rizzo identifies a 
“semantic openendedness, a living contact with unfinished, still evolving 
contemporary reality (the openended present)” (50).  Paterson’s dialogue 
with himself reveals his inner torsion.  On one hand, he assumes a Puritan 
stance of taking or withholding.  On the other hand, the poet uses Beautiful 
Thing, as he does Cress’ letters, to effect a release – in this case from the 
library’s sterility.  He must find a way to assume a different or giving stance in 
direct relation to Beautiful Thing, as his failure to do this earlier with Cress 
and “She” formed the heart of their grievances against him.  
The implicit openness and simultaneous failure that Rizzo and Flinn 
respectively identify reflect the poet’s own ambivalence.  Paterson's initial 
encounter with Beautiful Thing begins quietly to dislodge the blocks of ice 
that bind the poet even if that is not fully realized, or even apparent, until his 
subsequent encounter with her in section two.  The hint that the ground may 
be shifting under the poet in this initial encounter comes as Paterson veers 
between what he says and what he thinks – and they are often two quite 
different things.  Telling her to take off her clothes for an examination, 
Paterson repeats “Your clothes (I said) quickly, while/ your beauty is 
attainable” (3: 105).  And again: “Take off your clothes and purify/ yourself  .      
. / And let me purify myself/ -- to look at you,/ to look at you (I said)” (3: 105).  
Later, playing with the “I said” formulation, the poet continues: “I said your/ 
clothes, your clothes.  You smell/ like a whore. I ask you to bathe in my/ 
opinions, the astonishing virtue of your/ lost body (I said)    .    / -- that you 
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might/ send me hurtling to the moon/  .     .    let me look at you (I /said, 
weeping) (3: 106).  What, in fact, the poet says or wants us to understand 
that he has actually said to Beautiful Thing becomes less and less clear.  The 
dialogic structure of the text, then, really captures the poet in conversation 
with himself.  It does seem that something in Paterson is dislodging, and his 
loss of control may well explain his flashes of rage and temper.  Flinn would 
be mistaken to press the point of a failure of contact too far, for something is 
happening with the poet, even if he cannot yet fully express it.  The poet may 
best encapsulate his own terror of the primary and contact when he closes 
out his encounter with Beautiful Thing by observing: “beauty is feared/ more 
than death” (3: 106).  But the poet also moves beyond stagnating fear.  The 
oracular conclusion of section one derives from the powerful subterranean 
shifts beginning to dislodge Paterson’s stasis.  There is difficulty ahead for 
certain but there is a sense that the introspection that Beautiful Thing has 
prompted one way or another in the poet has been more effective than 
“She’s” desperate imploring or Cress’ biting indictment.  
Release, then, closes out section one.  An unidentified oracular voice 
intercedes to rebut “She’s” contention from the end of Book II to “Go home. 
Write. Compose.”  Instead, a voice now commands the poet to “Give it up. 
Quit it. Stop writing . . . Give up/ the poem. Give up the shilly-/ shally of art” 
(3:108-9).  Paterson, however, does not relinquish his art as an enterprise of 
the secondary but rather continues his poem.  He chronicles his own difficult 
and uncertain descent to the primary, and seeks in his aesthetics to facilitate 
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for the reader a similar descent.  Paterson's perseverance suggests that the 
poem, in both the writing and reading of it, is primary.  Paterson's 
incorporation of prior primary texts captures earlier writers' experiences of 
the "raw new."  Paterson is thereby always making itself new, approaching 
the past through a series of present moments of touch and withdrawal.  
Moreover, Paterson's ruminations on a medieval tapestry in the final section 
of Book V suggest the poem's status as part of the primary.  Referring 
obliquely to the conception of art as co-equal with creation (as opposed to a 
mirror or copy of reality), Paterson calls the tapestry a "living fiction" and 
asks:
— shall we speak of love
seen only in a mirror
-- no replica?
reflecting only her impalpable spirit?
which is she whom I see
and not touch her flesh? (5: 230)
Again suggesting the primary nature of art, Paterson even enters the tapestry 
scene, exclaiming: "I, Paterson, the King-self/ saw the lady/ through the 
rough woods/ outside the palace walls/ among the stench of sweating 
horses/ and gored hounds" (5: 231).  
Paterson, then, adjusts to the oracular voice that commands him in 
Book III to stop writing, not by ceasing his artistic efforts but by predicating 
his art on an aesthetic of the primary.  He returns to Book I’s formulation of 
“No ideas but in things.”  Thus, “(ridded) from Paradise,” Paterson descends 
through the “swill-hole of corrupt cities” to the primary (3: 109).  He proffers 
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no direct reply when asked: “What can you, what/ can YOU hope to conclude 
--/ on a heap of dirty linen?” (3: 109).  But Paterson locates the sense in the 
“inert mass” itself – just as Madame Curie is described at length in Book IV 
as doing.  Paterson invokes the “radiant gist that/ resists the final 
crystallization/   .    in the pitch-blend/ the radiant gist” (3: 109).    
Book III, then, marks a departure from the pleading and hectoring 
female stereotypes of “She” and Cress to the compelled introspection and 
contact offered by Beautiful Thing and Madame Curie, respectively.  These 
two latter representative primary females have assisted Paterson at section’s 
end to quit the library, and have enabled his “mind elsewhere/ looking down/ 
. . . [s]eeking (3: 112)” to ride the real, elemental wind of the tornado rather 
than the “ghost of a wind” that resides in “all books echoing . . . life” (3: 96).
Paterson’s second encounter with Beautiful Thing further propels his 
own regeneration, and the tone could not be more different from the earlier 
sequence.  This is one of the few instances in the poem where the poet 
genuinely descends in ways that he has not, does not, with “She” or Cress or 
anyone else.  Here, in section two, the contact that was hinted at in the 
earlier encounter with Beautiful Thing becomes palpable and arresting.  
Paterson's authoritarian, if conflicted, stance of the first section, is exchanged 
here for a stance of listening; he displays a new found sense of wonder, of 
openness like Rasles, for whom in In the American Grain all the flowers’ 
petals were upturned.  The internal torsion and dissonance of the spirit have 
passed, and Paterson’s anguished first encounter with Beautiful Thing is 
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transformed into a rich introspection that Beautiful Thing in particular 
engenders.  Paterson moves beyond the explicit if cryptic dialogic structure 
of the first encounter to a self-reflectiveness about his own relationship to 
both Beautiful Thing and the writing enterprise.
In section two, Paterson's writing links him to the elemental.  Indeed, 
section two commences with the observation that “[t]hey have/ manoeuvred 
[sic] it so that to write/ is a fire . . ./ The writing/ should be a relief,/ relief from 
the conditions” (3: 113).  But the creative fire of writing (which may be likened 
in some manner to the Indian rite of the tepee fire and sacrifice) is at war with 
the “destroying fire” of present conditions and past traditions, variously 
figured as the 1902 Paterson fire and the “men in hell” in the library (3: 116).  
Beautiful Thing, fittingly, is “intertwined with the [creative] fire.  An identity/ 
surmounting the world, its core;” and, Paterson admits, the sight is fearsome: 
for she is the fire and core “from which/ we shrink squirting little hoses of/ 
objection – and/ I along with the rest, squirting/ at the fire” (3: 120).  
An oracular voice appears, cryptically taking Paterson to task for his 
fear and summoning him forward: “Poet./ Are you there?” (3: 120).  Paterson 
reprises his reply to “She” in Book II, asserting that “the words are lacking” 
(3: 121).  He may well be right, for traditional means of valuation and 
articulating worth, namely through signs and language, cannot grapple, at 
first, with the elemental.  Paterson recognizes in “Beautiful Thing, aflame!” 
that the elemental “is/ a defiance of authority” (3: 119).  And, “your/ vulgarity 
of beauty surpasses all their/ perfections” (3: 120).  Paterson, then, defines 
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language itself, despite calling it a relief and a fire at the section’s start, as a 
neo-classical straightjacket, a meaningless and encumbering set of 
“perfections” and an "authority" that make it impossible to render the primary 
and the human.  
Ultimately, Paterson has the choice of fleeing from Beautiful Thing as 
he fled from “She” or engaging the primary.  He figures this choice in 
competing images of a man joining either a destroying fire or a regenerative 
fire (as represented in the mauled, refigured bottle).  The former yields only 
ash: “and you have/ a nothing, surrounded by/ a surface, an inverted/ bell 
resounding, a/ white-hot man become/ a book, the emptiness of/ a cavern 
resounding” (3: 124).  But, in descending to the basement where Beautiful 
Thing lays prone and suffering on the “damp bed, your long/ body stretched 
out negligently on the dirty sheet,” Paterson makes contact and touches the 
regenerative fire (3: 125).  His drama, then, is to overcome his fear, to 
become the “person/ passed into the flame, becom[e] the flame --/ the flame 
taking over the person/ . . . . The person submerged/ in wonder, the fire 
become the person” (3: 122).  Paterson figures his own contact with Beautiful 
Thing in terms of this very “wonder” and the fire.  Beautiful Thing is 
“Persephone/ gone to hell,” and Paterson confesses himself “overcome/ by 
amazement, . . . shaken by your beauty/ Shaken by your beauty   .   / 
Shaken" (3: 126).  His awed reaction recalls not only the wonder but also 
Paterson's exhilaration at achieving a writing that, like the fire it depicts, 
releases and relieves.  
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In an especially intense passage, Paterson renders the fire that 
mauled the bottle and describes how the glass “gets a new glaze, the glass 
warped/ to a new distinction, reclaiming the/ undefined/ . . . Hottest/ lips lifted 
till no shape but a vast/ molt of the news flows/ . . . the flame that wrapped 
the glass/ deflowered, reflowered” (3: 118).  The intense accuracy of the 
description, and its suggestion of contemporary language in the lips flowing 
with molten news, give way to a palpable and equal exhilaration with the act 
of the writing itself: “Hell’s fire. Fire. Sit your horny ass/ down.  What’s your 
game, Fire. Outlast you:/ Poet Beats Fire at Its Own Game!”/ The bottle!/ the 
bottle! the bottle! the bottle! I/ give you the bottle! What’s burning/ now, Fire?” 
(3: 119).  Paterson celebrates the fire almost – but not quite –  as much as he 
does himself.  He exhibits an aesthetic self-reflectiveness and new-found 
confidence.  He measures where he is, and assesses how he stacks up 
against the fire, against the task of writing itself.  The self-reflexive, dialogic 
introspection of Paterson's first encounter with Beautiful Thing has been 
exchanged for his now exultant introspection.  The former featured the poet 
in a kind of closed, thus self-reflexive, dialogue with himself as he dictated to 
Beautiful Thing.  The latter features Paterson in silent communion with 
Beautiful Thing and nearly giddy chatter with himself over the possibilities for 
his writing and, therein, his release from stasis.  The changed focus of the 
introspection suggests the distance the poet has covered, the progress he 
has begun to make.     
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Paterson's descent to the basement somewhat tempers his 
exhilaration with an awareness of something deeper, a stillness, a quality of 
listening, a quietness that resonates with Beautiful Thing’s own silence.  His 
encounter comprises nothing less than an “embrace” of the “foulness.”  We 
know this from the description of Beautiful Thing’s surroundings – the “damp 
bed” and “dirty sheets,” the “furnace odor” and the “low bed (waiting)/ under 
the mud plashed windows among the scabrous/ dirt of the holy sheets” (3: 
125-26).  But, in this scene Paterson embraces not simply the primary but 
the affective as well – he relinquishes the supremacy of the knowing 
physician to embrace the dispossessed.  That the poet finally manages to be 
“shaken” reveals how he has managed to assume genuinely the stance of 
the representative voluptuaries of In the American Grain.  As he begins to 
dislodge the stasis, there emerges an authentic sense of “wonder:” “I can’t be 
half gentle enough,/ half tender enough/ toward you, toward you,/ 
inarticulate, not half loving enough” (3: 128).  In the compelled introspection 
of Paterson's first encounter with Beautiful Thing, as revealed in the dialogic 
narrative structure, we could not be certain what the poet said to himself, and 
what he said to her.  In this second encounter, Paterson and Beautiful Thing 
share a mutual connection: 
for I was overcome
by amazement and could do nothing but admire
and lean to care for you in your quietness –
who looked at me, smiling, and we remained
thus looking, each at the other   .    in silence   .
You lethargic, waiting upon me, waiting for
the fire and I
attendant upon you, shaken by your beauty. (3: 126)  
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In this latter encounter, the ambiguity around “inarticulate” seems purposeful, 
representing the mutual silence that deeper recognition and touch brings.
Beautiful Thing continues to echo through the remainder of Paterson, 
particularly in the glimpsed lady, the unicorn, and Bessie Smith in Book V.  
Benjamin Sankey calls the unicorn a "mythic embodiment of 'Beautiful 
Thing,'" an apt characterization when we recall that the phrase Beautiful 
Thing is drawn directly from Christopher Columbus' journal description of the 
New World (215).  The unicorn does seem to capture the mythic resonance 
of this new, virginal land.  In addition, Sankey describes the "woman in our 
town" in Book V whom Paterson sees disappearing "in the crowd" as a "fine 
restatement of the theme of 'Beautiful Thing'" (216).  I think this is true, 
though I would also identify her as closely linked to "She" in Book II.  Indeed, 
I believe that Paterson's encounter with her reverses his marriage drama 
with "She."  Paterson asks: "What are you doing on the/ streets of Paterson? 
a/ thousand questions:/ Are you married?  Have you any/ children?  And, 
most important,/ your NAME!" (5: 218, emphasis in original).  Moreover, 
Paterson replies to this disappearing old lady by his art, which he was unable 
to do earlier when "She" implored him to "Go Home. Write. Compose."  
"[H]ave you read anything that I have written?," Paterson asks the 
disappearing woman in Book V, "It is all for you" (5: 220).  
I believe, too, that Beautiful Thing appears in the form of Blues great 
Bessie Smith immediately after the old lady for whom the poet has written 
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everything, disappears.  Paterson introduces a brief memoir from a white 
male musician who plays with a black band and listens spellbound to Bessie 
Smith.  The African-female presence of Beautiful Thing gets thus refigured in 
Book V and Paterson's mutual pregnant silence with her is here converted 
into music.  "I walked down Madison Street one day," the speaker tells us,
and what I heard made me think my ears were lying.  Bessie Smith 
was shouting the Downhearted Blues from a record in a music shop.  I 
flew in and bought up every record they had by the mother of the
blues – Cemetary Blues, Bleedin' Hearted, and Midnight Blues – then 
I ran home and listened to them for hours on the victrola.  I was put in 
a trance by Bessie's mournful stories . . . . Every note that woman 
wailed vibrated on the tight strings of my nervous system: every word 
she sang answered a question I was asking. (5: 219)
Here, Bessie Smith catches Paterson's attention for how she answers the 
white musician's questions, as Beautiful Thing, perhaps, answered 
Paterson’s own.  The white musician’s silence as he listens to what the black 
soul singer has to tell him is the aural complement to the intense visual 
experience that closes out Paterson’s encounter with Beautiful Thing in Book 
III.  Moreover, insofar as Bessie Smith illustrates a path to descent or touch, 
she resembles not only Beautiful Thing but also Madame Curie, to whom we 
will turn next, as an exemplar of the primary.
* * * * *
“What I miss, said your mother, is the poetry,” a voice tells Paterson, 
“the pure poem/ of the first parts” (4: 171).  Madame Curie in Book IV more 
than any other figure returns the poet to his original, animating purpose, the 
regeneration that he first sought through the poem.  Curie represents for 
Paterson the figure who most successfully achieves the very task he has set 
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for himself in his writing.  Not by imploring the poet, like “She,” not by 
hectoring the poet, like Cress, and not even by spurring the poet’s own 
introspection, like Beautiful Thing, but only by exemplifying the success of 
the poet’s quest does Curie capture Paterson’s imagination.  
Beautiful Thing inspired the poet in his descent to the basement, 
where he is “shaken,” finally, into listening and silence.  This is the first time 
in the poem where he truly assumes a receptive affective stance towards the 
primary.  Curie builds on this shift in Paterson, and inspires him as an 
exemplar of contact, and, even, of the primary itself.  There is a commonality 
of interests and ends, then, between Curie and Paterson that is really apart 
from what he could not share, or shared only after great difficulty, with the 
other female representative primary figures.  Paterson could not give “She,” 
Cress, and, at first, Beautiful Thing, what they needed from, and requested 
of, him.  By contrast, Curie does not need anything from Paterson.  Indeed, 
he does not have an antagonistic, or for that matter, any, relationship with 
Curie, but only views a film about her and ponders the intersection of her and 
his own work.  The dissonance and conflict, then, that characterizes his 
interactions with the other Paterson women is transformed and abstracted in 
Book IV with Curie.  She represents a validation of Paterson's poetic method 
– "Dissonance . . . leads to discovery" (4: 175).  His identification with Curie 
is more intellectual and less emotional than that reached with Beautiful 
Thing; but it is no less important.      
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Curie is critical to Paterson and his project for how she illustrates the 
principle of discovery in dissonance; thus, he uses her in very particular ways 
to figure the release in economics and writing that he seeks.  Paterson 
applies Curie’s discovery of radium to economics; the elemental radiant gist 
that she reveals assists the poet to reveal the radiant gist of social credit and 
the writing enterprise.  Critics have recognized this economic application and 
they have noted the trope of discovery that characterizes Book IV.  They see 
that the poet wants to apply the release of radium to economics and writing, 
and that he “thus align[s] his vision of credit with the . . . liberating aesthetics 
of discovery and invention” (Ulrich 122).  Joel Conorroe also notes how 
Pound’s epistolary inscription of “‘InVenShun”‘ on the same page as “‘credit/ 
Curie,’” links credit/radium with the search for a “redeeming language” (127).  
Alec Marsh eloquently notes how Williams associates credit with the 
permanent value of works of art and reminds us that money can be wiped out 
with the stroke of a pen, that it is “purely textual” (Money 212).  
I want to think in this section more specifically about how Curie's 
scientific discovery gets applied to the economic situation, beyond simply the 
critics’ focus on the working out of the money-uranium, credit-radium analogy 
with the cancer being usury that the credit-radium cures.  In particular, 
Madame Curie and Klaus Ehrens, the preacher in Book III, section 2, are 
engaged in what at first blush appear to be non-economic endeavors 
(science and religion) but which are actually proven to have critical social and 
economic implications.  Curie’s science encodes an affective stance of giving 
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and sharing, while Ehrens’ religion represents the affective stance of Puritan 
withdrawal from the primary and exploitation of the masses.  What is 
scientific gets used to realize an affective shift toward the primary in 
economic and social relations.  By contrast, Ehren’s sermon reveals how 
religion and morality are used by social and economic authorities to effect a 
shift toward the secondary for economic gain.  Religious and economic 
leaders move away from a stance of contact and actually seek to contain the 
demos, to prevent the application of our democratic principles to economics.  
Curie’s gift and what makes her so compelling for the poet – and the 
poet hopes for us – is her descent.  Critic Brian Bremen correctly contends 
that Curie is a “successful fusion of female/mother” and male/scientist, 
mixing “prose of the intellect with the poetry of invention . . . to release the 
‘luminous,’ ‘radiant gist’” (42-43).  She is, by her ability to “touch,” to assume 
an affective stance of heightened receptivity and sensitivity, more like Rasles 
and the other representative voluptuaries of In the American Grain.  As every 
flower petal opens for Rasles as the result of his extremely fine sensibility, so 
does the elemental or primary reveal its radiant gist to Curie.  But there is a 
difference too.  Curie, the brilliant scientist working in a man’s world and a 
man’s discipline, is primarily figured by the poet as “pregnant,” “a furnace, a 
cavity aching/ toward fission; a hollow,/ a woman waiting to be filled” (4: 174-
75).  This description recalls Elizabeth Gregory’s point that “Williams often 
stresses the value of the ‘feminine’ within the male . . . but has difficulty . . . 
acknowledging the ‘masculine’ (or active) within the female” (41).  Curie 
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possesses an hermaphroditic quality – male in touching, female in receiving.  
In any case, so much does she “touch” that she becomes, herself, “—a 
luminosity of elements, the/ current leaping!” (4: 174).  The way in which she 
comes to embody the primary explains the poet’s use of the image of “Love” 
to evoke the process of discovery (4: 175).  Yet, this love, this “contact” or 
“marriage,” is complicated and must, ironically, rely on its opposite.  “A 
dissonance/ in the valence of Uranium/ led to the discovery,” the poet calmly 
explains (4: 175).  Moments later, abstracting his own guiding principle for 
the poem, Paterson intones: “Dissonance/ (if you are interested)/ leads to 
discovery” (4: 175).  The love, then, is a love of “a purr and a/ pounce,” “the 
sledge that smashes the atom,” and it is a “love, bitterly contesting” (4: 175-
77).  
The dissonance that “leads to discovery” is replicated in the 
dissonance of the poet’s shift from the religious, and particularly, the 
scientific, to the economic.  Critics have debated the “frayed green thread” of 
economics and lamented its inclusion in the poem.  Indeed, Joel Conorroe 
contends that the passages on usury and Curie “comprise . . . the least 
successful poetic unit[s]” of Paterson – and are “unconvincing,” “repetitive,” 
“offensive” in tone and seriously undermine the artistic coherence of the 
poem (127-28).  Yet the point is the discovery that issues from this 
dissonance.  As Curie is “pregnant,” so does the poet offer a re-birth in 
economic and social relations by releasing the radiant gist of social credit.  
The social credit proposal for building more planes to win the cold war, for 
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instance, enables us to “ENFORCE THE CONSITUTION ON MONEY,” regenerating 
us by returning us to our original revolutionary purposes (4: 180, emphasis in 
original).  The primary gets released in a fashion that is more productive than 
the fire, wind, and flood that buffeted the poet in Book III: 
Money: Uranium (bound to be lead)
throws out the fire
the radium’s the credit – the wind in
the trees, the hurricane in the 
palm trees, the tornado that lifts
oceans .
And, the poet continues: 
Let out the fire, let the wind go!
Release the Gamma rays that cure the cancer
    . the cancer, usury.  Let credit
out . out from between the bars
before the bank windows
. credit stalled
in money, conceals the generative
that thwarts art or buys it (without
understanding), out of poverty of wit, to
win, vicariously. (4: 181-82)
“THE GIST/ credit   :   the gist,” the poet’s economic formulation, is 
tied back to the primary not simply by its relation to radium and Curie’s 
elemental discovery but also by Pound’s epistolary inquiry on democracy (4: 
184).   “IN/venshun./ O.KAY/ In venshun,” he asks – “and seeinz as how yu 
hv/ started.  Will you consider/ a remedy of a lot  :/ i.e., LOCAL control of 
local purchasing/ power” (4: 185).  Pound's question recalls the cryptic 
inquiry in Book III: “Doctor, do you believe in/ ‘the people,’ the Democracy?” 
(3: 109)  Local control, Paterson replies to Pound's question, represents the 
“[d]ifference between squalor of spreading slums/ and splendour of 
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renaissance cities” (4: 185).  The poet, then, posits a release of democratic 
energy – elemental and primary – that rejuvenates the promise of American 
democracy.  Finally, Paterson’s concluding five-line verse in section two links 
the primary and elemental in one other way – “Credit makes solid/,” he notes, 
“is related directly to the effort,/ work: value created and received,/ ‘the 
radiant gist’ against all that/ scants our lives” (4: 185).  The primary and the 
democratic come together now as the poet evokes a future with no 
“intermediate authorities,” no middle-men; there is only the poet and his 
aesthetic that compel our own direct participation.  The radiant gist of the 
primary element that Curie discovers finds its social correlate in credit and 
the artist's enterprise.  Both can regenerate the demos, and the latter, in 
particular, represents a standard of direct valuation in which worth is 
determined by effort, care and craftsmanship, and not by monetary motive or 
commercial transaction.
We have examined how Paterson variously applies Curie’s discovery 
through dissonance to rewrite credit and money affairs along democratic and 
affective lines.  Ehrens’ affective stance of Puritan withdrawal from, and 
exploitation of, the primary, including the masses, contrasts with Curie's 
stance and is rendered at several levels.  Williams believed, as captured in 
manuscript notes scribbled on early drafts of Paterson, that “No church has 
anything to do with religion; all are institutions for the regulation of men” (qtd. 
in Conorroe 122).  “Billy Sunday evangel/ and ex-rightfielder" in Book IV 
illustrates Williams' belief (4: 171-72).  Billy Sunday, we are told, is on “the 
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table now! Both feet, singing/. . . as paid for/  by the United Factory Owners’ 
Ass’n ./  . to ‘break’ the strike/ and put those S.O.Bs in their places, be/ 
Geezus, by calling them to God!” (4: 172).      
The poet also has other, more subtle, ways of exposing Ehrens’ 
affective stance and his religious language as complicit in economic interests 
and injustices.  In fact, Ehren’s Book II sermon reveals this complicity in the 
aesthetic construction of the text itself.  Playing again on the release effected 
by repeatedly transitioning between prose and verse, the poet composes an 
economic dialectic for the reader that sits at the very center of the preacher’s 
supposed sermon.  The essential dialectic resides in how the reader is 
compelled to rationalize the connection between Hamilton’s mercantile vision 
for the new country and Ehrens’ vision of working men and women giving 
away what little wealth they hold.  Far from being a “contrast," as Joel 
Conorroe suggests (121), Hamilton and Ehrens are fundamentally allied and 
their visions are of a piece.
Critics have had little difficulty in identifying Klaus Ehrens’ sermon in 
the park in Book II, aside from the Curie and credit section in Book IV, as the 
most sustained treatment of the economic theme in the poem.  Critics such 
as Bremen even allow that Ehrens may be complicit with “forms of power and 
exploitation” (167).  But they also miss, I believe, the essential congruity of 
Ehrens’ and Hamilton’s visions.  Thus, Bremen proceeds to suggest that 
Ehrens preaches his own “‘prosperity of poverty’ . . . to empower those who 
have no identification with the forms of power” of Alexander Hamilton (166).  
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Ehrens, then, cures “poverty by means of poverty” (166).  Marsh calls Ehrens 
“a sayer of irrelevant Old World truths” (Money 187).  While true, such 
statements do not pursue nearly far enough the ways in which Hamilton and 
Ehrens reinforce each other.  Flinn moves toward such a fuller reading when 
he observes that while “Ehrens’ vision is on the surface the antithesis of 
Hamilton’s, in that Ehrens wants to give money away” while Hamilton wants 
to tax and collect it, both actually espouse “centralized authority and control” 
(22).    
Hamilton and Ehrens’ complicity is exposed by the aesthetic 
construction of the text, by how it bounces the reader back and forth between 
sermon passages in which Ehrens essentially devalues wealth to passages 
depicting Hamilton’s efforts that seem at first to move in the contrary 
direction, to amass wealth – and found a national bank – for the new 
republic.  On the surface it seems that Ehrens wants us to give away our 
wealth and Hamilton wants us to give away our debts by having the new 
Federal government assume them.  Both programs appear intended to fulfill 
larger, even magnanimous, purposes.  But on closer inspection the 
animating forces suggest a deeper – and more disturbing – coherence.  
Hamilton’s vision reflects the fact that he “never trusted the people, ‘a great 
beast,’ as he saw them and held Jefferson,” the people’s representative, “to 
be little better if not worse than any” (2: 67).  Fittingly, the very point in the 
text at which Hamilton’s vision of a “national manufactury” based on 
exploiting the power of the Passaic Falls gets articulated, is preceded and 
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followed by the Lord’s radical injunction to Ehrens to “get rid of your/ money” 
(2: 69).  The poet, then, links from the very outset the mercantilist vision and 
people being hoodwinked to give away their money.  “Give away your 
money,” Ehrens quotes the Lord, “and I / will make you the richest man in the 
world!” (2: 70).  In the passages that follow, Ehrens parodies the language of 
economic devaluation or revaluation: “the riches” God gives him once he 
throws away his money “are beyond all counting. You can throw them / 
carelessly about you on all sides – and still/ you will have more.  For God 
Almightly has/ boundless resources . . . . There is no/ end to the treasures of 
our Blessed Lord” (2: 73, emphasis added).  Ehrens thus ironically converts 
God to the gold standard, and unwittingly reveals his own economic and 
social motives by debasing or betraying the very spiritual values he 
supposedly seeks to inculcate in the masses.  
By juxtaposing Ehrens’ economic characterization of basking in God’s 
spiritual light with an increasingly discursive and negative critique of the 
Federal Reserve, Paterson suggests in his textual construction the deceit 
that links both schemes.  The vision of boundless wealth that Ehrens argues 
will paradoxically belong to the working classes only by giving their money 
away is abruptly interrupted by the borrowed prose explication that exposes 
the banking and credit system as a usurious deceipt.  “The Federal Reserve,” 
we are told,
is a private . . . monopoly . . .  given to it by a spineless Congress . . . 
to issue and regulate our money . . . . They create money from nothing 
and lend it to private business . . . and also to the Government 
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whenever it needs money in war and peace; for which we, the people . 
. . must pay interest to the banks in the form of high taxes. (2: 73)  
Paterson further radicalizes the argument, informing the reader that “The 
Federal Reserve Banks constitute a Legalized National Usury System” (2: 
74).  The impact that this has on American citizens – as individuals and as 
members, for the most part, of the working class – is profound: “Every one of 
us is paying tribute to the money racketeers on every dollar we earn through 
hard work” (2: 74).  
The implications of the deceit shown to be inherent in Hamilton’s 
capitalist vision reverberate beyond the financial system, back to organized 
religion and Ehrens’ exhortations.  That is, the preacher’s vision of giving 
away our money to realize a greater spiritual recompense and all such 
idealized visions involving our money seem suspect.  This is especially so 
given the brick wall of cold prose reality regarding credit politics into which 
Ehrens’ vision, at its very poetic climax, slams.  The way in which the broader 
mercantile vision of Hamilton costs the individual on every dollar he earns 
corroborates our incipient skepticism about people taking our money.   
Suddenly Ehrens and others exhorting us to dispense freely of our money 
seem foolish, if not motivated by the same outright deceitful motives.  
Fleecing the individual and the public, then, are exposed as the 
deeper, more disturbing coherence between Hamilton’s capitalist and 
Ehrens’ allegedly religious vision.  Paterson applies the standard progressive 
critique of the Constitutional period and of the founding of the national bank 
that we would expect.  But so, too, does the poet reveal the underlying 
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affective stance of exploitation, fear, greed and withdrawal from the primary –
including the democratic – that animates both Hamilton’s explicitly economic 
vision and Ehrens’ seemingly spiritual vision.  The poet, near the conclusion 
of this section, neatly captures the retreat from the democratic impulse –
from the possibility of individual liberty and prerogative embodied in the 
revolutionary period and from the primary of the vulgar, sensual masses: 
“The bird, the eagle, made himself/ small  -- to creep into the hinged egg/ 
until therein he disappeared, all/ but one leg upon which a claw opened/ and 
closed wretchedly gripping/ the air” (2: 73).  The credit and banking system 
stand exposed as usurious.  The working classes – like Billy Sunday who, 
called in to break the strikers’ unity by “calling them to God,” gets “his 27 
Grand in the hotel room/ after the last supper (at the Hamilton)/ on the eve of 
quitting town” – can be said to live in the house Hamilton built (4: 172).  The 
working classes, then, are dispossessed, paying on every dollar to live out of 
Hamilton’s hotel.  As Hamilton exploits the power of the Passaic Falls, 
symbol of New World resources both for commerce and culture or language, 
he co-opts the language – and thereby the promise of the culture.  For the 
“common language” with which the poet opens Book I and seeks “to unravel . 
. ./ combed into straight lines/ from that rafter of a rock’s/ lip” stands revealed 
as anything but common – it is, regrettably, even painfully, exploited by the 
few at the expense of the many (1: 7).  The co- optation of the language and 
culture by economic interests, however, must be weighed against the entirety 
of Paterson's poetic enterprise.  Ultimately, Paterson not only chronicles his 
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discovery of where the stasis lodges, but enacts, through his stylistics, a 
release and regeneration for the poet and reader at levels both personal and 
social.
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Chapter VI:  Conclusion
We adjust our recollection to our needs and aspirations, and ask from it light on the 
particular problems that face us.  History, too, is in this sense not fixed and immutable, but 
ever changing.  Each age has a perfect right to select from the annals of mankind those 
facts that seem to have a particular bearing on the matters it has at heart.  
-- James Harvey Robinson, The New History (134-5)
Without invention nothing is well spaced,/ unless the mind change, unless/ the stars are new 
measured, according/ to their relative positions, the/ line will not change, the necessity/ will 
not matriculate: unless there is/ a new mind there cannot be a new/ line, the old will go on/ 
repeating itself with recurring/ deadliness.
-- William Carlos Williams, Paterson (2: 50)
[I]t is a method which processes its own user, who is also its only instrument.  It is self-
sharpening and what is sharpens is you.  In short, it does not organize materials, but 
transforms minds. 
-- Stanley, Fish, Self-Consuming Artifacts (425)
William Carlos Williams wrote, with Ezra Pound, T.S. Eliot, and others, 
the “poem including history.”  In Paterson and In the American Grain, 
Williams placed readers in the contested ground of history, in the dialectic 
between contact and withdrawal, touch and fear.  He named men who fought 
greed and usury “contemporaries, in whatever age they live or have lived” 
(Essays 167).  Historical terrain was transformed into an omnipresent 
contemporaneity by what James Longenbach calls the poet’s “imaginative 
reconstruction” of the past (18).  Williams’ poetic, then, comprised an 
“existential historicism” such as Longenbach identifies in other high 
modernists.  History was not “a deadening influence on the present,” but “a 
living part of the present that cannot be destroyed” (10).  History became, in 
Paterson and In the American Grain, as in The Waste Land and The Cantos, 
not “a sequence of events that occurred in the past” but rather a “function of 
the historian’s effort to understand the past in the present” (14).  This was 
249
how Williams and others “discover[ed] a vitalizing attitude toward history” and 
"forge[d] a life-enhancing attitude toward the past” (11-12).  It was how many 
modernist poets used history, and it was how Williams, in particular, 
prevented history from becoming “sheer regression or paralysis” – or what he 
called “stasis” (deMan 151).  
Williams knew that democracy required citizens actively engaged with 
the primary, with their own moment, independent of “all intermediate” or 
“unrelated authority.”  Williams' poetics, then, sought to animate the 
automatons he evoked at the start of Paterson by the poetic encounter with 
the past that he staged for the reader.  Reading, Williams hoped, would 
rouse the "unroused" – it would "leaven" Parrington's "sodden mass."  
Modern man, that Waldo Frank identified as having been “fathered by steel 
and broken by it” would no longer be “sucked void” (Frank 174, 171).  A 
“people turned debtor to its own affairs” would be released into fuller life 
(172-73).  Recognizing how Williams’ poetics encoded just this democratic 
imperative, means appreciating what Paul Mariani argued has been so much 
needed – a sense of "Williams' sense of American history" and an 
exploration of his relation to his contemporaries (Critics 243).  
Like his progressive contemporaries, Williams repeatedly 
characterized writing as an important part of his democratic program, 
comprising an “attack” against social stasis and capitalist inequities.  " All my 
life has been one steady bawling out from this old intimate," Williams 
confessed regarding Pound, "over my sluggishness in appreciating the 
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gravity of the world situation in the terms of his dialectic" (Autobiography
341).  "In many cases I can see the justice of his views," Williams 
acknowledged, "both in that particular, regarding the criminal abuse of the 
functions of money, as well as the place of the poem in our attack" (341).  
The poem as it is "[f]ormally" practiced "plays right into the hands of the 
criminals in charge of government that alone can compel obedience" (341).  
Williams meant that the conventional poem furthered, rather than challenged, 
conventional modes of thinking and existing social norms and hierarchies.  
The economic and social question, then, became an essentially aesthetic 
one.  The poet, using the right stylistic, was the only one who could 
regenerate society.  Williams argued the writers’ unique position in "Against 
the Weather," noting that "the economic imbecilities of the age are reflected 
in everything save the artist's judgments" (214).  The issue was, and must of 
necessity be, a matter of poetic form.  "[W]e do not see,” Williams declared, 
“that in the formalisms of the poem itself the criminal sits secure” 
(Autobiography 341).  “The poem (not ‘poetry,’ that sop) is the capsule where 
only, at times in the intelligence, the facts of the case may be made secure.  
Hence the hatred of the poem, the vicious and violent attempt to suppress it” 
(341)
The real power of Williams’ work, in fact, resided in how the very 
structure and stylistics of the writing itself enacted a release and relief from 
existing social and economic conditions, or, more accurately, from the 
affective stances that were found beneath the economics and that fed those 
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inequities.  "There is a good deal to say about money” (Essays 167), 
Williams observed, and a man or woman "can't be a poet without knowing 
about interest and money" (Interviews 51).  Williams’ poetics addressed 
these realities, leading a “basic attack” on the “secondary” or money culture.  
In particular, Williams animated the subject position of reader and 
writer.  He made the reader write his or her own subjective history, based, 
paradoxically, on inhabiting the subject position of representative figures of 
the past and of the poet himself as they confronted the primary and a 
secondary culture that would suppress it.  Williams’ aesthetic defended 
liberal democracy by compelling the reader to locate himself in relation to the 
conflicts and subjects of the past and, thus, to define his own subject-hood 
and agency.  This comprised the essence of his affective economics and 
participatory aesthetics.  Be it a series of dissonant encounters or romantic 
identifications with voluptuary representative figures, in Paterson or In the 
American Grain, respectively, the focus remained always on animating the 
poet's and reader's consciousness of the primary.  
It was for this purpose alone that the text may be said, paradoxically, 
to stage the reading and, even, the reader.  When Paterson inquired how to 
"move the mind" because there was "a poverty of resource," he spoke as 
much of, and to, the reader as to himself (4: 198).  Williams reflected, 
worriedly, in Paterson: "A marriage riddle: So much talk of the language –
when there are no/ ears" (3: 106).  But his poem including history was all 
about getting us to hear.  Williams staged the reader’s contact with primary 
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materials with an awareness that “‘meaning is an affair of consciousness,’” 
as reader-response critic Robert Crossman contends, and “an inference 
drawn by the construing mind, based upon probabilities” (155).  Williams 
placed and manipulated primary source material in an extremely disjunctive 
text just to engage maximally the reader’s consciousness, to pull him into 
“[t]ranslating” the text, making it his own (Crossman 152, emphasis in 
original).  
Williams, then, released "personality" or the "personal" element that 
other writers of subjective or imaginative histories, such as Waldo Frank, Van 
Wyck Brooks, V.L. Parrington, and D.H. Lawrence, argued was in serious 
jeopardy in a distinctly anti-liberal age.  Paterson may well represent "the 
search of the poet for his language,” but Williams forced the reader to seek 
with him in ways that the historians and literary critics simply could not, and 
made history a matter, ultimately, of experience not explication (MacGowan, 
Paterson xiii).  The reader finds himself in Paterson and In the American 
Grain – among "texts [that] mount and complicate themselves" –  navigating 
multiple layers of construction, meta-construction, and meta-meta 
construction.  If the famous formulation to "Make it new" characterized 
Williams' and Pound's vision, it is the reader who faces the “raw new” and the 
primary, repeatedly, in nearly every instant of reading.  In his textual 
encounters, the reader replicates the figure of the poet and even the 
historical representative figures that have preceded him.  Everything that has 
come before, both actual experience and text (for the poet and for the 
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reader), is dished up as raw material for narrative construction.  The reader 
responds – either by displaying the responsiveness of those representative 
figures the poet lauds, and of the poet himself, or by exhibiting withdrawal 
and fear.  
Williams’ repeated invocation of Pound’s economic beliefs make clear 
their shared project, as he jokes, to change America.  By contrast, Williams 
sharply differentiates himself over several decades from T.S. Eliot, calling the 
publication of The Waste Land nothing short of disastrous.  Williams, Pound, 
and Eliot studies, I believe, would be rewarded by further exploring their 
existential historicism.  How might Williams' affective economics and 
participatory aesthetic illuminate Pound's and Eliot’s oeuvre.  While Pound's 
and Eliot’s poetics may animate the reader's subject position by his 
encounter with historical figures and, perhaps, even the figure of the poet 
himself, it is less clear what the particulars of Williams' affective economics 
might reveal of these other poets’ work.  I would not contend that fear of the 
primary and secondary are found in Pound's and Eliot’s work in the same 
way.  While Pound surely sounds the theme of "usura," it may be revealing to 
consider if he (or Eliot) similarly historicized a stance of responsiveness and 
adaptation as Williams did through a series of representative figures enacting 
a binary of giving versus grabbing, sharing versus withholding.  Moreover, 
Pound’s and Eliot’s poetics may similarly demand that the reader construct a 
narrative out of extreme disjunctions in the context of a radically 
underdetermined aesthetic.  But it is not clear that their aesthetics are 
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participatory in some of the other fundamental ways that Williams’ work is.  It 
would be worth considering if Pound’s and Eliot’s poetry compel the same 
kind of identifications or dissonant encounters that Williams’ poetics do.  Can 
we say Pound’s or Eliot’s “poem including history” stages the reading and 
reader by taking him through a series of encounters and meta-encounters as 
Williams does?  And, finally, what are these other poets modeling?  The 
figures on which Williams would model himself as poet, and on which he 
would have the reader do the same, embody a stance of responsiveness and 
openness to the primary.  Pound’s and Eliot’s historical figures and 
fragments, by contrast, appear to represent a series of alleged “golden 
ages.”  Descent and adaptation, openness and touch, then, may be less the 
point for them, than a not-so-subtle nostalgia and clarity of outline.
If W.H. Auden concluded in “In Memory of W.B. Yeats” that “poetry 
makes nothing happen” (Collected Poems 197), Williams decided just the 
opposite, telling a correspondent in 1950 that the “poem is a social 
instrument” (Letters 286).  Williams’ aesthetic is a social instrument in that it 
processes the reader who is processing the poem.  Thus, Fish’s 
characterization of reader-response method as one that “processes its own 
user, who is also its only instrument” applies to Williams’ own aesthetic.  “It is 
self-sharpening and what it sharpens is you.  In short, it does not organize 
materials, but transforms minds" (Fish 425, emphasis in original).  The 
matter, then, really was an aesthetic one, and Williams hoped, as he said in 
Paterson, that "new line[s]" will create "new mind[s]” (2: 50). 
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With “new lines” and “new minds” come release and regeneration, an 
almost obstetric role for the poem.  The "usable past" becomes, finally, the 
stance of adaptation and responsiveness that Williams historicized in figures 
like Rasles, Boone, and, eventually, the poet himself.  Here, then, was 
democracy and renewal: the ability of individuals to respond as they wish, to 
decide for themselves “without intermediate authority.”  The poet illustrated, 
ultimately, what “descent,” “contact,” “touch,” and “marriage” looked like.  The
rest, he knew, was up to the reader.  
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